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   Abstract  
 
This study explored and assessed the challenges of regional integration in the Horn of Africa’s 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD, like all the other Sub-regional 
and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), is considered as the fundamental pillar for 
African development and continental economic integration. IGAD’s efforts integrate 
regionally is meant to address economic, social and political challenges by engaging and 
coordinating efforts of all the regional member states. The aim is to enhance regional 
development under the umbrella of the African Union. This study thus examined the challenges 
and opportunities of this initiative, its theoretical underpinnings and in the process explored the 
specific trajectories of IGAD to determine its role in the regional integration endeavor. By 
examining the above, this study explored IGAD’s institutional structures and arrangements, its 
programmes of action and implementation.  
 
In the main, two namely, the economic and security dimensions that have dominated IGAD’s 
agenda have remained the focal point of the study. Last part not least, this study probed into 
two cases of IGAD’s interventions that have been noticeable: the cases of Somalia and South 
Sudan. Thus, this study argues the successes achieved thus far remain rather ambivalent as 
manifested by the low and uneven positive outcomes. Arguably, this is due to the interplay of 
complex factors ranging from the political economy of global and regional dynamics, historical 
formation of the regional states and the geographical challenges in the IGAD region. In light 
of the above, this study recommends that the institutional capacity of IGAD and its members 
states needs not only to improve to meet developmental and security challenges but also to 
provide constructive and permanent solutions in the Horn of Africa.  
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Chapter One 
Researching IGAD and the Region 
  
1.1 Introduction: Background to the Study 
In recent years, the idea of regional integration in Africa which was largely informed by Pan-
Africanist ideology has found pragmatic political and material grounding. Many factors, such 
as intra and inter-states conflict, concerns over drought and famine, population movements, 
environmental changes and developmental challenges, have sustained the need for regional 
integration and cooperation on the continent. The number of regional economic agreements 
and negotiations both continentally and in the world at large attests to the fact that these issues 
continue to occupy a critical agenda on matters concerning inter-state cooperation (Geda and 
Kebret 2008:78; Gebregeorgis 2013:6; Hartzenberg 2011; Moravcsik 2005). As asserted by 
Hartzenberg (2011:19) “African countries have definitely contributed to the proliferation of 
regional trade agreements which are defining features of global economic governance in recent 
decades.” 
Notably, aspirations for regional integration have consistently emerged prominently as part of 
the regional agenda. Appropriating these as their product, many states in the continent have 
been fostering their regional agenda by engaging with supranational agencies and 
multilateralism. Thus, regional integration projects and cooperation in Africa have followed a 
similar trajectory to that of the experiments in other regions albeit having proven to be complex 
both in terms of the practices and processes. Due to the cultural and technological differences 
as well as the context and the forms of the state in Africa, regional integration as a project has 
become a daunting task. It is against this backdrop, therefore, that integrating the highest ethnic 
diversity and rich cultures, religions and languages under one umbrella is not an easy task. 
It is also notable that dealing with the growing concerns and challenges on achieving stability 
and security and the socio-economic development and sustainability of the continent has 
become crucial. African states have apparently not severed ties with their former colonial 
powers and states outside the region instead of forging new relations with their neighbours and 
immediate regions. For example, Qobo (2007:6) argues, on the one hand, that, 
…even though the vestiges of  Pan-Africanist ideology – with regard to its aim of creating 
economic enclaves insulated from the rest of the world – are still hard to dislodge in the 
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current integration process, there has been a growing crop of elite who is predisposed 
towards policies that are oriented outward. (Qobo 2007:6) 
 
On the other hand, outlining the historical background to regional integration, Omoro (2008:1) 
asserts that: 
Focusing [on] the case of regional integration in Eastern Africa, the cooperation starts 
as far back as the beginning of the 20th century. However, the inspiration for the 
establishment or strengthening of these arrangements, which have come to take the 
description of Regional Integration Institutions (RIIs) also known as Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs), was born out of the birth of the Abuja Treaty of the 
then Organization of African Unity (OAU).  
 
Earlier on, the Abuja Treaty signed in June 3, 1991 set the tone and aspiration for the 
establishment of economic community, regional industrial and trade zones and relations among 
African states.1 The main concern was promotion and establishment of economic, social and 
cultural development in the continent. It is within the context of the Abuja Treaty (and attendant 
aspirations) that many of the sub-regional organisations started to mushroom in the continent. 
Most of these organisations focused on economic integration albeit to a limited degree, with 
particular focus on sub-regional trade relations. What transpires from the foregoing explication 
is that economic integration and trade are elements of regional integration, which the 
continent’s elites were eager to institute (Economic Commission for Africa 2016c). 
The Abuja Treaty also establishes a roadmap comprising six stages for the establishment of a 
full-fledged African Economic Community. The first stage entails the establishment of 
Regional Economic blocks within 5 years from entry in this treaty into full effect (which was 
by 1999)2; the second stage entails the strengthening of the intra-REC (regional economic 
community) integration that was originally set to be complete in eight years, which by then 
would have been the year 2007. Stage three entailed the establishment of custom union and 
free-trade agreements and zones at the level of the regional economic communities which 
would have been achieved by 2017. This was to be followed by harmonisation of custom, tariff 
and common market as stage four in the continent which was to be achieved by 2019. Stage 
five is outlined as the most ambitious plan of all the setting up of the continent’s economic and 
monetary union (including the establishment of single currency and pan-African parliament) 
which is to be achieved by 2023. The final stage is treated as the transitional period for full 
continental integration with both economic, monetary and political union, to be achieved by 
2028 (see Article 6 of the Abuja Treaty 1991).  
                                                 
1 Organisation of African Union (1991) Treaty Establishing African Economic Community. June 3rd, 1991, 
Abuja, Nigeria.  The rest of the discussion draws from this document.  
2 This treaty was ratified and entered into force in 1994. 
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It should be noted that most of the deadlines for this ambitious proposal have come and gone 
with less than 10 years left from the original proposal of a full union by 2028. What we have 
as a result of this push, however, are the existing sub-regional economic communities and sub-
regional organisations along with the establishment of African Union in its current form. What 
is evident in this document is the unwavering trust on economic integration and asserting this 
as fundamental to achieving the objectives of the proposed union.  
Although less years from the original ten years are left to its proposed final stage, the trade of 
African states trade within and among themselves is still weak. For example, “some of the 
fastest growing countries in the world are African countries, including Angola and Ethiopia” 
as their import-export trade and investment volumes are by far stronger with the West and 
China (Economic Commission for Africa 2016c). These countries’ economies have grown 
exponentially in tandem with their trade with and economic ties with China and the West. 
Despite being a major priority area of all RECs, trade integration within the boundaries of the 
continent has seriously lagged behind. A typical example in this regard is the Community of 
Sahel–Saharan States (CEN-SAD) in the regional integration index developed by the Economic 
Commission for Africa (2016). In this regional integration index, out of 29 countries listed as 
members of CEN-SAD, only 8 countries show a score above 50 points on trade integration and 
only 7 states on the overall score for integration (Economic Commission for Africa 2016a)3.  
Similarly, Arvis et al (2015:463) point out that trade integration is weak while the cost of trade 
is the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa by comparison to the rest of the world. This is arguably 
indicative of the fact that the transformation of regional integration still lags behind despite the 
potential benefits.  
The growth and development of trade and economic process in the region should have boosted 
African economies and thus alleviated poverty. Notably,  much has been invested in this regard 
over the last three decades and this is attested to by the establishment of NEPAD, the eight 
RECs, ECA, African Development Bank to mention but a few. However, as Akonor (2018:33) 
puts it, the African economic integration project and the various institutions established to this 
                                                 
3 The score is developed using 5 indicators: trade integration, regional infrastructure, productive integration, free 
movement of people, and financial and macro-economic integration. The member states for CEN-SAD score 
lower on the average score for trade integration, regional infrastructure, and productive integration are very low. 
Average score of financial and macro-economic integration shows (0.524), which is certainly skewed by former 
French colonies, whose monetary and financial policies are still coordinated and influenced by France. All the 
countries that score high in this dimension are all former French colonies – Niger (1), Burkina Faso (0.982), 
Senegal (0.981), Chad (0.976), Mali (0.969), Togo (0.968), Cote d’Ivoire (0.964), Benin (0.952), Central 
African Republic (0.939), and Guinea-Bissau (0.820); it then drastically drops to score of below 0.5 (see 
Economic Commission for Africa, Integration Index Report 2016a:41).   
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end “have faced numerous challenges which, despite showing progress, have nevertheless been 
troubled.” For Akonor (2018) the tension and contradiction are in developing clear collective 
economic and foreign policy that is responsive and adaptive to the conditions set by the global 
political economy. In this regard, Akonor (2018) points out to the weakness of the extent of the 
African states’ economic integration and the institution Africans established in response to the 
contemporary challenges of the global market and the dynamics of the global political 
economy.   
The troubling scenario is that African trade and investment with the world through the 
movement of goods, services, capital and people are thriving while the same cannot be said 
about trade within countries on the continent. Additionally, tensions deriving from political 
and social problems within and across the states are not addressed without the mediation and 
direct involvement of Western (former colonial) powers regardless of the fact that the African 
Union has declared “an African solution to African problems” and has adopted this as its motto.   
This study, therefore, explored the aspirations, practices, successes and challenges of regional 
integration as defined by the core values of strategic partnership to strengthen political, cultural, 
trade and economic interactions and exchange within the African continent. It is noted though 
that despite its rhetoric and political currency, regional economic integration at the continental 
level has proven to be a protracted process. Since effective regional integration and co-
operation rely on the level of peace and security of the member states which are increasingly 
understood as essential conditions, there is need to probe into this aspect of integration. Thus, 
it is against this backdrop, therefore, that this study sought to take stock of the existing 
experiments and initiatives while closely examining the trajectories, challenges and 
opportunities they present. 
The vast variations in context and contradictions in different regions of the continent make it 
difficult to engage in an array of regional integration initiatives and projects. For this reason, 
(and others, which I will point out shortly), this study focuses on the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD as an East African regional initiative presents an 
interesting case in terms of its aspirations and objective realities, compositions, contradictions 
and pressing demands. Geographically, it is located in a region wrought with inter-state 
conflicts, tensions and competitions, intra-state troubles and severe fault lines (in some cases 
failed states – Somalia and South Sudan, for example). These objectives were to “achieve 
regional cooperation and economic integration through the promotion of food security, 
sustainable environmental management, peace and security, intra-regional trade and 
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development of improved communications and infrastructure” (IGAD 2016b:33). Byiers 
(2016:iv) writes, stressing the importance of integration at the sub-regional level by arguing: 
IGAD is an AU-acknowledged regional economic community (REC) … targeting the 
establishment of African Economic Community (AEC) under the AEC Treaty thus involving 
a commitment to initiate a Free Trade Area (FTA) and forming regional integration to enhance 
infrastructure and transport development in the region. Economic integration in the region 
makes an interesting case study given the wide variation in economic policy approaches and 
challenges among member states, their limited economic complementarity, and the fact that 
most are also pursuing economic integration through other RECs.  
Notably, the Horn of Africa is fraught with both intra/inter-state conflicts and tensions and is 
ravaged by civil war with two failed states devastated by war. It is also a region enduring 
multiple border disputes which have become a growing concern because of lack of trust and 
stability among the states concerned. The most prominent of these conflicts among IGAD 
member states are the Ethiopia and Eritrea border conflicts of 1998-2000 and the ensuing no-
peace-no-war situation/tension, the Djibouti-Eritrea conflicts of 1995 and 2008, and the 2012 
border conflicts between Sudan and South Sudan (all of them still unresolved and rather 
festering) (IGAD 2016a). Somalia and South Sudan are facing serious internal conflicts causing 
havoc. 
Map 1. The Map of IGAD Nations 
                     
Source:https://www.integrate-africa.org/rankings/regional-economic-communities/igad/  (accessed 
20 November, 2019) 
Notably, IGAD has multiple advantages, which have the potential of laying a foundation for 
its regional integration initiatives and these range from informal and indigenous cross border 
trades, cross border ethnic and cultural ties, cross border environmental problems and shared 
resources, for example, rivers and lakes. The challenge, however, is how to identify and build 
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on these and other relations and nodes to promote and develop regional integration. 
Additionally, it is also crucial to closely consider that the bilateral relations among members in 
the sub-region are growing significantly towards achieving African regional economic 
cooperation and integration (Abraham 2008; Economic Commission for Africa 2015; Uzodike, 
2009; Verhoeven 2011). 
Thus, it is worth underlining the fact that this study sought to explore and assess how under 
these conditions member states in the IGAD region could/should act collectively not only to 
bring about sustainable peace and security but also to promote socio-economic development 
and social progress in the region. So, the pertinent questions raised herein were: What are the 
potentials, capacities, and limits of IGAD as an organisation while dealing with the above 
issues and problems? What role can (and should) it play under such conditions? What are the 
specific advantages and disadvantages of IGAD’s regional integration agenda? Who is driving 
it and towards what ends? 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
 IGAD as REC faces multiple and complicated challenges. Thus far, the IGAD region has failed 
not only to peacefully settle intra-state and inter-state conflicts but also to maintain regional 
peace and security (Dersso 2014). In fact, many consider IGAD as the weakest of the eight 
RECs recognised by the AU (Bereketeab 2018). Despite its unique characteristics, IGAD’s 
challenges are symptomatic of the broader challenges of regionalization and regional 
integration in Africa. By definition, regionalization “refers to the grouping of nations within a 
common geographical location with the view of strengthening cooperation and sharing as a 
strategy for achieving socio-economic development” (Danso 1995:36). Thus, initiatives on 
African’s inter-state integration (both sub-regionally and continentally) must be viewed in line 
with such a regionalization thrust. Notably, regional integration is an identification process in 
which one state merges with other states forging a regional agreement to achieve economic 
development based on goals through promoting regional cooperation (Abraham 2008; 
Hartzenberg 2011; Ketema 2013; Nita 2013; Sehoole and de Wit 2014). It is notable, though, 
that despite the growing economy of African states, inter-regional and inter-state economic 
exchanges and trades remain very marginal. Thus, the transformation of regional integration 
remains a challenge to Africa (Vanheukelom 2016).  
Sekhu (2011:9-10) points out that “regional integration is a critical step towards ensuring 
stability and fostering economic development in the African continent”. It is notable, however, 
that Sekhu is referring to the following positive outcomes of regional integration: ensuring 
stability and security, the expansion of economic space and the liberalisation of trade which in 
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turn enable production inputs available at prices that are more competitive. These collective 
outcomes are expected to be mutual benefits for states entering such a configuration. For 
example, growth is possible by increasing the cost of production to be more efficient and 
creating effective opportunities for diversification of economies. This is very important for the 
long-term sustainability  of these economies in this increasingly ‘globalising and globalised 
world’ as this makes these economies more robust to international economic fluctuations and 
thereby offer them access to market expansion through the reduction of institutional costs and 
reduction /elimination of tariffs.   
Notably, most of the leaders in Africa, have had very few accomplishments in their regional 
integration and socio economic developmental process for the continent (Qobo 2007). Thus, it 
can be argued that while African leaders have failed on the domestic front, their efforts to 
achieve regional integration at the continental level has always been shadowed by such poor 
performances. This fact notwithstanding, regional integration enables the cutting out of 
institutional and material costs and fosters economic growth which can propel these countries 
to engage in a serious development path (Hawdon 1997; Mistry 2000; Nita 2013). It is also 
notable that regional integration in Africa is conceptualised from the political and geographical 
perspectives and its process and conditions are determined by these factors. Moreover, the 
culture of a political decision making process in Africa either targets how to keep the leaders 
in the office for long or how to get rid of the opponents from any kind of engagement through 
democratic processes. Despite some of the IGAD’s region states showing economic growth, 
the democratic transition of power through fair and free elections remains a nightmare.      
States in Africa are fragmented and are characterised by multiple contradictions and 
weaknesses. Much of this is to be attributed to colonially constructed and imposed national 
borders that have little relationship with the ethnic, cultural and religious configurations of the 
respective countries. As a consequence of such colonial instrumentation of borders, many 
countries have been established as small and/or landlocked markets. The dominant explanation 
for Africa’s poor economic performance focuses on the state-centred approaches to 
development which are driven by the desire to sustain these locked markets (Acharya 2012; 
Niekerk 2005)4. As part of the colonial legacy and due to demographic shifts, the salience of 
ethnicity, tribalism and languages still constitute the biggest challenges for postcolonial 
African states as frustrate intra-national integration. In turn, these concerns have often 
                                                 
4 What is even more troubling is that these locked market sought to sustain themselves by sustaining the links – 
both political and economic ones – created by the colonial powers, skipping their immediate neighbours.  
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influenced and framed initiatives of building a coherent regional body in the continent. This is 
to suggest that it is out of such concerns that the states seek integration on the basis of the 
political ideology and real politics with the impulsive desire to sustain state boundaries rather 
than the socio-economic imperatives and developmental potentials (Geda and Kebret 2008). 
Aside from the above claim, regional integration efforts in Africa are often tools that are meant 
to deal accordingly with the continent’s problems and challenges as a collective process. Some 
have pointed fingers at Africa’s elites claiming that they are obsessed with the weak set of 
pressing matters with few truthful and sincere efforts towards the dream of Africa’s economic 
development (Hawdon 1997; Øhrgaard 1997; Qobo 2007; Sehoole and de Wit 2014). The 
historical legacy of African countries has become an excuse for the absence of successful 
regional bodies on the continent. Because of lack of proper, well integrated and sustained 
development strategies, African countries within the postcolonial trajectories have not 
succeeded in the nation building, growth and development enterprise. This is certainly an 
outcome of both internal and external dynamics – failures and mismanagements of postcolonial 
leaders and their practices while in power as well as the postcolonial powers’ sustained and 
systematic interference, abuse and exploitation.  
According to Vanheukelom (2016), the success of regional economic integration in Africa is 
mixed and it becomes difficult to measure it alongside common goals because of the different 
processes of economic development and political conditions of each country (see also 
Economic Commission for Africa 2016c; Hartzenberg 2011; Hawdon 1997). Sub-regional 
integration initiatives are also to be considered within this frame. When weighing the process 
of regional integration initiatives in the Horn of Africa, one encounters multiple fragile states, 
with weak economy and internal political instabilities and dependence on Western powers. 
Such observations have led some to point out that the fundamental factors that contribute to 
success for regional integration in Africa are political and economic liberalization and sound 
macro-economic reforms that are meant to address the above problems. For example, 
Mshomba (2000) argues that it is not only because of the absence of common political values 
in the Horn of Africa (such as democratic political culture) that the growing instability 
emerged. It is also because of a lack of appropriate governance and political liberalization that 
have been noted as impediments to the possibilities of improved and growing integration 
(Mshomba 2000). 
It is well understood that Africa’s regional integration lags behind to bear substantive results 
of improving the socio-economic conditions and the wellbeing of its people (Mshomba 2000).  
This situation thus elicits the following important questions: What is the core reason for that? 
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What remains to be the main challenges? Can integration schemes at sub-region level be 
realized? What conditions needed to be met in order to achieve this? If not, what factors 
constitute as obstacle and how could these be overcome?  
These questions relate to the regional body IGAD. The establishment of IGAD  goes back to 
the regional challenges of the mid 1980s of drought, environmental crisis and associated 
challenges  of famine and food security which led to the formation of the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in 1986 (IGAD 1996; Bereketeab 2012: 
173). In the 1990s, this organisation evolved into its current form as IGAD which has “widened 
its scope and mandate with its transformation to IGAD in 1996” (Byiers, 2016:iv). This 
organisation is constitutive of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, 
Somalia and Kenya. IGAD, therefore, aims to widen the regional agenda to deal with all the 
challenges of the region and member states. It is along with such expansion of IGAD’s mandate 
that the organisation gained recognition as one of RECs and incorporated into AU’s (the then 
OAU’s) structures (Bereketeab 2012). IGAD reconfigured with the new mandates to deal with 
conflict prevention, economic cooperation, and regional integration (IGAD 2010).  
As early as the 1990s, the IGAD region has been (and is still) playing a crucial role in the 
mediation and peace processes in the region and in peacekeeping beyond the region (IGAD 
2016b). The varying level of success which focuses on economic policy and other related areas 
committed to it and a better understanding of key indicators and constraints is illustrative of 
the challenges besetting IGAD’s region (IGAD 2016a). IGAD has authority to promote the 
Horn of Africa’s economic cooperation and integration agenda dealing with huge areas 
characterised by many activities. Some of its target markets involve “cooperation on 
macroeconomic policies; free movement of goods, services, and people; regional food security; 
drought resilience; complementary infrastructures, peace and stability in the sub region; 
programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields which are the challenges facing 
the relatively young institution in a region characterised by long-running inter and intra-state 
conflicts, rivalries, alliances and anti-alliances and members with varying political settlements 
and capacities to govern” (IGAD 2016b:23). 
Arguably, major social and environmental challenges still become an influence with wide range 
of internal and external interests (IGAD 2016a). Thus, this study probed into the main political-
economic actors and factors that determine how IGAD sets and implements its agenda in the 
Horn of Africa (IGAD 2016a). It is this probing that set the tone for much of the inquiry of this 
study. This, in turn, forced us to focus specifically on peace, security and stability and 
specifically on socio-economic integration with specific reference to the social, cultural, 
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historical and institutional factors and outlining all the member states’ roles and engagement 
within the Horn of Africa region (IGAD 2016a). 
Against  the backdrop of the above identified problems, this study began with the following 
objectives: to examine the challenges and opportunities of the regional integration initiatives 
in the Horn of  Africa; to assess the political economy of regional integration and associated 
rhetoric and practices; to interrogate the nature and process of institution-making as driver of 
regional economic integration and the role of the nation-state in Africa; and to explore the role 
of IGAD in dealing with socio-economic and political challenges and problems in the Horn of 
Africa.  
1.3 Aim of the Study 
 This study explored and examined the complexities, challenges and encounters of IGAD as 
one regional integration initiative and factors that shape its processes and practices. This study 
interrogated and addressed the question of whether IGAD as a regional integration initiative 
has a significant role to play in both security matters and development and thus reflect on its 
challenges, opportunities and their implications for future directions. This study thus sought to 
assess how this regional initiative set out to achieve these objectives and the mechanisms it put 
in place to this end.  
1.4 Research Questions 
Following the above overarching aims and an intent to engage with them, this study set out to 
explore the following central research questions: 
(a) What is the nature and challenges of integration in the Horn of Africa where IGAD is 
situated?  
(b) How have such challenges and forms of integrations lend themselves to and for   
sustainable economic growth and stability on the region?  
(c) What does IGAD’s institutional-making processes, challenges and opportunities look 
like?  
(d) How about its rhetoric and practices?  How has IGAD performed in its integration 
project in the Horn of Africa?  
(e) What are the ways in which this initiative informs and work towards regional peace, 
stability and good governance in that sub region?   
 
It should be noted that IGAD’s region is war torn with multiple interstate and intrastate 
conflicts. This is exacerbated by the division of multi ethnic and religious groups that tend to 
shape political loyalties in their societies. These are also demographic features that straddle 
across states and multiple boundaries thus adding complexity to the regional order (Tekle 
1996). These have to be read within the context of multiple border disputes and related wars 
that have become the main factors for distrust and instability among the member states of the 
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region. Arguably, the reference is to the Ethiopian-Eritrea, the Djibouti-Eritrea, Ethiopia-
Somalia, Sudan-Ethiopia and Sudan–South Sudan are some of conflicts on the IGAD member 
states (Bereketeab 2018). These problems are compounded by the regional states’ poor human 
rights records, shoddy governance and fragile democratic institutional processes and culture.  
Arguably, the IGAD’s region has tremendous potential in terms of both natural and human 
resources which can propel the region toward self-reliance. This fact notwithstanding, the 
IGAD region remains one of the world’s poorest regions. According to the World Bank data 
of 2013, IGAD’s regional “per capita income is much lower than the Sub-Saharan African 
average of US$1, 624” (IGAD 2016a:14). According to IGAD 2019 report, the IGAD’s per 
capita income is $935. It is arguably for this reason that security and economic development 
appear to be the major agenda items of this organisation. This study thus assessed how this 
regional initiative set out to achieve these objectives and the mechanisms it put in place to this 
end. 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of this study were as follows: 
(a) To examine the challenges and opportunities of the regional integration initiatives in 
the Horn of Africa;  
(b) To assess the political economy of regional integration and associated rhetoric and 
practices;  
(c) To interrogate the nature and process of institution-making as driver of regional 
economic integration and the role of the nation-state in Africa; and  
(d) To explore the role of IGAD as one REC in dealing with socio-economic and political 
challenges and problems in the Horn of Africa.  
 
1.6 Justification of the Study 
In the Horn of Africa, it has been a monumental task for IGAD to achieve peace, security, 
economic development and stability. The organisation claims that it has recorded several 
achievements since its establishment making reference to what it claims “effective and efficient 
mechanisms, networks, processes, specialized institutions and partnerships among member 
states for the execution of its regional activities” (IGAD 2016a). Such a claim is also 
accompanied with rhetoric of success and regional initiatives. It is thus important to weigh 
these claims and rhetoric and counter them with formidable challenges and multiple festering 
and debilitating problems the region faces.  
This study area is relevant and timely given the fact that Africa is trying to promote its regional 
integration process in accordance with the Abuja Treaty. As indicated by Madyo (2008:8), 
“there are still outstanding issues that need to be addressed and recognized by African states, 
12 
 
individually and collectively in order to make this process more progressive and in an  
achievable way”. 
The findings generated from this study were expected to enhance understanding profoundly 
and deal also with the overall dynamics of how regional integration works with the experience 
of the East African region integration process as the focal point. This is of great significance to 
academics in general and academic researchers in particular in that it increases the body of 
knowledge production. This leads to a larger pool of academic material on regional integration 
resulting into a better understanding. To this effect, the study aimed for an African specific 
model of integration. The findings, therefore, do not only draw insight into the working of 
IGAD, but also help in projecting what specific economic effects this has to the integration 
states. The study also aimed to share and identify the importance of regional integration and to 
pinpoint potential state weaknesses that threaten socio-economic stability in the IGAD region. 
Since much of the literature on the topic tended to concentrate more on the role of IGAD in the 
Horn of Africa, the study expanded knowledge and literature covering analysis of the regional 
integration process in IGAD’s region.  
1.7 Significance of the Study 
This study sought to examine IGAD as one of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
established within the context of Abuja Treaty outlining a road map for full African integration. 
The results of this study relate to the broader debate and inquiry on this regional/sub-regional 
economic integration initiatives in the African continent. It also offers critical insight into the 
role of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) towards sustainable socio-
economic development in the Horn of Africa. The main aim of the institutions is to bring 
effective social, economic and political integration among Africa’s states with the core 
objective of promoting economic growth and thus strengthen the prosperity of the African 
peoples (Omoro 2008). In light of this, this study raises interesting and pertinent questions on 
how the African integration projects have been moving so far towards sustainable and thriving 
economic and political processes and their challenges and opportunities. While engaged with 
these broader questions, this study sought to account for their complexities by assessing 
IGAD’s existing programmes, charters and policy initiatives. The result of this study shows 
the gaps, understanding and contributions of individuals and institutions for further studies in 
the area and use it as literature for reference purposes on related studies. The effective regional 
integration and co-operation on the level of peace and security on the member states is 
extremely essential. The study assesses how member states in the IGAD region have worked 
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as a group to maintain peace, security and stability, and towards economic development and 
social progress of the IGAD region. It should be acknowledged from the outset that security 
and regional economic development in IGAD have featured as central components of this study 
for they represent IGAD’s prominent agenda.  
1.8 Research Methodology and Methods 
It is often the preference of any given state to subject its considerations to the economy, politics 
and the social or geographical considerations as a regional bloc. Therefore, each country, 
depending on the benefits of integration determines and considers the degree of sovereignty it 
is willing to surrender (Mwendwa 2014). In order to do this, this study considered the 
foundation of historical development of IGAD and examined the issues of stability, promotion 
of economic development, peace and security in the Eastern region. Following this, the 
qualitative approach was used to explore and examine the above noted issues in relation to 
IGAD as a regional integration experiment and its associated discourses. This approach was 
considered appropriate for this study for it generated insight and understanding confronting the 
region and IGAD as an organization.    
The Horn of Africa is culturally and religiously diversified as any other region of Africa (Tekle 
1996). However, each state of the region shares common characteristics with other states. Thus, 
this study explored the diverse social, political and public policy issues in this regional 
integration initiative and also interrogated and unpacked the challenges of regional integration 
in the Horn of Africa. Thus, the major preoccupation of this study has been three fold: one, 
structure and organisation form of IGAD; two, its economic objectives and programmes as 
REC; and three, its engagement with peace and security.  The latter two major initiatives it 
took since its inception namely the intervention in the Somalia and South Sudan conflicts 
received particular attention.  
This study adopted the qualitative approach since the questions raised in this study could only 
be dealt with through reviewing multiple documents, policy frameworks, public 
pronouncements and published material of IGAD. Thus, as a qualitative research, the 
objectives of this study leans more towards generating insights rather than measuring 
relationships between variables (Newman 2011). It should also be noted that this study as a 
case study, focused on IGAD’s role in regional integration in the Eastern Africa. Notably, case 
studies in social science research in particular are quite advantageous as they allow researchers 
to examine a particular area and use it as a representation of the situation of a greater area. 
There are four reasons why IGAD was chosen as a case study. Firstly, IGAD was chosen as 
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one of the eight RECs established in line with the Abuja Treaty road map in order to explore 
the broad issues of regional integration and regionalism. The second consideration is the fact 
that IGAD is located in this complex and troubled region which makes it an interesting case 
study. The third reason was based on the consideration that IGAD has a limited mandate and 
has often confined itself to specific programmes of actions and interventions (Bereketeab 
2018). Last but not least was the obvious one: the familiarity of the researcher with this region 
as an individual from Ethiopia.  
Thus, qualitative data was collected on IGAD from the existing data sources and the focus was 
on the overall aspects of the integration framework. Additionally, document analysis was used 
for the main data collection instrument for this study. As a desktop research, purposive 
sampling, as a strategy of selecting documents and materials to be reviewed, was more 
appropriate. Purposive sampling is a well-known strategy in a qualitative research. According 
to Cohen et al (2011:156) “researchers hand-pick the cases to be included in the sample on the 
basis of their judgment of their possession of the particular characteristics being sought”.  
In order to produce insight and deeper understanding on IGAD, quantitative data was collected 
on IGAD from existing data sources focusing on the overall process of the regional integration 
framework. For the large part, the main data collection instrument used was reviewing and 
collecting documents and texts. The researcher himself collected the data following multiple 
sources. Since this research raised questions on issues and particular problems in relation to 
IGAD as a regional institution, the data came directly from the organisation’s records, 
including its charters and official records, media statements by its representatives, etcetera.  
The IGAD documents included policies, proclamations and publications used to describe 
policy issues and regional integrations framework in the Horn of Africa. Also, this study made 
use of other publicly available statements of diplomats, state officials of member states, and 
media analysis etcetera. Therefore, the study-focused data from public documents were 
analysed to derive inferences from the findings. The study also made use of secondary data 
from various sources peer reviewed journals, books, articles, news (both printed and 
broadcast).  
For purposes of clarity, this study categorised the data sources as primary and secondary 
sources of data that are primarily of a qualitative nature: texts, documents, charters, news 
bulletins and etcetera. The primary sources of data constituted the documents from the 
organisation itself, the various speeches made by its representatives, the media briefings, policy 
documents and charters it published, etcetera. The secondary sources of data represent what 
other authors/researchers collected, appropriated and used for their own work, which may or 
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may not have direct relation with this study (Newman 2011). This study thus relied on 
secondary data and reviewed already published materials, data and the source of information 
included books, journal articles and other materials published online examining IGAD’s 
regional efforts, policy documents and regional integrations in the region.  
Data collected was analysed through content analysis which is a critical examination and a 
measurement of sifting and interrogation of the publicly or privately collected information 
related to the issue under investigation. The actual collection process itself was significantly a 
guide towards content analysis. What this means is that analysis of the data took place even 
while collecting the data necessary for this research. The rationale for content analysis lies in 
its role in methodological and data triangulation, the immense value of documents in case study 
research, and its usefulness as a stand-alone method for specialised forms of qualitative 
research (Bowen 2009). Understandably, content analysis may be the only necessary data 
source for studies designed within an interpretive paradigm, as it may simply be the only viable 
source as in historical and cross-cultural research. In some sense, this study has the element of 
historical research, not by design but by necessity of doing the actual research, pulling the 
researcher into collecting and examining over the last three decades. This has often offered this 
research the opportunity to assess trajectories, through exploring the past and current 
developments. The study attempted to trace the regional integration challenges and prospects 
within the framework of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).     
1.9 Structure of the Dissertation     
This study is organised into seven chapters and the demarcation is as follows:    
Chapter One – This chapter introduces the study in its entirety.  It provides the background 
and problem statement, objectives, significance of the study and methodology in relation to 
IGAD’s challenges and rhetoric in the Horn of Africa region. This chapter deals with the 
introduction of the dissertation by outlining the research problem and issues/themes 
investigated. This chapter also offers the historical background to the problem as part of the 
effort to outline and delineate the research question. This chapter also discussed the 
methodology and the methods of the data collection process outlined. 
Chapter Two - This chapter brings together the key theoretical arguments related to regional 
integration. It reviews the literature that is relevant and theoretical framework in the IGAD’s 
region and probes into the regionalization and cooperation of legitimate structures. The study 
drew insights from two theories: Regional Cooperation and Inter-governmentalism and 
explored how these theories fit to the challenge and successes of within Inter Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD). This chapter reviews the literature on regional integration, 
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the process of integrations, regional agreements, regional institution making. This chapter aims 
to look the IGAD conceptual and theoretical aspects of the topic at international, continental, 
and regional levels. 
Chapter Three – This chapter analyses the historical background of Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD). Specific attention paid to the institutional structure and 
strategic framework, the peace and security strategy and the main four pillars discussed. This 
chapter examines the ways in which the organisation set is priorities, programme of actions 
and measures their success.   
Chapter Four – This chapter deals on the IGADS’s economic integration projects and 
explored initiatives and assessed their performances. This chapter, therefore, focuses only on 
two programme areas of Pillar 2: trade, investment, industry and tourism development 
programme and the infrastructural development programme.   
Chapter Five - This chapter deals s the Somalia and South Sudan conflicts as a case study 
outlined. In this chapter, IGAD’s interventions in, and initiatives, to deal with these crises is 
explored. IGADS’s role for peacekeeping mission in Somalia and South Sudan and role of 
regional and global actors (including the UN) for mediation and peace and stability in the 
region are examined and discussed.  
Chapter Six – This chapter analyses the main challenges of IGAD. Through data collections, 
analysis of different themes and analytical categories which include political challenges, 
security challenges, economic and social challenges and structural challenges that how affect 
the war torn region. Specially, the intra- and interstate conflicts are assessed to examine how 
peace and security issues have become the biggest challenge in the region.  
Chapter Seven – The final chapter offers summary and conclusion to the dissertation and 
recommendations based on the findings obtained. 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Introduction  
 This chapter provides a general overview of the theoretical framework in the context of 
developing countries. Michel (2012:3) states, “the core driving force behind African integration 
starts in the 1950s and 1960s was the Pan African movement calling for independence of 
African states and the end of colonialism”. This means that a transnational elite pushing for 
regional cooperation supported this ideologically driven movement. The main actors involved 
in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which is now the African 
Union (AU) and the African Economic Community, among others, were states officials 
strategizing their determinations both on Pan African identity and on the expanding of 
individual states and regional gains (Michel 2012).  
Thus, this chapter provides a general overview of the theoretical framework and conceptual 
choices necessary to explore the context of IGAD’s activities and its overall regional 
integration projects.  In the case of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in particular, de Melo and Tsikata 
(2013) note that “the RECs were to be the ‘building blocs’ of the hoped-for African union in 
the immediate postcolonial era. Hence, they are now central for implementing the socio- 
economic and security in the region”.  de Melo and Tsika’s (2013) propositional argument 
outlines how the Horn of Africa needs to identify current economic growth inclusive of socio-
economic development. In addition to sustaining and improving business environment, good 
political and economic governance and management, social development strategies that are 
consistent with the needs of the industrial and modern sectors are required. Conducive socio-
economic conditions, peace and security as well as political will are equally important to ensure 
that Africa’s structural transformation can effectively take place (Economic Commission for 
Africa 2015:9).  
This chapter argues that the process of African regional integration initiatives are best 
understood by framing them within multi-level governance theoretical approaches. As the 
chapter outlines, the premise to this is the assertion that these two theories are better placed to 
explain the dynamics, processes and conditions of regionalism. The chapter argues that 
notwithstanding the enormous diversity and wide circulation of theories on model of European 
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integration, wholesale application of these to account and guide a sub-regional integration 
project of vast and diverse IGAD’s region is problematic.  
2.2 Conceptual Appropriations: Regionalism, Regional cooperation and Integration 
 As an overarching concept and practice, regionalism has become prominent a feature of 
contemporary world politics and various regions of the world.  According to Nye (1968: vii), 
regionalism refers to “the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of 
regions and in the doctrinal sense it entails advocacy of such formations.” Such a conception 
of regionalism thus entails an ideological form that promotes such grouping within a region 
which is the basis for the formation of formal structures /institutions to facilitate common 
objectives. As an ideology, it has spread through the processes of diffusion and the necessity 
of mechanisms for interdependent decision-making in response to factors in the region and 
beyond (Börzel 2015). For Cantori and Spiege (1970:6-7) the idea of regionalism is based on 
“geographical proximity, common bonds (historical, social, cultural, ethnic and linguistic), a 
sense of identity and international interactions” as defining features for common destiny.   
According to Michel (2012), regional cooperation as a project and a concept progressed out of 
necessity to increase the production of coal and steel resulting in the emergence of the 
‘European Coal and Steel Community’ in 1951 and this culminated into the ‘Rome Treaties’ 
in 1957. Regional cooperation, as a theoretical approach, captures how the nation/state 
becomes more interconnected regionally to address each state’s internal challenges with 
specific consideration given to the national interests. Thus, it is useful to assess how states 
behave and interact cooperatively to deal with the domestic necessity of reducing cost and 
maximising gains. For example, sustainable economies result from decreased trade costs and 
multilateral and bilateral mutual agreements which assume that states enter into regional 
cooperation to limit costs and increase benefits (Obydenkova 2008a; Byiers 2016). 
Regional cooperation thus underlines the mutual advantages and benefits that accrue through 
cooperation. According to Lindberg (1963:121), political integration entails the following pre-
conditions:  
(a) Central institutions and central policies must develop.  
(b) The tasks assigned to these institutions must be important enough and specific enough 
to an active socioeconomic process to which conventional international organizations 
have no access.  
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(c) These tasks must be inherently expansive. 
(d)  The member states must continue to see their interests as consistent with the enterprise.  
 In such a formulation, the state is treated as central for most part of the appropriation of this 
concept and analytical tool in the studies of international relations. This is what has been called 
“old regionalism” which views region-building through the prism of the state and the state as 
the only role player. Söderbaum (2016) points out that the criticism levelled against “old 
regionalism” is that it is too state-centrist. This relates to the possible roles of other institutions 
and actors such as the market and civil society. This is also suggestive of the diffusion of the 
ideas as foundation for regionalism and region-thinking which is referred to as the social 
construction of regions along with trusts of globalisation creating the conditions for flows of 
capital, trade and people (Börzel 2016). It is, arguably, under these conditions that “new 
varieties of regionalism” are considered where “the state is no longer regionalism’s only 
gatekeeper” (Fawcett and Serrano 2005:24; see also Söderbaum 2016 and Hettne 2005). 
Despite the persistence of inter-state region-making and regionalism, recent works consider 
market and civil society actors organised along formal and informal networks as crucial 
elements of contemporary forms of regionalism (Söderbaum 2005, 2012; Jessop 2003; Hettne 
and Söderbaum 2000). 
Thus, as we move away from the state-centric form of regionalism, we see the emergence of 
multiple possibilities for forging ideologies and practice regionalism. This also means the move 
away from the European model of regionalism that has dominated the world since the Second 
World War (Söderbaum 2005). Such thrusts have inevitably forced us to reconsider existing 
conceptions of regional cooperation and integration and their processes and dynamics more 
broadly. Börzel (2013), however, argues that we should sufficiently differentiate between 
regional cooperation and regional integration. Though the conceptualisation of these concepts 
might represent distinct elements of processes and practices of regionalism, it is important to 
note the fact that they overlap and, are intertwined. Thu, in the following s section, regional 
integration is treated as a dynamic process subsumed within regional cooperation/regionalism. 
It is also treated as deeper interdependence and interdependent regional institution-building.  
Notably, the European Commission (2019) defines the concept of regional integration as “the 
process of overcoming barriers that divide neighbouring countries, by common accord and of 
jointly managing shared resources and assets. It is a process by which groups of countries 
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liberalize trade thus creating a common market for goods, people, capital and services”.5 To 
Hartzenberg (2011), regional integration is seen as a rational response to the difficulties faced 
by a continent with many small national markets and landlocked arrangements with several 
overlapping membership. Another important definition is by Madyo (2008) who conceives of 
regional integration as the process in which neighbouring states enter into an arrangement in 
order to upgrade cooperation through common institutions and rules. It is further added that 
regional integration is the process by which two or more nations states agree to cooperate and 
work closely together to achieve peace, stability and wealth. The foregoing review of some of 
the scholars’ definitions of regional integration reveal that regional integration involves the 
coming together of more than one state to establish institutions, sign accords for the purpose 
of promoting economic activity and other related objectives among themselves. 
Notably, regional integration can also be initiated to pursue political goals and is said to be 
playing some other critical roles which, as argued by van Langenhove (2006:49) includes, 
among other things: 
Contribution to peace and security in the region; strengthening of trade integration 
in the region; the creation of an appropriate enabling environment for private sector 
environment development; the development of infrastructure programmes in support 
of economic growth and regional integration; the development of strong public sector 
institutions and governance; the reduction of social exclusion and the development 
of an exclusive  civil society; the building of environment programmes at the region 
level and the strengthening of the region’s interaction with other regions of the world. 
Regional cooperation theories emphasizes that the regionalisation of different parts of the 
world is fundamentally driven by countries’ need to engage in strong cooperation with each 
other in order to access markets, enhance own economies and address other common 
transnational challenges. In this sense, the driving force is the accruing benefits to be reaped 
through the specific form of regionalism the regional states enter with each other (Börzel 2016). 
Here, it is crucial to delineate the questions of integrative or cooperative dimensions that may 
feature. Regional states can cooperate without being integrated. Regional integration, as 
conceptualized above, entails a departure from the old version of state bargains on trade 
liberalization and economic cooperation in the region. Deeper interdependent institution-
building and decision-making are defining characteristics of regional integration while regional 
cooperation features as an overarching feature of regionalism. 
The following section outlines and reviews the theoretical underpinning of regionalism and 
regional integration. 
                                                 
5 A definition place on the European Commission official site  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/economic-
growth/regional-integration_en 
21 
 
2.3 Choosing a Suitable Theoretical Framework 
It bears repeating that the inception of IGAD was necessitated by the desire to respond to a 
long period of common problems in the region such as drought, famine and conflicts. This was  
informed by  the realisation of the elites of the countries in the greater Horn of the African 
region that a multi-sectoral approach to socio-economic and political transformation should be 
pursued as an urgent strategy to address common challenges to sustainable development (in 
mid 1980s) peace and security (later in the 1990) (Mwendwa 2014). This is suggestive of the 
desire to cooperate rather than integrate as it has been framed since the inception of IGADD 
and its offspring IGAD.  
Hettne and Söderbaum (2006:181) argue that there are “diverse forms of regional cooperation 
that have developed due to the new wave of regionalism.” Thus, Börzel (2016) instructively 
categorises the theories of regional cooperation and integration into two namely, the rationalist 
and the constructivist approaches respectively. According to Börzel (2016), the old-
regionalism is dominated by the rationalist which is a power-based and a state-centred 
approach, while the new-regionalism is typical of norm-based and constructivist approach. 
New regionalism criticises old-regionalism for being state-centrist and this emphasizes the role 
of the market and civil society and the social construction of regions in region-building 
(Fawcett and Serrano 2005; Hettne and Söderbaum 2006; Söderbaum 2016).   
The old regionalism refers to the regionalism theories that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in 
an attempt to understand and interrogate European integration and its trajectory after the 
Second World War.  This has sustained itself since many of the regional integration initiatives 
around the world sought to mirror the European experiment (van Klaveren 2017). The 1980s, 
however, saw new forms of regionalism which are not typically confined to inter-state relations 
and are characterized by “multidimensionality and complexity” (Hettne and Söderbaum 
2006:183). It is also noted that the increasing complexity and multidimensionality of 
regionalism is attributed to globalisation and associated globalising thrusts (Börzel 2016:8).  
Börzel (2016:7) makes reference to the emerging “transborder mobility, economic linkages and 
trade issues” that are necessitating new modalities of dealing with them at the multilateral level.  
Classical approaches such as neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism whose focus has 
been state-led forms of regional cooperation are considered the old-regionalism theories while 
multi-level governance approaches that “focus on a complex, multilevel system of governance, 
with vertical and horizontal interaction” are considered new-regionalism (Hettne and 
Söderbaum 2006:183). The focus of the latter is the role of the market, business associations, 
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trade unions and other civil society region-building initiatives to promote their own economic 
and political interests (Börzel 2016:3).  
This study sought to appropriate both the role of the state and the market as well as other non-
state actors in the facilitation of region-building. The proposition here is that while the role of 
the state is central in region-building in the IGAD region (see Bereketeab 2018), it is also 
important to consider other variables shaping it particularly the external actors and institutions 
whose perceived interest is to be promoted through IGAD as a regional organisation. In line 
with this position, the multi-level governance approaches have been central as theoretical lens 
to this study. The following sections appraise this approaches and make a case for these by way 
of appropriating it to this study.  
2.4 From Intergovenmentalism to Multilevel Governance: A Political Economy 
Approach 
Intergovernmentalism as a theoretical framework has informed this review and the analysis of 
IGAD’s activities and the regional integration process. Notably, intergovernmentalism was 
constructed in the 1960s and the 1970s as a response to neo-functionalism. Put differently, 
intergovernmentalism is a response to the criticism of neofunctionalism (Lindberg and 
Scheingold 1970; Schmitter 1969). Obydenkova (2008a) conceives of “functionality and 
structure authority” as crucial elements in the neo-functionalist theory’s formulation of 
conditions and political processes of integration. According to Kleinschmidt (2013:4), “[n] eo-
functionalism explains processes of state cooperation aimed at solving conflicts between each 
other and gradually giving up on national sovereignty”. Neo-functionalism is perceived to be 
insufficient in explaining some of the emerging trends in regional integration which are 
grounded in the realist school of thoughts (Abraha 2013). Neo-functionalists argue that 
progress and achievement in a certain area increases the force and motivation for successful 
integration in others (Kleinschmidt 2013).  
Neofunctionalists’ propositions on the gradual elimination of conflict and national sovereignty 
are what the intergovernmentalism approach mainly criticizes. One of the main arguments of 
intergovernmentalism is that “states are the main actors in international cooperation and that 
they act both as unitary and rational units” (Michel 2012:24). According to Obydenkova 
(2008b), intergovernmentalism approaches the phenomenon of regional integration from the 
potential of nation-states and thus treats states, national governments in particular as the prime 
actors for the integration process. In this sense, states have significant influence and potential 
control over the process of regional integration initiatives. While building on the neo-
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functionalism’s view of the state as an actor, intergovernmentalism, however, considers the 
state as acting and entering into regional integration with all its internal dynamics. In the above 
conditions, the state as a gatekeeper and as a channel to domestic interests featuring at the 
regional field is central concept.   
The main thrust of intergovernmentalism theory in its account of the European integration 
process “is that member states are main drivers of European integration process. Member states 
have interests and it is based on those interests that they decide whether they will pursue a 
certain policy or not” (Lame 2007:19). For example, as argued by Laursen (2008:9), “Liberal 
intergovernmentalists see the European Union (EU) Member States as unitary rational actors 
that are in control of the process of integration”.  In light of this, one can thus assert that the 
state’s mandate and power are central to integration and there is need to determine how this 
can be realized in the practical integration process in the African context. In fact, it is important 
to note that the founder of the theory has made the framework “a general one, which can be 
applied to any kind of regional integration” (Lame 2007:21). 
Considering that African regional integration initiatives mirror the European experiment, the 
same claim applies to the region-building projects in Africa. It is often argued that in order to 
overcome their inability to industrialise and strengthen their economies, states in the African 
continent need to engage in regional cooperation. This is also clearly noted in the Abuja Treaty, 
which states that region-building is the only way to address economic and social transformation 
in this continent.  
Recent literature and accounts have placed a profound emphasis on local organisational 
arrangements and mandates to their effectiveness to achieve their economic aspiration and to 
get to grips with the thrusts of globalisation (see Coe et al 2004). This captures the collective 
choices to be made by national governments as autonomous actors. This notion emanates from 
a realist view of the world which argues that states are the significant players in regional 
integration and international relations. However, powerful states dominate the process and 
influence the nature of integration and within such settings conflicts and competitions are 
inevitable features of these integration initiatives. Germany’s role in EU, Ethiopia’s in IGAD, 
Nigeria’s in ECOWAS, and South Africa’s in SADC have similar characteristics. These states 
dominate the regional integration projects and shape their directions while other regional states 
resists against and compete with these regional powerhouses’ role and positions and weaker 
states simply move along with these projects.   
According to Michel (2012), there are three stages in the process of integration: preference 
formation, substantive bargains and institutional choice. In Michel’s (2012) formulation, the 
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initial stage of preference formation entails strategic and geopolitical consideration of region-
building. The second stage determines the negotiation and consultation on how to establish set 
common objectives and ideals in order to organise the regional block. The third stage is about 
institutional choices to be made in order to achieve these objectives and organisational 
aspirations. The powerful states, however, have more political and economic advantages than 
the poor states which results in unequal influences in the union/relationship. Read from the 
political economy perspective, intergovernmentalism treats, on the one hand, states and their 
governments as entering into region-building and regionalism to promote their own political 
and economic interest, and, on the other hand, powerful states within the region seek to 
manoeuvre this process of region-building and its projects to serve their transnational interests.  
One of the most important criticisms that has been levelled against the proponents of 
intergovernmentalism is that they tend to overlook the process of actual implementation of 
regional decisions as the implementation is not perceived to be problematic (Abraha 2013). 
According to Caichiolo (2017), in the process of integration, “disputes that take place at the 
domestic level also occur at the international level. So, the greater the relative power of a state, 
the easier it will be for it to show its preference externally” (Caichiolo 2017:5). This type of 
choice shows that weak states are up against powerful states. While a regional cooperation 
approach enables us to interrogate the dynamics of cooperation within regional integration, 
intergovernmentalism helps us to appraise the elements of conflict and competitions in the 
integration process. In this sense, intergovernmentalism framed within the political economy 
perspective offers a systematic analysis by considering the dynamics of power-relations in the 
processes and structure of region-building, structure of domination and strategic moves of 
states to enhance their own power by cooperating within a certain region.  
It bears repeating should be stated again that intergovernmentalism fails to consider the role of 
non-state actors and institutions and the role of powerful actors away from the region. 
Söderbaum (2013) argues that the troubles with intergovernmentalism is that Eurocentrism and 
static understandings of regional space have severely curtailed development of theoretical and 
conceptual drives, and empirical analysis and practices. The view offered emphasizes the social 
construction of regions and the various ways in which states, markets and civil society actors 
relate and come together in different formal and informal patterns of regionalism. This 
effectively forces us to consider political economy of formal and informal regionalism, and 
how the state, markets and external actors relate to one another and often come together in 
hybrid and multi-actor coalitions. Thus, the multi-level governance approach is relevant for it 
considers the emergences, dynamics and processes of region-building to be influenced by states 
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as well as non-state actors and institutions. Following this notion, while acknowledging the 
state’s mandate and power in any regional integration project, we need to questions how this 
can be reflected in the practical integration process in the African context and insert in other 
non-state actors and institutions into the analysis. These are important concerns considering 
the forms of states in Africa and the national politics, African states relations with the outside 
world, and global power dynamics that would have implications to the process, dynamics and 
outcomes of regional integration initiatives.  
Arguably, this can only be addressed by appropriating the multi-level governance approach. In 
fact, this approach is developed to engage with, and make sense of, the dynamics of region-
building in the African continent (Söderbaum 2016, 2004). For Söderbaum (2016), state forms 
in Africa, the development and influence of non-state actors and the very nature of globalisation 
and its impulses force us to consider multiple power circuits in international relations in Africa. 
It is out of this observation that Söderbaum and others strongly argue for the adoption of the 
multi-level governance approach in dealing with complex patterns of region-building in the 
continent. Moving away from the state-centrism or privileging formal processes, the multilevel 
governance approach offers a “framework that can address the complexity of regional 
organizations/regionalism and at the same time transcend the case of Europe/EU itself” 
(Söderbaum and Sbragia 2010: 568). 
Figure 1. Actors of Intergovermentalism 
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While the states, markets, and civil society are central to this approach, there is much less to 
consider in terms of civil society in the context of IGAD since this sector is weak and 
fragmented in this region. Ethnicity and ethic layouts, anticolonial movements and aspirations 
in the post-colonial moments are crucial elements shaping the discourses of regionalism and 
region-building in this region. Appropriation of this approach certainly allows us to critically 
engage and appraise multiple actors (state as well as non-state ones) and discursivities, their 
role and influence in regionalism and region-building initiatives. So, it is worth considering 
how regional and global political and economic interests and competitions frame and shape 
these initiatives and dynamics of integration.  
The importance of this approach is both in explaining the success and failure of region-building 
initiatives and it is useful to appraise the power struggle and conflict of interest such projects 
host and required to solve. The political economy approach to multilevel governance thus 
requires close scrutiny of the local, regional and global actors’ (including market institutions 
and civil society) involvement in region-building initiatives. In such scrutiny, we find the 
competition for influence, the agenda setting, the negotiations and mediations of conflicts and 
conflicts of interests.  
2.5 Framing IGAD’s Regionalism within Political Economy of Multilevel Governance  
Michel (2012) points out that though similar to the European Union, the historical backdrop of 
the African economic integration has been described through a typical philosophy and 
historical impulses. This suggests that the unique historical and material context of the 
continent has to be appraised to understand both failures and triumphs of the African 
integration experiment. This experiment, which was built on Pan-Africanist and liberation 
movements, has seen several setbacks and failed aspirations of Africans more than a few times. 
Such disappointment with the Organization of African Unity (now African Union) has 
profound effects on the regional thinking and practices of economic and political elites/circles 
on the African continent (Michel 2012). They have retreated into the local sphere and moved 
abroad for their relations and economic ties instead of the neighbourhood. Arguably, regional 
integration serves to promote national interest and the local agenda and objectives as opposed 
to the regional one, through dominating and controlling processes at the regional level. Under 
such conditions, the state as an entity controlled by political and economic elites, emerges as 
27 
 
an actor in the regional realm. Though it is driven by local interest, the domestic base formation 
and the economic process will influence the state’s economic interdependencies.  
According to Dersso (2014), the IGAD region is mainly known for the lack of peace and 
security within and among its member states. These security challenges of the countries and of 
the region are inextricably intertwined and thus remain for the most part inseparable. What is 
important to note, therefore, is that these conflicts characterizing the region and the countries 
constituting the region are ubiquitous as these conflicts are not confined to national borders. 
On the contrary, such conflicts, more often than not, not only spill over into neighbouring 
countries but also tend to draw countries in the region into the fray (Dersso 2014).  
The review of the literature on the IGAD region concentrates mostly on the various political, 
security and socioeconomic characteristics that have caught the attention of those who 
champion peace and security in the context of the politics of regional integration. The ethnic 
dimension and ethno-national aspirations in the Horn of Africa’s region are perennial problems 
that regionalism sought to whittle out. As argued by Mekonnen (2013), ethnicity as a concept 
is masked by nationalism which exacerbates internal turmoil and continuing conflicts and this 
is coupled with the scramble for wealth and power. This, arguably, continues to feature as a 
major cause of conflicts in the Horn of Africa given the many ethnic groups that inhabit the 
Horn of Africa. Thus, given the inextricable relationship between nationalism and ethnicity, 
and the attendant aspirations for self-identification and self-determination, states in the Horn 
of Africa are under constant threat of fragmentation. Existence of cross-border ethnic 
identifications and ethno-nationalism in the region is directly or indirectly linked, in many 
respects, to the multiple intra-state and inter-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The typical 
examples in this regard are socioeconomic deprivation and inequalities, lack of democratic 
governance and rule of law and the non-inclusive organization and control of state power 
heavily reliant on force (Dersso 2014). 
It is for this reason that conflict in the region “as a social phenomenon is widely perceived to 
be part of daily life” (Axt et al 2006:19). Thus, its manifestations do not only vary but are also 
contingent on many factors which entail, among other things, contestation (Bereketeab 2013). 
Notably, the origin of conflicts is attributable to two approaches namely, the subjective and the 
objective (Axt et al 2006). It is also notable that the objective approach, on the one hand, traces 
the origin of conflict to the socio-political fabric and structure of society whilst the subjective 
approach, on the other hand, attributes the origin of conflicts to the perceived incompatibility 
of goals and differences (Deutsch 1991). As argued by Axt et al (2006:6), the objective 
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approach advocates the view that it is incompatible differences that engender conflict. What 
this means, therefore, is that for conflict to exist, there should be position difference or interest 
position between groups over certain values (Axt et al 2006:6). Region-building and 
regionalism in the Horn is thus instituted within such context and, partially, in an attempt to 
deal with such perennial problems.  
The economic dimension is also another rationale for entering into the region-building 
initiative. RECs proposed in Abuja Treaty are instructive of this. Countering globalisation and 
its negative consequences, on the one hand, and the desire to over-come underdevelopment 
certainly feature as driving discourses of REC projects in Africa. Thus, establishing 
intergovernmental institutions is seen as central to gradually achieving these objectives. As a 
consequence, these projects emerged as both state-focused where the states join such initiatives 
and operate as fundamental actors promoting and directing regional organisations and region-
building projects. It is in light of such observation that many scholars adopt the 
intergovernmental approach to interrogate and unpack region-building projects and 
regionalism in Africa.  
However, society-based methodologies underline the significance of trans-national markets 
and common society of shared geographical and cultural characteristics which do not just 
characterise state inclinations or weight but also influence them to build provincial 
incorporation processes and also participate in their own building regional institutions with or 
without the involvement of states (Börzel 2014). Viewed from the intergovernmentalist 
approach, regional cooperation/integration has the potential of addressing each state’s internal 
problems. Aside from this, it can also be a useful guide to how states behave as regional actors. 
Major progressive total economic profits come from reducing trade costs and significant losses 
caused by political instabilities and civil wars. According to Obydenkova (2008a:7),  
…for some countries, additional benefits from migrants’ remittances can be highly significant 
and the economic costs of risks such as HIV/AIDS, TB and natural disasters that the region 
faces are also high’ which then justifies the advocacy of the view that “on all issues, regional 
cooperation can help limit costs and increase benefits. 
It is notable that what is often not captured in the above theory is the conflict and competition 
between states as each state seeks to pursue broad socio-economic, political and security 
objectives described by the national governments as national interest. Therefore, regional 
integration has been organised by super-national and institutional structures through a 
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collective decision-making process. It is well known that African geopolitics has been 
significantly determined by the continent’s colonial powers and current global powers. As 
some argue, state forms in Africa are significantly shaped by external powers (Hartzenberg 
2011). States in Africa are formed along the lines of extractive practice of colonial powers to 
facilitate the colonial economy (both regional and global). Thus, African geopolitics has little 
to do with the recent development of nation states. It is within such context that we have to 
read regional integration initiatives in the continent with specific consideration of regional and 
global interests and their influence in success and failures of such projects. The assertion here 
is that IGAD as a region-building initiative cannot be separated from the regional and global 
powers’ interests in the region and geopolitical shifts attendant thereto.   
According to Hartzenberg (2011:5), “the geo-political configuration and structure of Africa has 
been largely determined by the continent’s European colonial powers and as such has little to 
do with the emergence of nation states”.  This means that almost all the IGAD member states 
face direct or indirect challenges resulting from their past colonial legacies. For instance, 
Somalia, well- known as one of the colonies of the European states, is not an exception. The 
colonial powers (France, Britain and Italy) subdivided Somalia into five different parts and it 
is still a challenge to national integration and building of sustainable peace and security 
(Mulugeta 2009). 
This study considers how the region integration process post-independence and as modality to 
the fragmentation colonial project has been instituted. Such regional integration initiative 
should be distinguished by significant engagement in regional economic development. For 
large part, however, as Hartzenberg (2011) argues, recent experience “indicates that political 
motivation for regional integration has also played an important role in African integration” 
(Hartzenberg 2011:4). Such political motivation often entails concerns over regime stability 
and security.   
Due to this and multiple other factors, the integration of economies and developments have 
lagged behind. To this day, as it were historically, the European Union is Africa’s greatest 
trade, investment and development partner. It is notable though that China is emerging as rival 
to this and is increasingly becoming an important trading partner in the continent. There are 
sustained arguments that regional economic integration among African states need to have 
strong inward looking projects, economic implementation plans, both at micro and macro 
levels. Aside from the economic benefits, such initiatives would have a ripple effect in security 
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and stability of the regional states. This is not meant to give the economic integration a primal 
place but rather to appraise its critical role in influences the other areas of concern. Notably, 
most African states are very far behind in sustainable economic growth, stability, peace and 
security in the region. As a result of this, many are interrelated in many respects.  
The Horn of Africa especially has the most complex history of poverty, civil war and economic 
underdevelopment compared to other African states. IGAD as regional integration initiative is 
constituted in order to address these problems through coordinated regional efforts. A testament 
to this is the various mediation efforts and peace operations which this organisation seeks to 
take pride in. Despite such efforts and emphasis placed on these peace and security initiatives 
in the region along with the current engagement and regional diplomatic efforts, the IGAD 
region is still wrought with multiple security problems and instability. This is compounded by 
the fact that the region has become a theatre for global power players, with imposition of 
traditional western powers and new global players in the region and further afield. Such 
domination and imposition of global power players as this study  argues, are clearly seen in the 
funding priorities and programmes implemented that clearly reflect the funders’ own security 
agendas.6 This has certainly made economic development and social programmes rather 
secondary in the list of priorities and programmes of actions of IGAD.  
In addition to this, the competition for global markets and investment among member states of 
IGAD has not been helpful. In many respects, rather than cooperation, this condition has 
created competition and rivalry rather than cooperation. In some sense, this can be attributed 
to the pervasive colonial legacy of the state formation in Africa that has simply turned these 
states into suppliers of raw material to the Western market. Competition for dominance, 
influence and for favours of the global powers are also elements of this problem. Undoubtedly, 
persistent conflicts, poverty and environmental problems are the prominent enemies in the 
region which this study considers could best be addressed through cooperation and inward 
looking policies and programmes.  
According to Coe et al (2004), regional cooperation and development requires the necessary 
presence of three inter-related sets of conditions:  
(a)  The existence of economies of scale and scope within specific regions  
                                                 
6 As you will noticed in the chapter five, much of the funding IGAD received has gone into peace and security. 
This is in spite of the fact that the organization has a list of programme of actions that certainly received 
marginal attention by the funders.   
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 (b) The possibility of localised economies within global production networks   
 (c) The appropriate configurations of 'regional' institutions to 'hold down' global production 
networks and unleash regional potential (Coe et al, 2004:470). 
In the formulation above, regional integration and development depend on multiple processes 
that evolve over time and are linked to significant progress in economic changes, demands of 
global production networks and whittling down variation in regional economic development 
process and specific goals (Coe et al 2004). The study strongly argues that to understand and 
acknowledge why regional institutions take the forms they do, a vast range of independent 
variables need to be considered. This includes types of integration and cooperation, the number 
of stakeholders, the ideologies and identities of the actors, strategic and sub-systemic power 
distributions, domestic politics, extra-regional institutions and non-state actors, cultural and 
religious aspects and history (Coe et al 2004). 
When it comes to African integration, the factors affecting the advancement of intra-territorial 
exchange include getting individuals ready for noteworthy worldwide rivalry and negotiating 
the terms and conditions of power. Thus, Maruping (2005:135) argues that:  
…liberalisation in Africa’s regional trade has been limited by, among other factors: costly 
overlapping memberships, including some bilateral agreements; different time horizons for full 
liberalisation of trade among member states and sub regions implying that considerable trade 
barriers – both tariff and nontariff barriers – continue to inhibit intra-regional trade and cross-
border trade; delays by some member states in signing trade treaties and protocols, followed by 
additional delays in implementation. 
This means that local actors in some  regions and non-local actors in global production 
processes are differentiated by their level of territoriality being firm which, in turn, will have 
great challenges for regional sustainable economic development (Coe et al 2004). 
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Figure 2. A framework for examining regional development with the comparison of global 
production network 
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To better consider these, as noted above, this study adopted the political economy of multi-
level approach to probe into the activities of IGAD and the concomitant regional integration 
process in its member countries. Framing the research questions within the multi-level 
governance approach is necessary since the decisions and activities of IGAD are controlled and 
guided by member states, non-state actors (within and outside) and regional and global powers. 
This theory remains a suitable framework to be used to analyze IGAD’s activities in relation 
to the regional integration process in its member countries.The political economy of multi-level 
governance approach addresses power and influence of and, competition and conflict among, 
the state actors and the non-state actors as well as regional and global players.  
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of IGAD Climate Prediction Application Centre (ICPAC) which relays reports on climate 
change to member states every 10 days. There has also been an establishment of IGD Women’s 
Desk in 1994 to foster gender mainstreaming and promoting Women’s participation in IGAD 
Programmes; establishment of IGAD Sub-regional Action Programme (IGDSRAP) to identify 
vital areas to facilitate IGAD’s intervention efforts; establishment of information and 
communication service centres for easy flow of information across member states” (Dersso 
2014). It is notable, however, that the successes that have been achieved have not been without 
challenges as attested to by the incessant conflicts or wars among member states. Also, the 
issues of harsh weather conditions in the form of drought and desertification as well as 
multiplicity of regional organizations with overlapping memberships and functions have 
equally affected the process of integration among IGAD’s member states (Dersso 2014). 
It is notable, however, as argued by Byiers (2016), that the allegiances and alliances with 
outside actors can undermine the integration process. This fact notwithstanding, the 
interconnected nature of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa suggests the need for a regional 
approach to address the diverse underlying causes of conflicts and insecurity in the IGAD 
region. Thus, there is need for the adoption of a political compromise between national interests 
as opposed to advocating a linear process of institutional functionality. This should be 
considered in view of the fact that there has been fluctuation in the regional integration and 
cooperation in peace and security (Byiers 2016). It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the 
conclusion is reached that IGAD’s success on conflict mediation has been relative with its 
progress on economic integration as having been described as ‘dismal’ (IGAD 2012).          
As argued by Byiers (2016), it is worth recognizing the fact that the progress or lack of it in 
economic integration is to be construed as ultimately relating not only to the interests of 
countries and groups within countries but also to whether there is direct intent to address the 
stalemate in economic integration through regional processes or not (Byiers 2016). The 
situation is accounted for by the fact that a diverse range of interests are at play in the IGD 
economic integration agenda (IGAD 2012).           
As argued by Obi (2012), the people of the Horn are called upon to imagine that they are the 
sovereign actors of the Horn and can through everyday struggles in the future negotiate a new 
social contract with the states and regional institutions which might open up radical pathways 
to peace and development in a highly conflicted region. What transpires from the foregoing 
explication is that the complexity and interconnectedness of intra and inter-state conflicts and 
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the concomitant pervasive insecurity ravaging the region make the Horn of Africa the most 
conflict-ridden region in the African continent. At the root of these intra- and inter-state 
conflicts and insecurity is the crisis of the state. The precarious state-building process has 
rendered the state crisis-stricken.  
Underpinning these bitter conflicts and insecurities are historical, socio-economic, domestic, 
intra-regional and international factors and underdevelopment. External intervention, driven 
by competing national, economic, political, security and strategic-linked interests connected to 
the war on terror and concern about piracy, render the conflicts intractable. In spite of the 
engagement of many local, national, regional and international actors in the attempt to mitigate 
the conflicts, so far no significant results have been achieved (Bereketeab 2013). 
The methodology of international intervention and the politics of conflict resolution which 
stress, global strategic, security, political and economic interests, has not only proved lacking, 
but has also skewed the process of state-, peace and security-building. The peace-meal 
approach to conflict resolution quite often emanating from geo-strategic expediency is another 
factor that perpetuates conflict in the Horn of Africa. Interlinked conflicts and insecurities 
demand holistic, historicized, multidimensional and multidisciplinary analyses, regional 
approaches and mechanisms (Bereketeab 2013).                                   
The regional security environment accentuates weak governance systems and authoritarian 
tendencies on the part of those that govern. Conditions for achieving strong and dynamic 
regional frameworks for economic and political integration are lacking. According to Dersso 
(2014), the peace and security agenda of IGAD and its broader ambition of regional economic 
integration cannot succeed unless political governance is also addressed within the regional 
framework. It is thus arguable that some measure of democratization is a precondition for 
sustainable regional cooperation and the two processes reinforce each other. As argued by 
Dersso (2014), the most worrying factor though is that “the political landscape of a significant 
number of IGAD countries remains dominated by repression of the media, opposition political 
groups, dissenting voices, the politicization of state agencies and the resort of governments to 
the use of police and military force as an instrument of settling political disagreements.  
It is also notable that what has become commonplace and thus constitutes major sources of 
instability and contestation of state legitimacy are political and socioeconomic inequalities 
along ethnic and regional lines (Dersso 2014). There is thus need and demand for greater 
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integration of the countries of the region. The IGAD region holds strong potential for 
substantially improving the process of regional economic and socio- political integration. This 
is attributable to the presence of economic and geographical conditions that tend to catalyse 
and enhance greater interdependence and cooperation among member states of IGAD (Dersso 
2014). 
2.6 Conclusion  
This chapter explored the broader ideological and theoretical currents influencing IGAD in the 
context of Africa’s region-building initiatives and has placed this within its historical trajectory 
of regional integration projects in the continent. According to Michel (2012:3), “the core 
driving force leading to the dawn of African integration in the 1950s and 1960s was the Pan 
African movement calling for independence of African states and the end of colonialism”. This 
means that a transnational elites pushing for regional cooperation supported this ideologically 
driven movement. The main actors involved in the establishment of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) [and now the African Union (AU)] and the African Regional Economic 
Communities, among others, were political and economic elites strategizing their 
determinations both on Pan African identification and on the expansion of states and regional 
gains (Michel 2012).  
This chapter explored these initiatives and made a case for why these should be captured 
through mobilisation of regional cooperation conceptually and in practice. It is also notable 
that regional cooperation as a concept emphasizes the regionalisation of different parts of the 
world where countries need to cooperate with each other to access market economies and 
benefits. Regional cooperation deals with how states attain economic and political objectives 
through international institutions by implementing rules and regulations. Mutual benefit and 
cooperative exchange for socio-economic and political advancement are the fundamental 
challenges for states entering into regional cooperation. In the case of Africa, it is thus argued 
that for the different countries on the continent, in order to overcome their inability to 
industrialise and strengthen their economies, they need to engage in regional cooperation.   
The argument advanced in this chapter, along with many in the literature, is that the process of 
African regional integration is best understood through the multilevel governance approach. It 
is also noted that inter-governmentalism has been the dominant framework informing 
regionalism and region-building. Intergovernmentalism as a theory of European regional 
integration identifies how states acquire mandates and the authority to implement and regulate 
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policies for the purpose of international cooperation among states. Beyond the European 
experiment, it is argued that intergovernmentalism offers a systematic structure that enhances 
power by cooperation within a certain area. Intergovernmentalism focuses on economic and 
geopolitical interests among political and domestic actors. This theory is appropriated to 
explain African regional initiatives. As Hartzenberg (2011:19) puts it, “African countries have 
definitely contributed to the proliferation of regional trade agreements which is a defining 
feature of global economic governance in recent decades”.   
However, the complexities and dynamism of the states in the continent necessitates considering 
non-state regional and global actors as well as global powers that seek to promote their own 
interest through regionalism as transnational governance mechanism. In assessing the two 
theories special attention is paid to the complexities and ideological conceptions in relation to 
when and under what conditions the process of integration is likely to be achieved. Here, 
specific conditions pertinent to the Horn of Africa region have been explored in order to make 
a case for appropriating the multilevel governance approach. Notably, the causes which 
underlie conflicts and insecurity in the region are diverse and these range from external and 
historical factors to structural ones. After a long period of experiencing common problems in 
the region such as drought, famine and conflicts, these East African states have come to realise 
that a multi-sectoral approach to socio-economic and political transformation should be 
pursued as an urgent strategy to confront common challenges to sustainable development 
(Mwendwa 2014).  
Since region-building and intergovernmental practices are sites of contestation and a power 
struggle for domination and influence of one state over another it is crucial to frame these 
within the political economy of region-building. This has highlighted the importance of 
regional and global non-state actors and global powers which infuse these processes with 
complexities, competition and contestation. This in turn affirms the need to draw from political 
economy which is reflective of the manner in which these processes are framed and shaped by 
economic and political interests of multiple actors. This chapter outlined how the political 
economy of multilevel governance better explains the complexities, challenges and 
opportunities of political and economic integration initiatives to achieve socio-economic 
progress and identifies states’ internal challenges.  
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Chapter Three 
Historical, Institutional and Discursive Contexts of IGAD 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter discusses the historical background that informed the study and the discursive 
dimension of IGAD as a regional integration initiative. Evidently, IGAD as a region is riddled 
with and troubled by poverty, economic and environmental crisis, political and security 
problems. The IGAD region is liable for the recurrent famine and civil war and as such it is 
one of the powerless regions in the African continent lacking sustainable peace and security. 
The Eastern part of the region challenges the economic integration so initiated. Thus, this 
chapter focuses on these aspects and how the structure and operation of IGAD’s objectives and 
aims are discussed.  It is in light of this that this chapter considers IGAD’s past and present as 
a regional integration project.  
Thus, the first section of this chapter explores the historical foundation of IGAD as a regional 
organisation. This is followed by an exploration of the objectives and the structure of the 
organisation. Here, the section explores the relationship among the objectives, priorities set and 
organisational capacity. The latter sections examine the policy and the strategic framework of 
IGAD and how these are linked to the organisation’s challenges and opportunities. By and 
large, therefore, the focus is on the outlining of the policy initiatives and programme of actions 
identified by IGAD and their implementation and measuring their success. Additionally, the 
challenges and opportunities confronting the organisation in implementation are also are 
explored.   
3.2 Context and Historical Background of the IGAD Region   
Demeke and Gebru (2014) point out that Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Drought and Development (IGADD) that was founded in 1986. The main aim of the 
establishment of IGADD was to prevent and mitigate drought and famine  in the Eastern 
African countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda (Desmidt 
2016:11). IGADD’s headquarters were established in Djibouti. Notably, the then six-member 
state organisation was certainly the first regional multilateral initiative of its kind. Upon 
attaining its independence, Eritrea joined IGADD in 1993 to become the seventh member state.  
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IGADD as an organisation was a response to growing concern in the region afflicted by 
recurring severe drought, famine and other natural disasters. Abnormal low rain fall, ecological 
degradation and economic privation in the region and locust invasion have been (and continued 
to be) major contributors to these problems (IGAD 2016b). Thus, the core mandate and target 
of IGADD was the alleviation of the effects of the recurrent droughts and other human-made 
disasters. Thus, as its name indicates, two fundamental concerns guided the establishment of 
IGADD namely, the developmental and environmental control. To this end, the organisation 
was intended to respond to immediate problems/disasters (such as drought and environmental 
crisis) and medium and long-term recovery and rehabilitation to overcome developmental 
challenges.  
In line with these concerns as explicated above, the organisation had three crucial activities 
(focus areas). The first set of activities were the emergency and relief measures in response to 
immediate humanitarian crisis focusing on the victims of environmental disasters and drought. 
The activities in this regard included assessing and determining the impact and extent of the 
disaster, mobilising and coordinating relief measures. The second set of activities focused on 
short and medium terms measures which dealt with the effects of the crisis at hand through 
resource and knowledge sharing, skill development and training, and infrastructural 
development. These had a specific focus which  ensured that the resilience of communities of 
member states against drought  ensured that food security was maintained, control 
desertification, rehabilitation and effective use of natural resources (water, energy and marine 
etcetera.). The third one focused a long term initiatives and projects which dealt with the 
sustainability of the environment and development. In this regard, IGADD paid particular 
attention to rural economy and the agricultural sector.   
As revealed in IGADD’s initiatives above, reveal, this organisation was driven by the ultimate 
desire not only to improve food security but also to deal with environmental challenges through 
regional cooperation. While IGADD was certainly a multilateral response to collective and 
transnational problems, it was not meant to deal with security and political problems the region 
was facing (Heally 2011). In the 1990s, few years after the establishment of IGADD, the region 
was undergoing serious changes which entailed among other things the creation of Eritrea, the 
collapse of Somalia, the rise of cross-border threats of terrorism and addressing multiple 
political and security challenges. This is not to say that some of these challenges did not exist 
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in the mid-1908s. However, the magnitude and nature of these challenges were markedly new 
and were acutely felt by the region thus necessitating regional response to them.  
Driven by these new emerging political and socio-economic challenges in the region, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and governments met in Addis Ababa in April 1995 and resolved 
to revitalize IGADD in order to response to the emerging political, economic and security 
challenges. Following the consensus built in these meetings, the regional states signed a Letter 
of Instrument to Amend the IGADD Charter / Agreement on 21 March 1996. In line with this, 
they decided to expand areas of cooperation among the member states under IGAD in three 
areas of priority namely:  
(a) Food security and environmental protection 
(b) Economic cooperation, regional integration and social development; and  
(c) Peace, security and humanitarian affairs (IGAD 2016). 
 
What is evident in the above is that the newly established IGAD is building on the core issues 
raised in its predecessor and expands these to include regional integration, economic 
development and peace and security as an additional objective. Most importantly, this new 
organisation is following the agreements reached in Abuja Treaty to establish RECs in each 
sub-region of the continent. In comparison with the other African RECs, “the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is one of Africa’s youngest sub-regional 
organizations and the region has always been regarded as the conflict zone” (Weldesellassie 
2011:1).  
This regional bloc is located as the most strategic region of the Horn of Africa and has an area 
of around 5.3 million km2 that covers eight regional countries - Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan Kenya and Uganda. It is located in the Red Sea Basin thus linking 
Africa to the Middle East and the Nile Basin linking it with the south-eastern states of Tanzania, 
Rwanda and Egypt at the north east. Its coastline extends from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, 
including the Gulf of Aden and Toudjoura (with 6960 Km of coastline). In land, the IGAD 
region has 6910 Km of international borders linking it to eight countries (Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Egypt, Libya, Chad and Tanzania).7 
Although the IGAD region has the third smallest population with 236 million people living in 
the regional bloc, it is also one of the regions that are experiencing a high population growth 
rate. The demographic age structure of the regional bloc reveals that the majority of its citizens 
                                                 
7 https://igad.int/about-us/the-igad-region (accessed September 12, 2019). 
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are young people sitting at about 50 percent of the population. This is a double edge sword in 
that it could be an opportunity provided that they receive education and training and participate 
in the economy of these states or it would be a source of instability if these economies fail to 
absorb the youth and incorporate it into productive activity. Unfortunately, for the regional 
bloc, all of the IGAD member states belong to the ‘world’s Least Developed Countries’ (LDCs) 
with the exception of Kenya. For example, IGAD’s regional per capita income is much lower 
than the Sub-Saharan African average (2015 – IGAD US$ 1006 and SSA US$ 1 635, and in 
2018 – IGAD US$ 918 while SSA registered US$ 1 634).8  IGAD member states also share 
similar economic conditions with serious microstructural problems with negative current 
account balance (% of the GDP) with severe trade imbalances thus rendering it unable to attract 
sufficient foreign direct investment with a growing number of labour force. Unless it finds a 
way of transforming its economy, this certainly poses significant challenges to the regional 
bloc that has an average median age of around 19.   
 
Table 1. List of IGAD member states with Population data and GDP per Capita 
Country  Population Size 
(2018) 
% Young(0-25) 
Population 
(2018) 
Population 
Growth Rate 
(2018) 
GDP per 
Capita (2018) 
US$ 
Djibouti 958,923 47.23 1.57 % 2 075 
Eritrea 3,452,786 59.71 1.17 % 1 943 
Ethiopia 109,224,414 61.42 2.65% 731 
Kenya 51,392,565 59.51 2.33 % 1 639 
Somalia 15,008,226  67.24 2.87 % 108* 
South 
Sudan 
10,975,927 61.55 0.60 % 753 
Sudan 41,801,533 60.23 2.42 % 980 
Uganda 42,729,036 66.98 3.80 % 687 
Source: Adapted from https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/  and 
https://unctadstat.unctad.org/  
*Unreliable data 
A huge volume of their economic outputs is dependent on their natural resources (mining and 
agriculture) and most of the population are dependent on subsistence farming. This is aside 
                                                 
8 See http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Index.html. Accessed on February 2019. 
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from the recent mushrooming of flagship infrastructural projects and industrial parks across 
the region that are meant to usher in industrialisation and develop the manufacturing sector 
(see HESPI 2018)9. The region’s population is for the large part dependent on agriculture 
(IGAD 2016). The farmlands of the regions account for “7 percent, forests 19 percent and 
permanent pastures 28 percent of the total land area. The remaining 46 percent is unproductive 
or marginal land” (IGAD 2016d). As noted in the IGAD’s report, the economic pillar of the 
“region is agriculture comprising both livestock and crop production which provides the basis 
for food supplies and export earnings as well as contributing as employment for over 80 percent 
of the population. The contribution of industries to the respective national economies of the 
IGAD member states is about 15-20 percent.” (IGAD 2016d). This fact notwithstanding, it is 
notable that land and ecological corruption are the most threatening dangers to the locale as 
they influence agrarian creation and financial development. Such debasement adds to the 
uncertainty in nourishment, starvation and the need of resources in the region. 
Demeke and Gebru (2014:4) assert that “the IGAD region has been the most conflict and 
terrorism torn zone in the world”. This is evident in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
Sudan and South Sudan and the continuous uncertainty in Somalia in particular. The region is 
well known for its militarism and as Roux and Kidane (2007:83) put it, “except Kenya, the 
governments of the IGAD region all have their roots in militarism. Militarisation in the Horn 
of Africa, as in many developing countries, is partly a product of structural conditions that 
comprise a crisis for human security and civil war”. The IGAD region is also noted as a region 
engulfed by struggles over economic and political powers and most of them are driven by 
ethnic discontent against the state and other forms of ethnic rivalries.  The transnational nature 
of these conflicts are partly attributed to the existence of cross border social ethnic groupings 
in the region (Byiers 2016). This, on the contrary, should have been a significant point of 
connection and an opportunity for IGAD to promote regional cooperation, geopolitical and 
sustainable socio-economic partnership. Thus, such ethnic overlaps and cross-border affinities 
could have been appropriated in the region that has the potential of mitigating against the 
region’s perennial challenges (Byiers 2016). 
In a nutshell, the region is known for the recurring famine and droughts, poverty and starvation, 
civil conflicts and inter- state wars and political instability and underdevelopment. It is within 
                                                 
9 The Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute – Annual report on IGAD 2018. 
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such context and set of region challenges that IGAD’s mandate and authority is instituted as 
region-building initiative and practice of regional cooperation and integration in the Horn of 
African. It is out of recognition of the transnational nature of the environmental, 
socioeconomic, political and security challenges that region that IGAD as regional organisation 
was instituted. As the upcoming section shows, IGAD’s strategic frameworks and regional 
strategy choices appear to reflect these concerns and aspiration to tackle them.  The next section 
discusses the organisational structure and institutional arrangement of IGAD.  
 3.3 IGAD’s Organisational Structure and Operation  
Organisational structure of IGAD is constituted of four segments that allow all the member 
states to exercise their mandate and levels of power (Byiers 2016). These segments are: The 
Assembly of Heads of States and Government; The Council of Ministers (Foreign Affairs); 
The Committee of Ambassadors; and The Secretariat.  
IGAD’s Assembly of head of states and government is established as the supreme body of the 
organisation and many of the activities and directions of the organisation come from this organ. 
The Assembly has the authority to perform the following functions:  
(a) Make policy, direct and control the functioning of the Organisation; 
(b) Determine the main guidelines and programmes of cooperation; 
(c) Give guidelines and monitor political issues especially on conflict prevention, 
management and resolution; 
(d) Appoint the Executive Secretary upon the recommendation of the Council of Ministers; 
(e) Approve the scale of assessment of contributions of Member States to the budget 
(Article 9 of IGAD)10 
Notably, the Assembly of Heads of States and Government is the highest decision making body 
in the organisation since it sets the principles, programme of actions, follow ups, guide and 
control the political processes in the region (Byiers 2016:27). According to the organizational 
rules, the decision making process and any decision to be taken within the organisation should 
be based on consensus and by general agreement. Considering the complexity of matters in the 
region and rivalry of states, building consensus is likely to be difficult. The rule also states that 
                                                 
10 Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), IGAD/SUM-96/AGRE-
Doc, Nairobi, 21 March 1996, https://www3.nd.edu/~ggoertz/rei/rei475/rei475.01tt.pdf (accessed February 
2018). 
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the ordinary summit of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government should take place 
once a year. Alternatively, it takes place upon a request of any member state/s and should be 
accepted by the majority of the members. However, the Assembly of Heads of States has not 
occurred for well over a decade.  
As a matter of practice, the Assembly is to be chaired by a head of state selected through 
consensus and it is supposed to be rotational. There is certainty, however, in the Agreement 
Establishing IGAD for how long a selected head of state chairs the organisation. Presumably, 
this could be the reason why Ethiopia has been chairing the authority uninterrupted for almost 
two decades and it has shown absolute reluctance to relinquish this position which has not been 
well-received among some member states. Ethiopia has been getting away with this by refusing 
to call for the ordinary summit of Assembly of Heads of States which has not taken place for 
nearly ten (10) years. Using this, Ethiopia has managed to effectively block Eritrean from re-
activating its membership for years (Bereketeab 2018).   
IGAD’s Council of Ministers is constituted of ministers of foreign affairs of member states and 
“one other focal Minister who shall be designated by each Member State” (Article 10).11 The 
task of the council of ministers is to examine the political and security affairs. This includes 
conflict prevention, management and resolution, post-conflict building, monitoring and 
enhancing humanitarian activities, promoting peace and security in the sub region and making 
recommendations to the assembly (Article 10). In accordance with the rule of IGAD, the 
Council ordinarily meets twice a year and similar to the Assembly, the decisions to be made in 
this organ of IGAD is by consensus. Unlike the Assembly, decisions in this organ of the 
organisation that failed to garner consensus are made based on voting. In this organ of IGAD, 
as point 5 of Article 10 stipulates, should “the committee fail to reach an agreement by 
consensus, a decision shall be taken by two-third majority of members present and voting as 
long as such members constitute a legal quorum”. This Council has the authority to establish 
“ad hoc sectoral Ministerial committees” with defined tasks and mandate established through 
agreement of the member states in consultation with the Secretariat within the specific terms 
of references and conditions. Ad hoc committees are meant to be sector specific and they can 
meet as regularly as they deem necessary in their effort to achieve their objectives.   
                                                 
11 Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), IGAD/SUM-96/AGRE-
Doc, Nairobi, 21 March 1996, https://www3.nd.edu/~ggoertz/rei/rei475/rei475.01tt.pdf (accessed February 
2018). N.B. The rest of the section is written based on this document.  
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The Committee of Ambassadors is another organ of IGAD which consists of assigned 
ambassadors from IGAD member states. The two main functions and duties of this committee 
are firstly,  to “advise the Executive Secretary on the promotion of his efforts in realizing the 
work plan approved by the Council of Ministers” and secondly, to “guide the Executive 
Secretary on the interpretation of policies and guidelines which may require further 
elaboration” (Article 11, point 2). This committee is thus tasked with engaging, working with 
and following up on the activities of the Secretariat. This Committee then reports to and advises 
the respective states (Article 11). Once again, as with the Council of Ministers, this committee 
is expected to make decisions based on consensus failing which decisions must be based on 
voting. 
As stated in Article 12 of the Agreement Establishing the IGAD, the Secretariat is an executive 
body of the authority. The main task of this body is to follow-up on the resolution of the 
assembly and the council dealing with draft proposals and agreements, facilitating the 
economic and social development policy, arranging necessary resources to administer projects 
and programmes agreed to by the council and implementing regional projects and policies. In 
a nutshell, many of the activities of IGAD, including the essential tasks of programme 
development, coordination, implementation and monitoring, are to be conducted by this organ. 
Additionally, it deals with many national and regional policies and strategies at the national 
and regional levels (IGAD 2016b). 
Organogram 1. IGAD Organisational Structure (Adapted from (Byiers 2016)) 
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To run its day-to-day activities, this organ appoints its own staff, experts and technicians made 
available to it by the member states and it is to be headed by the Executive Secretary who is to 
be appointed by the head of states of the IGAD member states with a limited term of 4 years. 
As things stand, Mahboub Maalim who id a Kenyan diplomat, has been heading the Secretariat 
since June 2008. This means that the Kenyan diplomat has been running this organization for 
well over a decade. It is informally reported that Eritrea, Uganda and Djibouti have been 
unhappy with such state of affairs. In fact, these countries have been complaining that Ethiopia 
(through the chairmanship of the authority) and Kenya (through the Executive Secretary) have 
dominated and hijacked IGAD as an extension of their foreign policy thus creating distrust in 
this organization and raising questions as to  whether it is a genuinely regional and multilateral 
body or not. 
In any case, there are four Directors assisting the Executive Secretary, each with specific 
responsibilities for agriculture and environment; economic cooperation and social 
development; peace and security; and administration and finance. IGAD also has additional 
specialized institutions and programmes with their coordinators, such as the IGAD Security 
Sector Programme (ISSP), Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), 
IGAD Centre for Pastoral Area and Livestock Development (ICPALD), IGAD Regional Aids 
Programme (IRAPP) and IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Center (ICPAC). These 
institutions and programmes are hosted by the member states.  
3.4 IGAD’s Strategic Framework: Linking Objectives to Programmes of Action  
In broad terms, the strategic aim of IGAD is to promote and implement the advancement of 
regional cooperation to attain sustainable economic development, peace and security in the 
Horn of Africa. The fundamental principle is that IGAD should continue to focus on the 
regional strategy by facilitating regional interventions and develop trans-boundary 
programmes with regional relevance and monitor their implementation (IGAD 2016a). In line 
with this, the authority upon its establishment has the following aims and objectives:  
a) Promote joint development strategies and gradually harmonize macro-economic 
policies and programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields; 
b) Harmonize policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, communications, 
agriculture, and natural resources, and promote free movement of goods, services, and 
people and the establishment of residence; 
c) Create an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic trade and 
investment; 
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d) Achieve regional food security and encourage and assist efforts of Member States 
to collectively combat drought and other natural and man-made disasters and their 
consequences; 
e) Initiate and promote programmes and projects for sustainable development of 
natural resources and environment protection; 
f) Develop and improve a coordinated and complementary infrastructure, particularly 
in the areas of transport and energy; 
g) Promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the 
sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-State 
conflicts through dialogue; 
h) Mobilize resources for the implementation of emergency, short-term, medium-term 
and long-term programmes within the framework of sub-regional cooperation; 
i) Promote and realize the objectives of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) and the African Economic Community; 
j) Facilitate, promote and strengthen cooperation in research, development and 
application in the fields of science and technology; 
k) Develop such other activities as the Member States may decide in furtherance of the 
objectives of this Agreement. (Article 7 of Agreement Establishing IGAD) 
Combined together, these aims and objectives speak to the aspiration of establishing an 
institution that will champion peace and stability, sustainable development and economic 
integration at the regional and continental level. Some of the core objectives of IGAD noted 
above speak in many ways to the Abuja road map for the establishment of RECs and regional 
integration. In many respects, there appears to be sufficient appraisal and understanding that 
peace and stability are central to the development and economic growth of the region.  
What is evident from the above explication is that the main mission of IGAD is to help and 
engage to achieve through member states “increased economic cooperation, food security and 
environmental protection, promotion and maintenance of peace and security and economic 
cooperation and integration” (Mulugeta 2009:23). Aside from these institutional aspirations, 
one has to consider whether there are institutional mechanisms put in place to materialise these 
aspiration. This forces us to consider and explore how these are operationalised and how these 
are turned into specific programme of actions, IGAD’s structure, operational measures and 
capacities which are issues the following sections explore in some detail.   
3.5 IGAD’s Regional Strategy and Implementation Plan 
Niekerk (2005:6) suggests that a measure of the regional organisation’s success has to 
“distinguish the depth of regional integration and cooperation. Forms of cooperation and 
intergovernmental activity may vary depending on the level of activities and form of projects, 
programs, policies and institutional structure and the degree of harmonizing and coordination 
through states, regionally and globally”. It is against this backdrop of regional integration, 
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therefore, that IGAD engaged in strategic planning, designing specific programmes and 
projects, linking the authority with members states, and other multilateral bodies. Since its 
inception, IGAD has developed two regional strategy documents: IGAD Regional Strategy 
2011-2015 and IGAD Regional Strategy 2016-2020.  
In January 2016, the organisation published the IGAD State of the Region Report, which is an 
effort in assessing its 2011-2015 regional strategic program. Thus, the IGAD Regional Strategy 
2016-2020 is based on this assessment and is split into two documents comprising volume 1- 
the Framework and volume 2 – Implementation Plan. IGAD Regional Strategy 2011-2015 is, 
arguably, the first of its kind for the regional body. It certainly set the foundation for strategic 
direction, planning and implementation by facilitating regional cooperation and integration. 
Prior to this document, for well over a decade, the regional body had been operating for the 
large part with programmes set on issues and sectoral basis and with very little strategic 
direction.  
In search for strategic planning, both the 2011-2015 and the 2016-2020 regional strategy 
documents were developed on a consultative basis with the stakeholders (national and regional) 
as well as on review of baseline studies and literature. Besides the strategic planning, these 
documents represent an attempt to reorder and operationalise the aims and objectives of the 
organisation as well as develop the areas of cooperation into specific programmes of action. 
For example, the Agreement Establishing IGAD (see Article 13 A) outlines around twenty 
crucial areas of cooperation to take effect in the sub-region. While these areas of cooperation 
are extensive and detailed, they feature overlapping issues and themes. The list is also two long 
to turn into clear a programme of action. In what appears to be an attempt to address these 
concerns, in IGAD’s Regional Strategy of 2011-15, first ever regional strategy document, these 
are reformulated and regrouped into four overarching pillars as follows: Pillar 1 - Agriculture, 
Natural Resources and Environment; Pillar 2 - Economic Cooperation, Integration and Social 
Development; Pillar 3 - Peace and Security, and Humanitarian Affairs; and Pillar 4 - Corporate 
Development Services (IGAD 2016). These pillars are meant to operationalise the objectives 
which IGAD has set out and turn them into concrete strategies and plan of actions. 
Though IGAD had some initiatives and programmes based on the objectives and aims noted in 
the agreement establishing IGAD, it is through its Regional Strategy that these gained 
coherence and translated into action plans and programs in a period that spanned for five years.   
IGAD’s regional strategy documents thus reflect the organisations and regional states’ 
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aspiration to define and refine IGAD’s development initiatives and chart out practical ways 
and means of achieving them in a sustainable way. The first one was its Regional Strategy 
2011-2015, and the second one, IGAD Regional Strategy Framework and Implementation Plan 
2016-2020. Each of these strategic plans were developed envisioning a five (5) years action 
plan, implementation and monitoring. As part of the effort to concretise the objectives of the 
Strategy, IGAD has produced a medium-term Implementation Plan for the 2016-2020 planning 
period (2016c).  
The core activities of IGAD, as articulated in both IGAD’s Regional Strategy 2011-2015 and 
IGAD Strategy and Implementation Plan 2016-2020 documents, include promoting compatible 
policies in the IGAD priority areas, developing policies and enhancing regional relevance and 
strengthening capacity building. IGAD’s strategic plan of 2016-2020 identifies institutional 
and wide regional capacity building by creating regional, continental and international 
partnership to facilitate information and knowledge sharing in an early warning system thus 
providing a legal framework for the implementation of policies and facilitating engagement 
with key stakeholders. These are formulated with cognisance of the exchange of information 
and evaluation of the implementation process of the region’s programmes using the common 
institutional strategies which expedite the process of IGAD’s regional economic integration 
and policy implementation.  
The main purpose of the IGAD Strategy Implementation Plan 2016-2020 is to promote 
economic cooperation and social development in the IGAD region through enhanced regional 
capacity in the following key areas: agriculture and livestock development and food security; 
natural resources management and environmental protection; regional economic cooperation 
and integration; social development; maintaining peace and security and IGAD’s corporate 
development.  
In the foreword to IGAD’s Regional Strategy 2016-2020, Ambassador Mahboub Maalim, as 
executive secretary, claims that “[t]he Plan is based on realistic assessment of expected 
outcomes, focusing on the priority areas where  IGAD’s Secretariat has a comparative 
advantage as described in the strategy. The Plan 2016-2020 is designed to be the guiding 
mechanism for the implementation process of the IGAD strategy” (IGAD 2016c:v). Therefore, 
this eventually forms a comprehensive annual operational plan. The main components of the 
Implementation Plan 2016-2020 include funding the institutional capacity of the security 
reform and the implementation of peace and sustainable development programmes, 
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transitioning from medium-term to annual action plans and monitoring and evaluation 
framework (IGAD 2016c). The 2016-2020 strategic plan is committed to the provision of the 
necessary policy, legal and institutional frameworks for the successful implementation of the 
Plan in close partnership with IGAD’s member states and allies to advance the region and the 
continent at large. 
In many respects, both the 2011-2015 and 2016-2020 strategy documents are formulated within 
the four pillars noted above. These pillars have indeed continued to form a core structure to 
Regional Strategy 2016-2020 even though they featured first in Regional Strategy 2011-2015. 
The 2016-2020 document clearly acknowledges this by asserting that “this strategy document 
affirms the vision, mission, values and goals as laid out in the 2011-2015 document and 
attempts to update it by taking into account the internal and external environments affecting 
the region and the Organisation.” (IGAD 2016b:25).   
The usefulness of these pillars is that they are then translated into programmes of actions and 
projects with measurable outcomes. In the Regional Strategy 2016-2020, for example, under 
Pillar 1, there are 16 programs and 55 projects; Pillar 2 has 14 programs and 53 projects; Pillar 
3 has 6 programs and 21 projects; and Pillar 4 has 2 programs and 23 projects. Each pillar 
reflects the specific strategic objectives of the organisation. The first pillar’s strategic 
objectives are to promote attainment of food security and promote sustainable management of 
the environment and natural resources. The second pillar sets out to deal with the promotion of 
regional economic cooperation, integration and promotion of social development. For the third 
pillar, it is promotion of good governance, peace and security. The last pillar’s objectives are 
to enhance the corporate capacity of IGAD to effectively deliver its mandate.  
Implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the programmes and projects outlined in the 
strategic plan are expected to be undertaken by IGAD’s Secretariat. Rather strangely, unlike 
the traditional M&E, the focus of IGAD’s monitoring and evaluation is results-oriented as 
opposed to being a process involving actual activities. The specific focuses of IGAD’s M&E 
include actual results, implementation timelines, resource allocation usage and activities 
related with budgets and finance.     
IGAD’s strategic pillars and associated programmes (particularly of those revised in 2016-
2020) are designed in such a way that they align with the AU Agenda 2063 and the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Following this, the strategic document itemises the 
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resource required to achieve these objectives and thus implement the programmes. In this 
regard, IGAD’s Regional Strategy 2016-2020 document is a bit more detailed. Both documents 
have a five years programme with specific set of targets and details of budget required. 2016-
2020 strategy, for example, outlines the resource and budgetary requirement of almost US$402 
dollars (IGAD 2016c:102). This amount is for all the programmes, plan of actions and the 
multiple strategic interventions to be carried out by various organs of the organisation.  
The funding for these programmes is to be mobilised from what the document identifies as 
partner states, development partners and private sector. What is apparent here is that hardly 
any funding is expected to come from the regional member states. Such heavy reliance on 
external funding for such wide and expansive programmes and projects raises questions of 
sustainability of these plan of actions and programs. It is known that grants and foreign aids 
are often limited and unreliable. Predictably, the regional body is clearly aware of it. Thus, it 
asserts,  
Execution of the Implementation Plan 2016-2020 will pose huge challenges for the IGAD 
Secretariat and specialised institutions in both human and financial term. In the event that 
additional financial and human resources will not be available, strategic decisions will be made 
to review the Plan and carefully prioritise the programmes to focus on. Criteria for 
prioritization that align with the ultimate outcomes of the Regional Strategy and follow a 
programmatic approach will be developed. Resource mobilization efforts will be directed to 
strengthening and building on the close and harmonious relationships that the IGAD has 
developed over the years with the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF). (IGAD 2016c:15) 
Indeed, dependence on external actors for funding has the tendency of prioritising what the 
funders want rather than the region’s own priorities.12 By ways of unpacking IGAD’s regional 
integration strategy, in the following section, I outline and explore the four pillars and consider 
some of their programmes, project and measurable outcomes. 
Pillar 1: Agriculture, Natural Resource and Environment  
This pillar begins with the recognition that agriculture plays a significant role in IGAD’s 
regional economy. It is also cognisant of the region’s perennial problem of food insecurity, 
while agriculture still remains a dominant means of livelihood.  Regional Strategy 2016-2020 
states that “some 13 million of the region’s 230 million population are chronically food 
insecure. Over 80 percent of the population in the region derive their livelihood from 
agriculture and, therefore, factors that affect land productivity directly constitute a continuous 
challenge to the welfare of the population” (IGAD 2016c:4). To this end, IGAD has a strong 
                                                 
12 Aspect of this is dealt with in chapter four in some detail.  
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policy regarding access to sufficient food, thus it encourages effective management of the 
environment and natural resources.  
This is crucial considering the fact that the region suffers from recurring drought and famine 
which are induced by environmental changes and exacerbated by policy failures. Efficient and 
effective use of natural resources are the key inputs of regional and continental economic 
development. Thus, IGAD member states recognize that sustainable use of the environment 
and appropriations are critical to the region. A piece in the IGAD website states:  
The IGAD member States recognize that a clean and healthy environment is a prerequisite for 
sustainable development and development activities in various productive and social sectors 
including agriculture and livestock, energy, industry and infrastructure may pose a negative 
impact leading to the degradation of the environment. (IGAD 2016d).13  
This is expected in a region where more than 80 percent of its population primarily rely on 
traditional agriculture (which is susceptible to environmental variables) and the dominance of 
this sector in the regional states (see Table 3). It is worth noting, therefore, that the regional 
body’s major concern is the two interlocked problems of food insecurity and environmental 
degradation ravaging the region (IGAD 2016b). This is succinctly reflected in the 
organisation’s heavy investment on Pillar 1, which in some ways is also carried over from its 
predecessor IGADD.  
Table 2. The Contribution of Agriculture to the Economy of the IGAD’s Region  
Country GDP (%) Employment (%) Growth Rate (%) 
Djibouti  4.0 10 3.0 
Ethiopia  43 83 7.1 
Kenya  26 60 2.9 
Somalia  40 71 2.6 
South Sudan  15 87 3.6 
Sudan  34 75 2.8 
Uganda  23 72 1.5 
Source: (IGAD 2016:11, IGAD Baseline Studies, 2014, p 11) 
In order to attain  food security and sustainable environmental resources management, Pillar 1 
focuses on five programme areas: Agriculture, Livestock and Food Security Programme Area 
(include five programmes with three expected outcomes); Natural Resources Management 
(two components with two expected outcomes); Environment Protection Programme Area 
                                                 
13 https://igad.int/about-us/the-igad-region (accessed June 9, 2017). 
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(three components with two expected outcomes); Climate Variability and Change and Disaster 
Risk Management (four components with two expected outcomes); and Applied Research and 
CSO Support (with research as its fundamental component (IGAD 2016c:11).  
The organisation has outlined measurable indicators of success for these programmes of action 
which allow IGAD to contribute to the wise use, preservation and governance of natural 
resources (IGAD 2016c). As noted above, each of the programme areas has their own specific 
components/projects with determined outcomes/indicators. To demonstrate these, two 
programme areas of IGAD’s major programmes are considered under the rubric of Pillar 1: 
Agriculture, Livestock and Food Security Programme, and Natural Resources Management 
Programme areas.  
Agriculture, Livestock and Food Security Programme is split into five strategic programmes: 
agricultural production programme, food security programme, livestock development 
programme, dryland development programme and the fisheries management programme. 
Three main expected outcomes of these programmes are noted here: one is to improve and 
enhance food security through the development of agriculture, fisheries and livestock which 
the region is well endowed with despite struggling with agriculture which is largely dependent 
on erratic rainfall; two, improve livelihood and diminish poverty through agriculture 
development; and three, enhance resilience to natural disasters and economic shocks (IGAD 
2016c).  
Natural Resources Management Programme areas has two components: natural resources 
management framework for transboundary water resources management and renewable energy 
development. The expected outcomes of this programme are  “enhanced regional capacity in 
natural resources management” with two indicators with the first one being the “ability of 
IGAD to contribute to the wise utilization and preservation of the natural resources base of the 
region and the second one being I improved transnational governance of the natural resources 
(IGAD 2016c:6).  
The table below demonstrates that the number of projects, investment and resources IGAD put 
in place on agriculture, livestock and food security are much higher than the other programme 
areas. This is a succinct sign that agriculture is a predominant sector and it is a priority sector 
for IGAD. The required budget for the components and specific projects of this programme 
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area reveals this priority, with agriculture, livestock and food security taking the lion’s share 
of the budget set for programmes in this Pillar (sitting close to 50% of the total budget).  
Table 3. Pillar 1: Agriculture, Natural Resource and Environment (ANRE) 
Programme area 
 
Number of 
Programmes 
Number 
of Projects 
Available 
$ 
To be 
mobilised 
Total  Percent 
available  
Agriculture, Livestock and 
Food Security  (ALFS) 
5 20   2,389,997 66,770,000 69,159,997 3% 
Natural Resource 
Management (NRM) 
2 6   4,239,697 22,122,897   
26,362,594 
16% 
Environment Protection  
(EP) 
3 6   2,032,860 11,100,000 13,132,860 15% 
Climate Variability & 
Change and Disaster Risk 
Management (CVC) 
4 15 16,869,090   19,315,512   
36,184,602 
47% 
Applied Research & 
Community Service 
Organizations (ARCSO 
2 8 1,830,000 9,340,000 11,170,000 16% 
 
Total  
 
16 
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27,361,644 
 
128,648 409 
 
1,560,1005 
 
19.4% 
Source:(IGAD 2016c)   
 It is notable that considering the values of what is needed and what is already mobilised in 
these programmes in percentage suggests that there is a gap between aspirations and the real 
success of pillar 1. Evidently, the issue of environmental changes has become a critical problem 
in the region which has serious implications for food security and health as this has led to 
massive food insecurity and displacement of many of IGAD’s member states with Ethiopia, 
South Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia being the cases in point.         
Pillar 2: Economic Cooperation, Integration and Social Development 
Under this rubric, the aim is to enhance regional economic cooperation and social development 
for the region and, thus, strategically enhance regional integration. This pillar begins with the 
assessment of the existing level of trade in the region and in the continent. Thus, it is 
characterised by an extremely low level of trade of the African countries. The levels of intra-
regional trades are stagnant and regional market relation and linkage are extremely small 
(IGAD 2016c). Notably, addressing these concerns is treated as a central component of the 
integration objectives and necessary conditions for the development of regional integration.  
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Regional Strategy 2016-2020 (IGAD 2016c:7) outlines three components under this pillar: 
Trade, Investment, Industry and Tourism Development Programme; Infrastructural 
development programme and Health and Social Development Programme. Each one of these 
includes specific projects and each with its own timeframe and measurable outcomes. The 
broader key indicators of success for this pillar include: the number of cross-border trade 
agreements between all the member states, establishment of a functional free trade area of 
IGAD, modified human development index, migration policy and strategies developed and 
adopted by member states (IGAD 2016c).  
The first programme area of Pillar 2 deals with trade and investment, industry development 
and tourism to increase cross border trade and to enhance tourism in the region. The second 
area, the Infrastructure Development Programme, deals with the removal of the ‘physical and 
non-physical barriers’ to inter-state trade and investment and thus enhances safety on the 
transport system, mobilizes and identifies potential funding sources to issues related to socio-
economic integration. Health and Social Development Programme area deals with education, 
health employment, migration, culture and sports. Arguably, HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria are 
serious health and social challenges and this programme area focuses on the protection and 
eradication of the health related areas for the citizens (IGAD 2016c). 
The infrastructural development programme has three key programmes and these are the 
regional transport development, regional energy connectivity and the regional ICT promotion. 
Each of these has impressive projects with phased objectives and outcomes. For example, the 
regional body has proposed a development of what it calls Development of IGAD Regional 
Infrastructure Master Plan (IRIMP) as one project within the regional infrastructural 
development. Arguably, the vision of this master plan certainly offers an important regional 
strategic framework on transport connectivity which in turn would facilitate trade, economic 
relations and cost-effective and efficient transnational infrastructural development. The plan 
thus focuses on four sectors that are necessary for regional connectivity: transport, energy, ICT 
and transboundary water resources.  
IRIMP is thus considered to have far-reaching effects on regional integration as it has the 
potential of increasing trade, movements of goods, services and people. These are also expected 
to translate into sustained economic growth and poverty reduction.  Under this programme, 
regional strategy 2016-2020, has proposed the four outputs as part of the infrastructural 
development project: IGAD Regional Transport Master Plan 2014-2040; IGAD Regional 
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Energy Master Plan 2014-2040; IGAD Regional ICT Master Plan 2014-2040; and IGAD 
Regional Transboundary Water Resources Master Plan 2014-2040.14 These are major projects 
that require serious funding which in some ways is difficult to be met by member states. This 
would undoubtedly lead the organisation and regional states to look elsewhere for sources of 
funding.  
Table 4. Pillar 2: Economic Cooperation, Integration and Social Development (ECISD) 
Programme area 
 
Number of 
Programmes 
Number of 
Projects 
Available $ To be 
Mobilised 
Total  Percent 
available  
Trade, Industry and 
Tourism Development 
(TITD) 
3 8 100,000 2,510,000 2,610,000 4% 
Infrastructure 
Development (ID) 
3 14 4,912 500 48,839,000 53,751,500 9% 
Health and Social 
Development (HSD) 
8 31 4,400,000 35,670,000  
40,070,000 
11% 
 
Total  
 
16 
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9,412,500 
 
87,019,000 
 
96,431,500 
 
8% 
Source:(IAGD 2016c) 
The above table reveals that this organisation has made slightly higher investment on health 
and social development than the rest. Though it is hard to consider this as suggestive of where 
the organisation’s priority is with regards to this sector, it reflects, arguably, that this sector’s 
developmental challenge has drawn the attention of IGAD. The above table shows that the 
process of intra-regional trade with member states is still very low and thus needs to mobilise 
aggressively to promote economic growth and health competitive trades among the member 
states.15  
Pillar 3: Peace, Security, and Humanitarian Affairs 
The main aim of this pillar is to promote effective and efficient leadership, peace and stability 
and to address the challenges the region is facing concerning humanitarian security. Sustainable 
peace and the safety of all the citizens are the fundamental aspects of this pillar which are 
unquestionably necessary conditions for the sustainable and effective development in the 
region. This pillar begins with the recognition that the IGAD region experiences serious 
                                                 
14 This next chapter considers the following in some detail as part of the regional economic integration. 
15 This is also a theme explored in much more detail in the upcoming chapter.  
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challenges because of human induced as well as natural disasters and that in addition to this, 
the region hosts and suffers from intra and inter-state conflicts. Conflicts and other disasters 
thus feature as serious concerns of IGAD member states. The programmes under this pillar 
entail a desire to address and respond to these issues and thus bring all opportunities for 
permanent peace and stability in the IGAD region (IGAD 2016b).  
The Peace and Security Pillar has three programme areas with 6 programmes and 21 specific 
projects. The three programme areas are: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; 
Trans-national Security Threats; and Governance, Democracy, Rule of Law and Human 
Rights. The conflict prevention management and resolution programme area has three 
components and these are Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN), Enhancing 
IGAD’s capacity for preventive diplomacy and mediation, and Post-conflict reconstruction and 
development. The trans-national security threats area has three sub-programmes (namely, 
Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Coordination against existing, evolving and emerging 
Transnational Security Threats (EEE-TSTs); Enhancing Member States’ and IGAD’s 
Institutional and Human Capacities to Address EEE-TSTs; and Promoting and supporting 
regional and international normative, institutional/policy and programmatic frameworks to 
address EEE-TSTs). The governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights area has two 
components: one, strengthening the role of IGAD NGOs/CSOs on peace and security and other 
stakeholders; and two, assisting MSs in the area of democracy, good governance, elections, 
rule of law and HR (IGAD 2016c).  
The overall indicators of success for these programmes and sub-programmes under this pillar 
IGAD has outlined are two; these are: one, increased utilization of IGAD regional policies and 
mechanisms for peace and security issues and, two, effective cooperation among member states 
on addressing humanitarian issues (IGAD 2016c). Under this pillar, the region trans-nation 
security challenged appears to have received serious consideration by the authority. The 
region’s security and conflict affected the institution’s cost immensely. Programmes in this 
pillar have the second highest estimated cost, amounting to US$108,800,000 (the first one is 
Pillar 1 with estimated amount of US$156,010,000). Adding thrust to the claim of priority to 
peace and security, the authority had already raised substantial amount of the fund needed for 
this while it was designing the 2016-2020 implementation plan. Indeed, as Gebru (2016:16) 
puts it, since its inception, “[a]xiomatically, much of IGAD’s most visible work has been in 
the areas of peace and security.” When this is combined with the fact that much of the funds 
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for this are allocated for development of systems and structures and coordination and 
collaboration in tandem with the trans-national security, one gets a clear sense of what IGAD’s 
priority area is. Arguably, this is understandable when the number of state malaise, instability 
and insecurity besieging the region, particularly Somalia and South Sudan are taken into 
account.16 What is revealing is the authority’s inability to raise any fund for running 
Governance, Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights (GDRL), an area which the region 
has lagged behind in comparison to other regions in the continent.   
Pillar 4: Corporate Development Service 
Pillar 4 aims to promote the overall corporate capacity of IGAD to efficiently address its 
mandate and ensure that all the member states follow the process collectively (IGAD 2016c). 
Under this pillar, the authority has two programme areas and 5 programmes with a total of 23 
projects. These are for the large part based on the 2015 IGAD’s internal and external self-
assessment. The assessments addressed all the aspects of IGAD including its historical 
evolution, mandate, management structure, human and financial resources, policy issues, 
programmes and activities, relationships and responsibilities, achievements, challenges and 
opportunities (IGAD 2016b). These particular assessments generated valuable 
recommendations which have the potential of contributing immensely to the Secretariat’s drive 
for self-improvement. To translate these recommendations proactively into concrete actions 
that would engender the required transformation, the Secretariat is expected to focus on two 
key programme areas under Pillar 4: institutional strengthening and capacity building, research, 
science and technology (IGAD 2016c). 
Table 5. Pillar 4: Corporate Development Services 
Programme area 
 
Number of 
Programmes 
Number 
of Projects 
Available $ To be 
Mobilised 
Total  Percent 
available  
Institutional Strengthening 
and Capacity Building 
Programme Area (ISAP) 
4 20  38,983,000 - 38,983,000 100% 
Research, Science and 
Technology Programme 
Area (RST) 
1 3 - 1,700,000 1,700,000 0% 
Total 5 23  38,983,000 1,700,000 40,683,000 50% 
Source:(IGAD 2016b) 
                                                 
16The chapter on peace and security deals with these initiatives and interventions.   
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These strategic objectives of this pillar are meant to “enhance the corporate capacity of IGAD 
to effectively and efficiently deliver its mandate”(IGAD 2016d). Indicators of success outlined 
for this include: a vibrant and more effective IGAD able to provide sustainable service delivery 
capacity benefits to the region and level of donor interest in ‘basket funding’ IGAD’s 
programmes and activities (IGAD 2016d). As the table below shows, institutional 
strengthening and capacity building have a considerable amount of costs, although there is a 
potential input for efficient and effective economic growth and the science and technology 
sector really need attention. 
3.6 Financing IGAD’s Regional Strategy 2016-2020 
As we have noted above, over all, one can clearly see the comprehensive and the detailed nature 
of these regional strategic plans and the pillars that the authority has set out to guide its strategic 
5 years plans and regional initiatives. In the end, however, there are few factors that determine 
its success. One can raise efficient organisational structure, political will etcetera as important 
factors. Nonetheless, funding and resources sit at the heart of the success or failure of these 
projects. For these programmes and projects to take off and deepen in the region, the 
availability of funds is central. There are two components to financial requirements of IGAD; 
one is to its institutional operations and activities and the second one is related to programmes 
and projects.  
Despite the assertion that funding these operations is the responsibility of the member states, 
the authority has had to consistently look for external funders to meet the funding requirements 
of these projects. It is rather troubling to note that such a regional organisation considers 
looking elsewhere for funding and assistance as an indicator for effective delivery on its 
objectives of capacity building and corporate development. As the table below shows, the 
shortfall for funding requirement for the projects the authority has set under its strategic plan 
2016-2020 is substantial. It has referred to this shortfall as “funds to be mobilised”, which is 
over 70% of the total fund requirement (this amounts to US$286,170,000 out of the 
US$401,930,000) (IGAD 2016c:16).   
 
 
 
59 
 
Table 6. IGAD’s Pillars and their funding requirements, RS 2016-2020 
 
 
  
Available funds  
 
Funds to be mobilized 
 
Total funds (mill.USD) 
 
Percent available 
Pillar 1 27.36 128.65 156.01 18% 
Pillar 2 9.41 87.02 96.43 10% 
Pillar 3 40.00 68.80 108.80 37% 
Pillar 4 38.98 1.70 40.68 96% 
Total   115.76 286.17 401.93 29% 
Source:  (IGAD 2016c) 
These projects and programmes outlined in RS of 2016-2020 invariably have two dimensions, 
on the one hand, there is what the authority has to undertake as a facilitator, and on the other 
hand, there is what the member states need to undertake. In this sense, the funding requirements 
of IGAD relate to the facilitation of these projects while the actual projects would need to be 
funded by the member states or in cooperation with other funders. A good example is IGAD’s 
infrastructural development programme, such as Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia 
Transport (LAPPSSET). As it is, IGAD will engage in the feasibility and detailing design of 
the studies of the LAPSSET Railway project while the states involved would have to find the 
actual fund to build these on the ground. It should thus be clear that the authority’s financial 
requirements are limited to its already outlined intervention areas. IGAD indicates that the 
regional strategy 2016-2020 of its medium to long- term plans seeks to realise the desired 
objectives and it has delineated four intervention areas: policy development, knowledge 
management, research and technology and capacity building including gender issues in the 
respective priority areas within IGAD’s pillars (IGAD 2016c).  
To deal with its project, the organisation in its RS 2016-2020 document indicates that it would 
seek to improve its funding schemes and mobilisation of resource, through working with 
member states, bilateral and multilateral donors engage with non-traditional donors and create 
an  IGAD endowment fund (IGAD 2016c:15). The first presumption is that operational funding 
contributions should come from all the member states. One of the main responsibility of the 
member states is the cost of running the organization towards the objectives, and cost of 
funding projects and programmers of the authority. Considering that it has only been Kenya 
and Ethiopia who have been paying for the membership fee and contribute to these 
programmes, there cannot be any doubt that the organisation has simply been looking into 
external funders to meet these financial requirements. It is also not clear how the IGAD 
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endowment fund is going to be established while these member states are not even sufficiently 
contributing to these programmes.  
Therefore, it is clear that meeting the organisation’s financial requirements is heavily 
dependent on external funding sources. In fact, most of IGAD’s financial means come from 
donors, grants, savings, subsidies and taxes from the European Union and other international 
financial organisations. One of the recent funds/support comes from the European Union (EU) 
and the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) agreement, which signed a 42 million euros 
grant to assist and capacitate IGAD with resources to carry out peace and security agendas in 
the Horn of the African region. The agreement was signed on March 23, 2018 (Ashenafi 2018; 
IGAD 2016b). Notably, the grants made available from external funders have been focused on 
Pillar 3: peace and security. For example, the grant agreement with Australian government, 
which covers a four-year period from 2018 to 2022, is geared towards improving its conflict 
early warning systems and thus become more skilled in mediation and countering trans-
national security threats in the region. Another funding agreement IGAD entered with the 
governments of Austria and Sweden focuses on, once again, Pillar 3.  
This agreement is one of many initiatives being funded by the European Union Emergency 
Trust Fund for Africa (EUETFA), which was established to promote stability and address the 
fundamental causes of migration and displaced persons in the region. The main objective of 
this agreement which will be implemented for the coming four years is to advance the IGAD 
conflict early warning and response mechanism. These are meant to enable cooperation 
between member states and at large the continent on countering transnational security threats. 
Additionally, the skills of IGAD and national governments in the region is sought to be 
enhanced for preventive diplomacy and mediation and thus provide capacity building and core 
staffing for IGAD’s peace and security division (Ashenafi 2018). 
It is notable, therefore, that dependence on external donors has the tendency of being skewed 
by the geopolitical interests of the donors and may not reflect the region’s priority. As a result, 
the pillars and projects meant to deal with the region’s most pressing problems still lack 
sufficient funding. IGAD is still struggling to find funding for Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 for which 
the authority had only managed to raise 18% and 10% respectively in 2016 and not much has 
been collected since then. What these perhaps reveal is that both external funders and IGAD’s 
priority is towards peace and security. Arguably, peace and security are major concerns in the 
Horn of Africa region where IGAD’s member states are located. The broader objectives for 
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these countries is the authority engages in the region and work cooperatively with the regional 
states to deal with peace and security. These activities are meant to improve the collection and 
distribution of early warning data so that IGAD and its member state governments can take 
action in time to prevent conflicts. These funding include financing the cost of sending 
mediation teams into conflicts ridden areas and thus offer training in mediation and preventive 
diplomacy to improve the skills of the mediators. These external funders’ agreements are also 
geared towards trans-national security threats such as violent extremism and terrorism and 
work together towards finding lasting solutions.  
The ultimate goal of regional integration entails cooperation and coordination among the 
neighbouring states. IGAD has the strategic framework of enhancing the poor economic 
condition in the region. In 1997, IGAD member states identified that the integration should be 
a mutual collaboration and guidance rather than the practice of donor-recipient relationship 
with the dependency syndrome (Weldesellassie 2011). As a result, the IGAD Partnership 
Forum (IPF) was established for development to assist member states “with funds for sub-
regional development programmes, focussing on infrastructure projects. The IPF worked with 
IGAD at three levels: technical expert level, operational/ambassadorial level and policy or 
ministerial level” (Weldesellassie 2011:4). Therefore, both member states shared a common 
vision and objectives. According to Hartmann (2016), currently, IPF comprises the “United 
Nation Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank, International Organisation for 
Migration, European Union, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy Japan, Netherland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA” (Hartmann, 
2016).  
3.7 Conclusion  
The chapter outlined IGAD’s strategic framework, the structure and operational strategy with 
four major pillars identifying cooperation as a critical factor among the member states. The 
core objective of IGAD is thus to pursue  economic cooperation and regional integration by 
averting and eliminating security threats in the region as they negatively affect the economic 
cooperation and development in the region. IGAD’s successive regional strategic plans and the 
pillars within which these are conceptualised are evidently comprehensive and expansive. 
However, the lack of funding and its skewed nature as it focuses on peace and security reveals 
the challenges this organisation faces in its effort to implement these strategic plans. There is 
need for IGAD member states to mobilize and allocate proper funding mechanisms that should 
strengthen and sustain IGAD.  
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The regional body needs to look into internal funding mechanisms. Such meaningful strategy 
regarding funding can reduce being dependent on external donors which comes with strings 
attached that have the potential of hampering its activities in all priority areas (Wafula 2015). 
There is thus need for the region to develop a funding strategy to be independent and self-
supporting to mobilize sufficient amount of financial and technical resources in order to 
successfully implement the plan earmarked to span from 2016 to 2020. Security is a great 
concern for the IGAD’s region. The continuous unstable security and peace in the region made 
it difficult for the institution to exercise its institutional mandates and financial resources as 
planned. The institution spends much time and efforts on conflicts and the sustainability of 
peace and security rather than the economic development of the region, wellbeing of the 
citizen’s extreme poverty, famine and unemployment in the region. Member states have to 
work closely for socio-economic and political integration to materialise. Thus, the 
peacebuilding approaches need a strong collaboration of all the member states for sustainable, 
permanent and long-term peace building in each member state at the regional level.    
IGAD’s strategic  plan spanning from 2016 to 2020 is designed “on a realistic and actual 
assessment of expected outcomes, focusing on the priority areas where IGAD Secretariat has 
a comparative advantage as described in the strategy”(IGAD 2016b:5). Both phases of the 
strategic plan of the authority were based on key pillars, with key objectives, programmes of 
actions and specific outcomes and indicators. This study posed the following questions: How 
much has been achieved through translating this pillar in real practices of IGAD specifically as 
it relates to good governance, rule of law conducive and supportive business environment? Do 
all IGADs strategies achieve the desired aim and objectives accordingly? So, the final 
outcomes of this pillar are expected to be real practices at the regional and national level that 
entail law and institutions making, establishment of efficient bureaucracy, conducive business 
environment, and sustained business support. Thus, the next two chapters closely examine the 
two pillars namely, peace and security, and Economic Cooperation and Integration and Social 
Development.  
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Chapter Four 
Reflection on IGAD’s Regional Economic Integration Project 
  
4.1 Introduction 
The exploration of the context of IGAD’s economic integration initiative begins with 
considering its mandate as part of the RECs and the direction given to them in the Abuja Treaty. 
de Melo and Tsikata (2013) note that “the RECs were to be the ‘building blocs’ of the hoped-
for African union in the immediate postcolonial era. Now, they are central for implementing 
the socio- economic and security plan in the region” (de Melo and Tsikata 2013:4). IGAD, as 
one REC in the Horn of Africa’s region, was formed in line with the direction specified by the 
Abuja Treaty for the formation of RECs. The purpose of these RECs include promoting 
economic growth, inclusive socio-economic development and industrialisation in the 
continent. These are meant to materialise through measured and step-by-step regional 
economic integration of the continent constituting the sub-regional blocks – such as IGAD.  
Formulating short and long-term strategic plans requires honest assessment of the existing 
conditions within which the RECs are operating.  As explored in Chapter Three explores, 
IGAD as one of the RECs of this region has developed two five years strategic plans (from 
2011-2015 and 2016-2020) which are also in many respects linked to three important targets: 
the Abuja Treaty for Continental Integration, AU’s Agenda 2063, and the UN’s SDG. These 
strategic plans of IGAD consider the developmental, political and economic dimensions and 
thus link to these continental and global agendas. Most importantly, these plans are also aware 
of the linkages and intertwined nature of the problems the region is facing and the solution 
therefor. This has been established in Chapter Three while exploring the four pillars the 
regional body outlined as part of IGAD’s strategic plan.   
While acknowledging these linkages, this chapter, however, confines itself to the economic 
integration dimension of the regional integration project.  This chapter, therefore, focuses only 
on two programme areas of Pillar 2: trade, investment, industry and tourism development 
programme and the infrastructural development programme. This chapter also, assesses the 
performance of IGAD member states drawing assessment data mainly from the data made 
available by the Economic Commission for Africa and IGAD’s state of the region report.  
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As succinctly stated in the Abuja Treaty, regional integration is viewed as a route to addressing 
economic and developmental challenges of the region. In this sense, economic integration and 
cooperation, within the context of RCs, are crucial in transforming the region’s economy and 
socioeconomic conditions. In line with this, IGAD has placed these within its regional strategic 
framework with the impulse of prioritising regional networks of infrastructure (ICT, 
transportation and energy) and trade. This chapter thus explores these initiatives in the IGAD 
region by assessing their progress and trajectory. This chapter discusses how the various 
projects are conceptualised under the rubric of intra-regional economic integration and trade in 
the greater Horn of Africa region. In line with this, this chapter also explores what the regional 
body has put in place and proposed in order to achieve economic and technological integration 
among its member states. Following these, the chapter engages with the conditions and factors 
influencing these aspirations.  
4.2 Context for Economic Integration in the IGAD Region 
The IGAD region is undoubtedly a region that, in as much it is struggling politically, is 
suffering economic challenges. Of these, the most formidable ones are poverty, unemployment, 
and failing agriculture as a result of land and environmental degradation. It is for this reason 
that IGAD’s (IGAD 2016b) strategic document links sufficiently the food security and drought 
and disaster reduction with its economic and market integration approaches. This is a 
recognition that the greater Horn of Africa region’s profound threats of land and environmental 
degradation pose serious threats to its economic growth and agricultural production. Such 
conceptualisation considers economic integration as having ripple effects in the material and 
social wellbeing of the population in the region.  
In recognition of this, IGAD has set out to deal with economic integration in its regional 
strategic plan. These aspirations and objectives are reflected succinctly in two of its Pillars: 
Pillar 1 - Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment and Pillar 2 - Economic 
Cooperation, Integration, and Social Development. The obvious is that elements of these pillars 
feed into and overlap with each other despite their presentation as being under two separate 
pillars. The regional body also envisioned the programmes under these pillars to be 
strategically linked to the UN’s SDG set for 2030 and the AU’s Agenda 2063. As already noted, 
Pillar 1 focuses fundamentally on environmental related challenges the region is facing while 
Pillar 2 is geared to engage with social and economic challenges. Both Regional Strategic plans 
(2011-2015 and 2016-2020) IGAD has developed consider Pillar 2 as a measure of addressing 
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the economic challenges of the region by focusing on trade, investment, industry and tourism, 
along with the necessary infrastructural development to make this happen (what is slightly 
different on 2016-2020 is the inclusion of health and social development). 
IGAD’s own self-assessment also reveals that insufficient infrastructure, lack of market 
linkages, poor intra-regional and national trade characterise the region’s economic space 
(IGAD 2016b, 2016a). This is a huge disadvantage in the global competitive market. The 
regional body thus claims that its “over-arching objective of regional integration is to create an 
open, unified, regional economic space for private operators which is a single market open to 
competitive entry and well integrated into the global economy” (IGAD 2016b:9). The authority 
also indicates that the region in addition to the above needs to reconfigure its connectivity in 
terms of infrastructure, ICT and energy as priority areas (IGAD 2016c).  
Beyond this, as the Economic Commission for Africa (2018) points out, sustained and 
improved business environment, good political and economic governance and management, 
social development strategies that are consistent with the needs of the industrial and modern 
sectors are required. Getting this done requires embracing regionalism and genuine cooperation 
of the member states and openness to the coordination of their economic and trade policies. 
Arguably, indeed, buttressing regionalism is seen in many respects as a fundamental solution 
to many of the challenges the region is facing.  
To encourage mutual benefits, states, civil societies, political and economic elites in the region 
must develop transnational thinking, relations and bonds to transcend the interest of states and 
aligning partnerships with national, regional and international cooperation at large.  For these 
to be effect it is necessary to work with and through the four core strategies towards creating 
economic cooperation within the sub-region (ECA 2018). These are based on encouraging 
agricultural production; promoting free trade and enlarging regional market; enhancing the 
development of regional investment and rationalization of industrialization; attracting tourism, 
developing infrastructure and communication among the member states (ECA 2018). 
In addition to this, necessary institutions, policies and programmes need to be put in place in 
order to ensure structural transformation and industrialisation of the member states. Arguably, 
conducive socio-economic conditions, peace and security as well as political will are equally 
important to ensure that these outcomes are realised (ECA 2015:9). Notwithstanding the 
declared allegiances for regionalism among the member states, it is very hard not to see the 
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rivalry and competition among them. In many instances it has been established that a gain for 
one country is treated as a loss for the other. A typical example in this regard relates to ports 
which are already servicing (Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia) and those with the potential of 
servicing Ethiopia (Eritrea, Kenya) which exhibit subtle rivalry.  
Regrettably, the regional member states’ engagement in economic and trade relations are often 
characterised by competition rather than cooperation and agreed upon regional strategy on 
these. This is understandable since these are defined and influences significantly by the 
political economy of the state rather than regionalism through cooperating on and 
complementing each other. True to the political economy of intergovernmentalism, the regional 
states entered the block with the intention of promoting the national interests thus opening up 
the block for multi-pronged competition and rivalry for dominance and control. The argument 
is that without strategic regional trade, exchange and cooperation, agroindustry, technology 
and environment, it is unclear when and how social, economic and political modernisation will 
be realised.  
Thus, the more pressing concern is whether IGAD as a regional body has the necessary political 
and material space as well as the requisite institutional capacity to develop its own policy and 
thus carry out its mandate. In other words, there is we need to weigh  its administrative authority 
with defined power over its spheres of influence with the view of  exercising its will and thus 
accomplish its aims autonomously (Weldesellassie 2011). Thus, there is need to evaluate the 
organisation beyond the declarations and reports on what it actually set out as programmes and 
projects and its capacities as critical components towards achieving its core objectives and thus 
turn regional agreements into effective practice.  
What is apparent is that the region has huge potential as  its combined GDP sits at about 
US$313 Billion and the population size over 268 million which mostly is a young population 
(see the table below). These are suggestive of the region’s collective potentials in terms of 
shared markets, trade and size of the economy. Also, the region has a large area covering 
“mineral resources that have not yet been fully utilized as a result of the main challenges in 
maximizing the agricultural potential of the IGAD’s region stemming from the high degree of 
lack of consistency in the rainfall patterns as they occur both in space and in time” (IGAD 
2016b:25).  
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Table 7: Regional Indicators for IGAD 
Selected regional indicators for IGAD (2017)17 
GDP $313.4 billion 
GDP per capita $1167 
Area (sq. km) 5.5 million sq. km 
Total population 268.458 million 
Total imports $61.8 billion 
Total exports $32.1 billion 
 
The region’s economies are also the least developed and less diverse. Despite the fact that that 
the IGAD region has been experiencing a steady growth over the decade, it still has a combined 
balance of payment negative US$29.7 Billion (2017). The region’s strong economies are 
Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia. Thus the bulk of the GDP of the region comes from these countries. 
Thus far, the region’s economy depends for the large part on agriculture and export of basic 
commodities (from agriculture and mining). Developing the intra-regional trade and having the 
economies and market linked will offer the region the much needed boost to transform these 
economies.   
Expanding linkages and relations of the region’s economies would benefit tremendously the 
much needed development and transformation of the region. Unfortunately, institutional costs 
of trade and the business environment of the member states are rather prohibitive for this to 
materialise. This combined with the corruption and uncertainties have made cross-boundary 
ventures unappealing. Consequently, there is a region of states with small local markets and 
the disintegration of regional businesses whose linkages are dominated by ties with outside 
economies outside the region. These conditions in turn translate into lack of proper economies 
in the production of goods and services (Hartzenberg 2011). For example, while the oil 
produced in South Sudan is exported outside of the region, the regional states continue to 
purchase oil from the Middle East. Arvis et al (2016:463) point out “that trade costs are 
generally higher in the developing world than in the developed world but the problem is 
particularly severe for the poorest developing countries.” 
                                                 
17 https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx (accessed August 2019) 
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It is also particularly notable that the process of regional integration has been hampered by 
unconstrained expenditure and misappropriation of public funds after the independence of the 
African states (Qobo 2007). To add to this, most of the IGAD member states have quite low 
governance indicators (Thonke and Spliid 2012). These are combined effects on the regional 
economic integration. On the one hand, misuse and abuse of public resource takes resources 
away from the most pressing areas of infrastructural development and other public investments. 
On the other hand, these behaviours often have the tendency of negatively shaping policy 
spaces which in such situations subject the trans-boundary economic and trade policies to 
possibilities of being hijacked by economic and political elites. In other words, regional 
projects and programmes would be more than likely to be evaluated within the narrow interests 
of these corrupt political and economic elites. In recognition of this problem, the regional body 
states that“[c]urrently all protracted and complicated problems in the IGAD region relate to an 
absence of legitimacy either due to unpopular governance and intolerance to diversity or the 
lack of capacity and political will to deliver public goods” (IGAD 2016a:44-45). 
The IGAD region has been receiving the lowest share of FDI per capita, comparing to the other 
RECs of the continent for more than ten years (2005-2017) and these are attributable to the 
issues and challenges noted above. Also, accounting for this state of affairs are the civil wars 
and conflicts (both intra and inter-states ones) that have been ravaging the region for a while. 
These are the underlying factors framing the region’s economies, its potentials and challenges. 
Thus, the regional economic integration initiatives would have to be considered within the 
context of these underlying conditions in the region.  The strategic plans of IGAD for the last 
two five (5) years cycle have pointed out these challenges and opportunities and formulated 
the specific programmes/projects as the regional level as a response to them. The following 
section thus assesses the regional economic integration initiatives of IGAD over this period 
mainly drawing from ECA’s regional integration reports and IGAD’s own self-assessment.  
4.3 Assessing Regional Economic Integration of IGAD Member States  
As already noted, economic integration in Africa is seen as a route to transforming the continent 
to ensure development and wellbeing of its people. Economic integration is also one of the 
most important pointers for regionalism and regional integration. Economic integration thus 
features as one of the crucial indicators for the African region’s Index which is an index that 
measures the stages, success and progress of the integration process in Africa. ECA developed 
for the African economic integration index is the most widely used one. The main aim of the 
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Index is to comprehensively assess the regional economic integration processes and dynamics 
by focusing on the mechanisms, strategy and policy directions. This index uses five indicators 
to measure integration. These are regional infrastructure, trade integration, productive 
integration, free movement of people and financial and macroeconomic integration (ECA 
2016a).  Each of these has its own specific indicators which are outlined in the following (taken 
from ECA 2016a:11). 
Regional infrastructure: the main target in this is that each state has to facilitate trade and 
investment opportunity by providing transportation, financial intuitions and arrange 
communication networks for the purpose of mutual sustainable economic development in the 
region. This is measured by using the following indicators: Infrastructure Development Index: 
transport; electricity; ICT; water and sanitation; and Proportion of intra-regional fights; Total 
regional electricity trade (net) per capita; Average cost of roaming. 
 
Trade integration: this focuses on economic integration which deals with the collective 
coordination of trade policies among the member states and the region as a whole, weighed 
against the extent of tariff and non-tariff restrictions on trade and investment. It has the 
following indicators: Level of customs duties on imports; Share of intra-regional goods exports 
(% GDP); Share of intra-regional goods imports (% GDP); and Share of total intra-regional 
goods trade (% total intra-REC trade). 
 
Productive integration: this entails the fair division of intra-regional intermediate exports 
within the member states (African Union 2016). According to the Index, the productive 
integration works on the percentage of intra-regional goods exports and it has the following 
specific indicators: Share of intra-regional intermediate goods exports (% intra-regional 
exports); Share of intra-regional intermediate goods imports (% intra-regional imports); and 
Merchandise Trade Complementarity Index. 
 
Free movement of people: it is directly measured by considering legislations governing the 
movement of people and the ratification of the free movement of people from one member 
state to other states without requiring a visa for entry. The following are its indicators: 
Proportion of REC member countries whose nationals do not require a visa for entry; 
Ratification (or not) of REC protocol on free movement of persons; and Proportion of REC 
member countries whose nationals are issued with a visa on arrival. 
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Financial and macroeconomic integration: this measures the coordination of fiscal and 
monetary policies at the regional level and intergovernmental policy development on these. Its 
indicators are Regional convertibility of national currencies and Inflation rate differential 
(based on HPCI). 
These indicators and value measures in many instances relate to what IGAD has developed as 
programmes, projects and indicators of success. For example, the infrastructural development 
programme area has three important sub-programme areas (Regional ICT Promotion; Regional 
Transport Development; and Regional energy interconnectivity). These have direct relations 
within items listed under the regional infrastructural indicator developed by ECA (transport, 
electricity, ICT, water and sanitation).  
There are two ways in which the data is presented by ECA for regional economic integration 
in the continent. One set of data explores the integration index of each member state and the 
other data set is presented as regional performance. A specific score is presented on each 
member state considering their performance in each of the indicators of regional integration. 
As the data below shows, Kenya and Uganda have the highest scores in the regional integration 
index, weighed against the overall integration scores with various indicators of the IGAD 
member states (ECA 2018). Except for Uganda and Kenya (scoring 0.67 and 0.76 respectively), 
the rest of IGAD members states integration index score is, once again, below average which 
is the average score considered [0.5].  
Based on the overall dimension scores, Uganda and Kenya score high on “Trade integration 
(TI); Productive integration (PI); Free movement of people (FMP) and the Financial and 
macroeconomic integration (FMI)” (ECA 2018). Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea scores average 
while South Sudan and Somalia are the lowest performers. It is not surprising that South Sudan 
and Somalia scores are extremely low considering their political context. However, below is 
the average score of Sudan which is something that requires explanation. All IGAD member 
states, except Somalia, are simultaneously members of COMESA. As members of COMESA, 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan have the lowest integration index and are sitting at the 
bottom four out of 20 states (ECA 2016a:14). It should be noted that almost all the member 
states of IGAD have overlapping membership with COMESA (Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, 
Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti), EAC (Kenya and Uganda), and CEN-SAD (Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
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Sudan, Somalia). These overlapping memberships entail differential economic relations and 
structural linkages and thus shape the differential scores in the indexes. 
 
           Figure 3. Summary of each country’s ranking for IGAD        
Source:https://www.integrate-africa.org/rankings/regional-economic-communities/igad/ 
Uganda and Kenya are also countries that are in East African Community (EAC) and 
COMESA. Two factors account for their better than average performance in the integration 
index. Firstly, both of them are in EAC, and EAC has pushed the integration project a bit more 
than the rest. Indeed, EAC is the better performing region in all the indicators with the 
exception of Financial and macroeconomic integration [with the score of 0.156].  Secondly, 
this is accounted for by their colonial legacy since as British colonies their economic, trade and 
social infrastructures are connected. Kenya is the performer in the IGAD region, scoring highly 
on the four indicators of regional economic integration (on trade integration; productive 
integration; free movement of people; and financial and macroeconomic integration).  
Uganda has the highest score on free movement of people, trade integration and productive 
integration. This is accounted by Uganda’s unique position deriving from its historical 
structural linkages to Kenya and Tanzania and as a land locked state (thus dependent on 
regional states for export and trade) and a member of EAC and IGAD. Similarly, Djibouti has 
scored high on three areas: productive integration, regional infrastructure and financial and 
macroeconomic integration. Undeniably, these are directly linked to Djibouti’s structural 
linkage to the Ethiopian economy as Djibouti depends on Ethiopia for water, electricity and 
other commodities, and it is also the major outlet for Ethiopian import and export. Somalia’s 
and South Sudan’s poor performance certainly have to do with the political instability and crisis 
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that these countries have had to endure. Somalia’s crisis, for example, has lasted for almost 
three decades. 
The ECA report shows that IGAD has the following scores in the specific indicators of 
integration: trade Integration (0.5), regional infrastructure (0.63), productive integration (0.43), 
free movement of people (0.45), and financial and macroeconomic integration (0.22). The 
IGAD region scores the highest [0.63] in the regional infrastructure when compared to the other 
continental RCs and extremely low in financial and macroeconomic integration [0.22].    
The intra-IGAD member states trade (both for import and export) constitute 14% of the total 
trade of the regional block. Although this appears to be positive, it is still significantly lower 
than the region’s trade with the rest of the world (for example, China 21% and the EU 16%).18 
All of the IGAD member states’ import from Africa is less than 20%, while their export is also 
far too low. These are indicative of the extent to which trade and market integration in IGAD 
has been slower than the aspirations and declaration. IGAD (2011; 2016b), in its regional 
strategic documents has indicated to work towards regional economic cooperation and 
integration and open a single regional economic space with a single market. These are meant 
to focus on the development of integrated regional infrastructure and a gradual harmonisation 
of policies. Despite these declarations of intent, there are hardly any noticeable signs signifying 
actual progress. There is no regional trade agreements at the IGAD level for example. It should 
be noted also that IGAD has approved a Minimum Integration Plan in January 2012 whose 
objective was economic cooperation, integration of trade as well as harmonisation of trade 
policies and standards. Contrary to this set objective, there is nothing substantive in these 
regard after ten (10) years.  
IGAD member states’ slow progress in these stems from the multiple overlapping memberships 
and unequal development in the integration process of these REC. These uneven developments 
create an environment for states in the IGAD region to take extreme precaution, with the other 
REC member states showing a significant progressive level of market integration. For example, 
three of the IGAD member states (Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan) are members of EAC with 
far more advanced market integration which is splitting the IGAD member states. Another one 
is the progress in COMESA (to which most of IGAD member states belong) is pushing for 
                                                 
18The data for these is compiled from UNCTAD database, and data for 2017.  
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market integration and aligning itself with other RECs. Thus, alignments and coordination of 
policies among the RECs are the only outlets out of such concerns.   
Nevertheless, IGAD’s performance in trade integration cannot be discounted. It sits as the third 
best performing REC (with EAC 1st, and UMA 2nd and a tie with COMESA). IGAD’s 
performance in this is for the large part aided by its members in EAC and COMESA. This is 
reflected in the fact that it has scored the highest in the level of customs duties on imports 
which are by far determined as part of both EAC (which has level of customs duties on imports 
score [1]) and COMESA), while performing poorly in the intra-regional trade (% of total intra-
REC), import [% of GDP] and export [% of GDP] (0.46, 0.18 and 0.42 respectively).19 Once 
again, the region block is also performing better than the other continental RECs on productive 
integration. Arguably, IGAD’s performances on these are primarily supported by Kenya and 
Uganda whose performance scores are aligned with EAC and COMESA.  
The regional block has scored low on another crucial regional economic integration indicators 
which are financial and macro-economic integration. The IGAD region has zero score on 
regional convertibility of national currencies and it has no plan or proposal on these either. This 
is certainly a disincentive for intra-regional trade and investment. Djibouti is the better 
performing country in the block with financial and macro-economic integration which in many 
respects is suggestive of its deeper integration with the Ethiopian economy rather than its 
performance towards integration with the regional block as a whole.   
The regional block is one of the poorly performing RECs in terms of the free movement of 
people. In fact, IGAD does not have any discernible protocol governing the movement of 
people within the region. Neither have the regional states ratified the AU’s REC protocol on 
the free movement of persons. While Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea have expanded their 
list of countries whose nationals do not require a visa, visa on arrival appears to be the dominant 
rule in the IGAD region. These are indeed functions of the bilateral agreement states in the 
region have entered into with each other rather than a collective IGAD-based dispensation.  
Integration in terms of regional infrastructure is where IGAD has done better than the other 
RECs. IGAD has the highest score on regional infrastructure (0.63) when compared to the other 
RECs. Its specific scores of each indicator for regional infrastructure integration is as follows: 
                                                 
19https://www.integrate-africa.org/rankings/dimensions/trade-integration/. 
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Infrastructure Development Index (0.53); Proportion of intra-regional flights (0.39); Total 
regional electricity trade (net) per capita (0.82); Average cost of roaming (0.40). Clearly, 
electricity trade among the regional states is the highest and this is essentially a significant 
contribution of Ethiopia with its massive hydro electricity output and trade with its neighbours 
(Kenya, Sudan, Djibouti, and potentially South Sudan and extending to Tanzania). South Sudan 
and Djibouti have the highest score in the regional infrastructural development.  
In its two strategic documents IGAD has expressed the desire to expand regional infrastructural 
development with multiple programmes and projects outlined in this regard. These include 
development of regional physical infrastructure (road, rail, port, and air transportation) and 
integration in energy (oil, gas, hydropower, wind and geothermal energy). The specific projects 
outlined under the rubric of Pillar 2 of IGAD’s regional strategic documents are very clear in 
this regard.  
IGAD has proposed multiple projects which range from constructing new transnational 
highways, electricity grids and ICT projects to upgrading existing ones (IGAD 2016c). These 
include IGAD Regional Transport Master Plan 2014-2040; IGAD Regional Energy Master 
Plan 2014-2040; IGAD Regional ICT Master Plan 2014-2040; and IGAD Regional 
Transboundary Water Resources Master Plan 2014-2040. These are outlined along with their 
proposed timeframes to fit with the African Union agenda 2063 of building the necessary 
infrastructure and ICT to support Africa’s integration and development (ECA 2015).  
As part of such initiatives, IGAD has designed what it calls the Horn of Africa Initiative 
(HOAI) to enhance the regional connectivity, with an eye on promoting IGAD’s economic 
competitiveness. A typical example in this regard is the LAPSSET Corridor programme which 
is by far the most complex and advanced projects the IGAD region has ever embarked upon. 
The ambitious project intends to connect Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan with an oil pipe 
line, inter-regional highway and gauged railway lines. This project is conceptualised to connect 
the Lamu Port of Kenya with these three countries both for logistic and tourism purposes. 
However, the fact that such a huge project would only be connecting three countries has not 
gone down well with the other regional states, particularly, Sudan and Uganda. In reaction to 
this, Uganda has been in talks with Tanzania on a similar project, with the exclusion of Kenya 
and Ethiopia. Ethiopia has also pursued separately the South Sudan-Ethiopia-Djibouti pipeline. 
These are suggestive of the incoherent bilateral and trilateral strategies, and often built with 
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rivalry and competition. Besides these, many of the projects under this rubric are embattled by 
lack of internal funding and sustained political commitment to see them through.  
Thus, developing a coherent regional economic integration strategy, with elaborate and 
inclusive agreement and policies and the necessary institutions to sustain them is crucial to 
materialising these aspirations. The IGAD member states thus need to reach consensus on how 
to configure the regional trade, market, infrastructure, and macroeconomic policies in order to 
make substantive progress in regional integration (RI) and ensure a better life for the citizens 
in the respective member states. Member states should see the opportunities in these regional 
economic integration initiatives and thus engage in complementing instead of competing with 
each other.  In other words, they need to stop assuming one’s gain would be the other one’s 
loss. Avoiding such perception also requires developing an inclusive regional project and 
programmes that would boost the economies of the region. Thus, for the regional economic 
integration to succeed and meaningfully impact positively on all the member states, efficient 
regional institutions, inclusive projects, and evenly distributed capacities and infrastructures 
are critical. 
4.4 Linking the Economic Integration, Agriculture, Social Development and 
Environment 
The IGAD region’s regional strategic plan considers social development such as health, labour, 
gender issues as crucial elements of its regional integration plan. Health and social 
development (with social protection, education, migration, gender as central concerns) are 
treated as central to the region’s development and there must be regional measures and 
coordination at the regional level. The youth and sports programs are the most ambitious ones 
in this category.  These are clear indications that the regional body considers economic 
integration as going goes hand in hand with sociocultural integration. Besides this, most of 
these issues have regional dimensions and as such do require regional responses.   
In addition to the above, the regional block is also cognisant of the challenges environmental 
changes and the degradations pose to the population and countries in the region. These changes 
do not only contribute to extreme poverty, lack of sufficient food and famine but also have 
implications for socio-economic and political burdens whose outcomes are conflicts which 
exacerbate poverty and unemployment. Therefore, managing natural resources is 
conceptualised as a fundamental platform for all IGAD member states towards the eradication 
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of extreme poverty, effective and efficient economic progress and sustainable peace in the Horn 
of the African region.  
In recognition of this, the regional body has outlined these in its regional strategic plan by 
dedicating it as one of its leading pillars with multiple programmes and projects. In these 
projects, agriculture, livestock, fishery, water resources and their development and 
management are outlined. Transboundary energy development, environmental protection, and 
resource management are integral parts of Pillar 2.  
Arguably, IGAD emphasises the linkages between economic integration and market access and 
its aspiration to ensure food security and drought/disaster reduction. Thus, the pursuit of 
economic integration as part of the authority’s vision of regionalism is deemed to have direct 
and direct implications to growth in the agricultural sector and its strategies of ensuring food 
security and drought resilience.   
In its regional strategic plan for 2016-2020, IGAD has proposed that there be development of 
a regional policy framework on fertiliser and seed industry and the inter-regional development 
of these must boost agricultural production in the region. Beside this, cross border training and 
knowledge and skill sharing are developed as part of such strategy. Particular attention is paid 
to the Climate Smart Agriculture which is one that is sensitive to climate variability from which 
the region suffers and on which commodity value chains are to be configured within the region. 
The authority also proposed to boost the regional agricultural production with the use of 
environmentally friendly, sustainable technological inputs (such as fertilisers and improved 
seed varieties). 
Livestock development is another important project the regional body has identified. This is a 
critical step considering the fact that a significant portion of the population in this region 
depends on animal husbandry and as such they are often severely affected by climate changes 
and drought. The trans-boundary nations of these pastoralist communities are known for taking 
their livestock across borders for pastor and water and this necessitates trans-boundary 
environmental management and agricultural goods and livestock monitoring and regulating 
programmes.   
The activities cited above do certainly have forward and backward linkages with other sectors 
in the economies of the region. Besides their immediate benefits to food security, building 
resilience to environmental changes and poverty reduction provided that they are sufficiently 
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developed, their potential impact to regional economic growth and transformation is 
tremendous. Arguably, these are interconnected and intertwined in many respects.   
As impressive as these well elaborate projects and programmes that IGAD region has put in its 
regional strategic plan are their implementation is a critical factor to be considered.  So far, 
however, the authority has not received sufficient support to make most of these projects take 
off. As already indicated, these probably do not feature in the list of priorities of the funders 
which is suggestive of the need for the regional body to find internal (intra-regional) funding 
mechanisms which would enable it to pursue its own priorities. 
4.5 Conclusion   
This chapter explored IGAD’s regional economic integration initiatives and assessed their 
performances and thus offered tentative remarks on the progress and shortcomings in these. 
The context and dynamics for the IGAD regional economic integration were also explored. 
These are characterised by competition and rivalry, conflict and tension. Notably,  the IGAD 
region is known for the various intra-state and inter-state conflicts which make regional 
economic integration very frail and slow moving, if not completely difficult. Far more pressing 
are the challenges to consensus building, coordination of programmes and projects and policies 
under these conditions.   
This chapter also assessed the region’s performance on economic integration by drawing data 
from the ECA and the UNCTAD. The IGAD region and the member states have mixed 
performances in the regional economic integration index. Compared to the rest of African 
RECs, IGAD has low overall performance on the regional economic integration. While the 
IGAD region still has significant room for improvement, it has done well in terms of regional 
infrastructure.  Nevertheless, it is clearly lagging in all the other indexes of regional economic 
integration.   
Kenya and Uganda are the better performers within the region while South Sudan and Somalia 
lag behind. While Kenya’s score on the regional integration index is the highest Somalia and 
South Sudan score the lowest. Integration in the region, for large part, is driven by the regional 
power houses namely, Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya which are also the major contributors to the 
regional economy with Ethiopia at 29%, Sudan at 28.5% and Kenya at 27.7% and these 
countries contribute to the regional GDP.  
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Chapter Five  
IGAD’s Peace and Security Strategy/Architecture  
5.1 Introduction  
The Horn of Africa has gained the reputation of being a site not only of civil wars but also of 
intra-state and interstate conflicts. The IGAD member states are marked by lack of credibly 
elected national leaders and pervasive civil strives, wars and border conflict which are issues 
that have sustained a decade of fighting in the region (Weldesellassie 2011). Another 
dimension to these conflicts has been the state collapse in Somalia in the 1990s which gave 
rise to piracy and terrorism in the region to increasingly become transnational. It is against this 
backdrop, therefore, that from its constitution, IGAD has given particular attention to peace 
and security in the region. The emphasis here has been on peaceful settlement of these conflicts 
with specific focus on how to deal with intra- and inter-state conflicts through dialogue. 
Regional security in the IGAD region is, however, defined by geopolitical interdependence of 
the member states on security issues.  
It is known now that the security challenges in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, 
Djibouti and Kenya cannot be untangled as the tension in the respective countries has 
ramifications for the other countries irrespective of whether the conflicts are inter-state or intra-
state. Although Ethiopia has waged wars with Somalia, it is now operating as a peacekeeping 
force (this is along with the presence of non-peacekeeping military force and undue political 
influence, which adds contradiction to its role). As a result, Somalia is still struggling to emerge 
as a functioning state. It is ironic that the regional states’ (Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya)20 
security is completely reliant on a stable Somalia. Eritrea has had protracted conflict with 
Ethiopia with a longstanding border conflict and rivalry and this conflict has drained the 
resources of both countries thus pushing them to the verge of instability. Sudan’s multiple 
intrastate conflicts and the civil war tearing apart South Sudan have regional dimensions. The 
superpowers’ naval and military base in Djibouti shape the dynamics in the region.  Somalia’s 
instability too has become a breeding ground for terrorists and other non-state actors operating 
in multiple states in the region.  
                                                 
20What are considered here are the presence of ethnic Somalis in these countries – potentially dragging the 
Somalia clan conflict and tension into these states, the cross-border presence of Al Shabab, and the various 
terrorist attacks in Kenya and Ethiopia.  
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In this chapter, therefore, the focus of the discussion is on IGAS’s peace and security 
architecture and its strategy that are designed to address these problems.  This chapter also 
explores IGAD’s interventions in the Somalia and the South Sudan conflicts by probing into 
how IGAD member states act collectively to address peace and security challenges of the 
region. Two I important concerns are central to this aspect of the inquiry. On the one hand, 
regional actions and interventions in the context of the complexities of conflicts and tension in 
the region is of particular interest in this chapter. On the other hand, the focus is on how the 
organisation mediates and manages competing interests, rivalries and tensions in line with 
inclusive participation and consensus based decision-making principles of IGAD. This is meant 
to enhance cooperation and decisive commitment. It is thus notable that the furthering IGAD’s 
aims of sustainable peace and security in conflict resolution and the forging of co-operation 
and friendly relations among the member states are of the utmost importance.  
Before going into the details of these cases, it is worth considering the regional and global 
dynamics that frame and shape IGAD’s involvement in these conflicts. Following this, the 
chapter closely examines the most important Pillar of IGAD and the success of its regional 
strategy in securing Peace and Security. Additionally, IGAD’s most important initiative of 
Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) is also examined. The chapter 
also explores how the Peace and Security Strategy of the authority is sought to be integrated 
into the AU’s peace and security Architecture. Thus, this chapter offers a critical discussion of 
Somalia and South Sudan by examining how the policies and strategies are put into action and 
thus probes also into the possible causes and implications of their antagonistic conflicts. The 
conflicts in the two countries are construed not only as an eastern region security dilemma but 
also of continental and even global concern.   
5.2 The Regional Peace and Security Challenges and the Global Dynamics  
Many conflicts have catastrophically affected the region both at the intrastate and interstate 
levels which operate as the backdrop to IGAD’s intervention in Somalia and South Sudan. By 
all measures, this is the worst area since it is widely known for its protracted conflicts which 
claimed thousands of lives during and in the post-Cold War era. The list since 1990 include: 
the border conflicts between Djibouti and Eritrea; Eritrea and Ethiopia devastating border war 
namely, the Darfur crisis in Sudan; the Sudan – South Sudan war, and the now pending border 
conflict between Sudan and South Sudan; the civil war in South Sudan; the multiple conflicts 
in Somalia. Al-Shabaab in Somalia and its spill-over effects in the region and incidents of 
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cross-border terror and attacks, for example, along the borders of Ethiopia and South Sudan.21 
Notably, these are cases of trans-boundary security challenges. IGAD, in its 2016 State of the 
Region report, states that “since 1993, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda 
have faced terrorist attacks by Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidden (Al Shabaab) and the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) operating in Central and East Africa” (IGAD 2016a:65). The 
following table shows major inter-state conflicts in the region. 
 
Table 8.Selected Inter-States Conflicts among IGAD Member States   
 
Year 
 
 
State 
 
Type of Intra-State 
Conflict  
 
Involved IGAD Member 
States  
Since 1991  Somalia  Civil War among Clans and 
Militia Group  
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, 
Uganda and Kenya  
Since 1990  Djibouti  Ethnic Tension between 
Afar and Issa 
 Ethiopia, Somalia and 
Eritrea 
2006-2008 Ethiopia-Somalia Full-Scale war/Ethiopia 
Intervened Military 
Ethiopia and Somalia 
1998-2015 Brief Armed 
Confrontation  
Territorial Dispute  Eritrea and Djibouti; 
Ethiopian and Eritrea; 
Sudan and South Sudan 
Source: Adapted by the Author from Various Sources   
 
Evidently, the Horn of African Region is plagued by protracted violent conflicts and thus faces 
several security challenges. These are certainly compounded by severe poverty, perennial 
drought induced famine, high unemployment and the migration of people adding complexities 
to these regional problems (Girma 2016; Fikade 2017). As they feed into each other, these 
challenges are exacerbated by environmental factors, famine and civil wars. Thus, these 
security challenges feed into socio-economic challenges and vice versa. The assertion here is 
that despite their sources, the IGAD region’s peace and development challenges are certainly 
intertwined. Since there are intersecting political and socio-economic dynamics, this has led to 
                                                 
21 The brutal act of armed South Sudanese Murle tribes that severely affected Ethiopia’s Nuer tribes (Gambella 
Regional State) on April 15, 2016 is typical example of this. 
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the realisation that these are transnational threats and thus necessitate a collective and regional 
response through a common forum such as IGAD.  
Militarisation in Africa, as in various developing countries, is partly a product of structural 
conditions.22 It is notable, however, that the militarisation in East African Region is highly 
influenced by the state’s forms, neo-colonial conditions, competition for control of state power, 
rise and persistence of protagonist groups (Luckham 1994). For example, groups such as Al-
Shaabab, Al-Ithad and the multiple warlords in Somalia are formed within the context of, not 
only state collapse - filling the power vacuum created, but also as a result of the desire of 
outside powers to influence the political trajectory in the country. The conditions include a 
history of civil wars, authoritarian rule, the exclusion of minorities from government, socio-
economic inequity and deprivation and weak governments that are unable to manage normal 
societal conflict and exercise a legitimate political decision in a sustainable and effective 
manner (Roux and Kidane 2007). The IGAD region has hardly known peace, democracy, a 
blameless human rights record and free and fair elections. As Roux and Kidane (2007) argue, 
most of the states in the region do not represent the good interests and character of their 
populations and that is, arguably, the root cause of the conflict. These conflicts invariably 
constitute a perpetual crisis of human security, humanitarian crisis and state instability.  
These conditions as explicated above have for long been enduring features of the greater Horn 
of Africa. What is also significant to note here is how these are interlocked as they often 
transform into a regional crisis.  As it has already been noted, the inter-state conflicts in this 
region often feature as trans-boundary nature involving the regional states. Notably, the inter-
state conflicts have a tendency to devolve into intra-state conflict as one state tries to weaken 
the other. Many of the conflicts in the IGAD region thus challenge the basis of statehood and 
its bounded nature.  For example, the conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, North and South 
Sudan, and Somalia and Somaliland have both inter-state and intra-state dimension as each 
actively works to destabilise the other. The greater Horn of Africa region as a consequence saw 
the formation of new states. In relation to these, Healy asserts that “possibilities of new states 
emerging from conflict meant that essentially domestic conflicts had foreign policy 
implications and fragile peace and security” (Healy 2011:4).  
                                                 
22 It should be noted that there are multiple ways of defining militarisation in African context. For the purpose of 
this discussion, the term militarization is used to capture a loosely tied/linked situations in Africa: the process 
through which military personnel control state power, usually through coup; the important of armed conflict to 
controlling state power, and the attendance disproportional investment in arms and military expenditure (Wiley 
2012; Cervenka 1987). 
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As noted, the consequences of these conflicts is that they negatively impact on the states’ 
relations at the regional level. Conflicts in the IGAD region thus need to be understood as 
regional problem and as such can only be addressed at the regional level by involving regional 
states. These is a general agreement that regions are the most unstable and conflict-prone areas 
in the world and the security sector reform is a critical agenda to alleviate this (Gebru 2016; 
Roux and Kidane 2007).  
 
These regional dynamics are also shaped and framed by global powers which seek to promote 
their strategic interests and competition for hegemony in the region. This began in earnest with 
the cold war conditions and proxy-wars of the then global powers (Wiley 2012; Luckham 
1994). The recent global powers’ relentless effort to militarise and securitise the continent, 
which have been taking place for the three decades is a continuation of the above (see Brown 
2019). For example, Somalia’s complex and protracted conflict cannot be fully understood 
without considering the USA’s entrenched involvement in the conflict and local politics 
(Møller 2009).  
Since 2001, the USA has viewed Somalia and its engagement in the region through the prism 
of its much taunted policy of “global war against terrorism” (Møller 2009). Arguably, the USA 
and to some extent the EU have channelled IGAD to play this role in the Somalia and the region 
in general. What appeared to be the rivalry between the USA and China in South Sudan and 
Sudan has also shaped the conflict as well as the mediation process in these countries. 
Unfortunately, these conditions were also exacerbated by rivalry and competition of IGAD 
members as well. The competition between Uganda and Ethiopia in South Sudan and Kenya 
and Uganda in Somalia are clear cases in point.  
Despite the complexity of these dynamics, IGAD has become, arguably, active in facilitating 
and arranging conflict mediations. The authority and member states have come to realise that 
dealing with these persistent conflicts in the region is very hard  and cannot be left to the states 
alone even if these appear to be intra-state issues. In line with such paradigm shifts, it has been 
noticed that the authority involved resolving decades long Sudan and South Sudan conflicts 
through extensive diplomatic means and South Sudan’s internal problems and Somalia’s long-
standing statelessness and lawlessness. Despite these initiatives, these tensions/conflicts have 
been some of the most formidable challenges in the region in recent years. IGAD and AU/UN 
interventions and mediations to deal with these problems have been instructive with regional 
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actors operating as peacekeepers, stakeholder, brokers and “peace-enforcers” (Weldesellassie 
2011). It should be noted, therefore, that these actions and diplomatic manoeuvres are usually 
inherently contradictory as “the national interest” overshadows “the regional interest”. Thus, 
regional states’ interventions are guided by their own narrow perceived ‘national interest’ and 
the interest of their global power sponsors and as a consequence they seek to impose their own 
will in these processes. In the end, these states appeared to be part of these conflicts as opposed 
to being mediators and neutral peace-keeping forces.  
This is despite the fact that these interventions are coordinated with other continental and global 
peace actors (Weldesellassie 2011). Many countries such as the United States of America, 
China, EU and all the IGAD members (with the exception of Eritrea) are, among others, 
involved in dealing with the South Sudan and Somali conflicts. Ethiopia is chosen as a strategic 
anchor state for the region by the USA to serve its ‘architecture’ of security and domination. 
In this systematic arrangement, the USA uses Ethiopia as its police state in the IGAD region 
where it (the USA) is engaged in counter-terrorism. Most of the USA’s projects, diplomatic 
and military involvements in the Horn of Africa is dealt with and through Ethiopia. In this 
sense, IGAD’s operations in the region and Ethiopians dominant role in this organisation is, 
for a large part, a function of US-Ethiopia relations as against the US’s interest in the region.  
It is against this backdrop, therefore, that most of Ethiopia’s interventions in the region have 
been launched at the behest of the EU and the USA. Ethiopia’s intervention, with specific 
reference to Somalia, was eagerly sought and recognised by the West. The USA, in the 
aftermath of September 11, 2001, has effectively turned to Ethiopia (including other regional 
state, with Ethiopia as the anchor) as its regional police and the hub of its counter-terrorism 
initiative in Somalia and the region (Wiley 2012). It is thus no surprise that Ethiopia receives 
roughly $1.9 billion under the rubric of peace and security assistance each year (Weldesellassie 
2011). This shows that global actors have enrolled the organisation and Ethiopia to promote 
their objectives in the region.  
Any appraisal of IGAD’s intervention efforts has to be viewed against overlapping interests, 
conflicts and rivalry and these are reflected in complexities of the missteps and the 
confrontations in IGAD’s initiatives in resolving conflicts in the region. It is also worth paying 
attention to the competition and cooperation among regional and global actors. These 
invariably constitute the regional and global dynamics and processes that shape and frame 
IGAD as an organisation and its initiatives. In this sense, successes and failures of IGAD’s 
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intervention efforts are located within the global and regional political economy of 
intergovernmentalism. In the following section, therefore, IGAD’s peace and security strategy 
is explored in some detail by interrogating both the successes and failures of IGAD.  
5.3 IGAD Peace and Security (PS) Strategy  
Arguably, sustainable peace and security are critical agendas for IGAD since the region 
experiences many conflicts. Besides addressing the Horn Africa, regional conflicts, wars and 
instabilities, peace and security are viewed as critical elements to regional integration and 
development. According to the African Index Report, the architect of peace and security in 
“regional integration also considers creating a safe environment for the free movement of 
goods, services and people across the region and the whole of Africa. Peace, stability and safety 
of the citizens are key preconditions for the effective and sustainable economic development. 
Therefore, this means getting goods to move more easily across borders, transport, energy and 
telecommunications to connect more people across more boundaries. This also entails having 
people move more freely across the frontiers and capital and production to move and grow 
beyond national limits” (African Union 2016:1). This is what necessitates the devising of a 
regional peace and security strategy. Development of peace and security strategy has to be 
grounded within frank assessments of these threats and sources of instability in the region.  
When the challenges and threats in the region are tallied, the trials and intractable challenges 
IGAD has to deal with can be appreciated. Peace and security are the two core challenges which 
come from both intra- and inter-state conflicts and tensions. The threats in the region also 
include piracy (particularly in the coast of Somalia), human and drug trafficking, terrorism, 
money laundering and illegal dealing in arms. In the face of militarised responses, the cold war 
and international interference, these internal conflicts transform into civil wars and struggles 
for secession including Sudan and South Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Somalia 
(Somaliland) with disastrous humanitarian and socio-economic consequences. In Sudan, the 
civil war started in the southern region of Sudan (now South Sudan) but later spread to Darfur, 
Kordofan, Blue Nile and the Eastern parts of Sudan (Mulugeta 2009). 
In addition to these intra- and inter-state conflicts, the states in this region have also seen serious 
problems of legitimacy and political instability. The region has seen regular rigged elections 
and the pre-election post-election process has become very challenging. For instance, Ethiopia 
(2005), Kenya (2007), Uganda (2010), Djibouti (2013), among others, are the cases in point 
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which have caused post-election conflicts and tensions. This is evidence of the region’s need 
to have effective institutions for permanent solutions to maintain peace and security in the 
IGAD region (Byiers 2016). In the list of fragile state index compiled by the Fund for Peace and 
Foreign Policy magazine, all the IGAD member states consistently featured as the most fragile 
states from 2005-2018.23  
All the regional states are weak and at different moments, each of these regional states shows 
varying degree of political, economic and social uncertainty. Beside the internal challenges, as 
part of the colonial legacy most states in this region have border disputes with their 
neighbouring countries which have become the main factor for the lack of trust and certainty. 
It is against this context that IGAD’s regional border disputes that have “escalated into border 
wars and led to military confrontations are assessed. This region has hosted brutal border 
related wars between the Ethiopia-Somalia in1977, the Ethio-Eritrea in 1998-2000, the 
Djibouti-Eritrea in 1995 and 2008, and the Sudan-South Sudan in 2012 (IGAD 2016b:44). In 
the final analysis, IGAD as a region is troubled by unrelenting and protracted civil wars, with 
the regional state exhibiting fragility both internally and internationally. 
In response to these, in the first few years of its inception, IGAD has been involved in 
developing a peace and security policy. After two decades of IGAD’s experiment as a regional 
organisation, the organisation appears to take pride in its historic efforts in mediation and peace 
support operations it has undertaken. It is notable though that despite these efforts, which 
include the region’s past and current engagement and regional diplomacy, the outcomes of such 
efforts are rather dismal.   
The fundamental regional peace and security policy is set out to control and manage possible 
conflicts in the region and thus facilitate peace making and building activities (Mulugeta 2009). 
Such policy featured more as a declaration, and less as a coherent strategy. Notably, IGAD’s 
efforts concentrated on facilitating regional cooperation and coordination to ensure stability of 
all the member states. Apart from such declaration, this initiative has not been able to articulate 
well what its peace and security strategies are. Instead, in these few years, IGAD appeared to 
have developed a piece meal approach towards managing peace and stability in the region. This 
is attested to by the number of firefighting as instantiated in Somalia and South Sudan and 
manifested in other cases by having burning security issues in the region ignored. The absence 
                                                 
23 See the following site: https://foreignpolicy.com/?s=failed+states+index and https://fragilestatesindex.org/. 
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of a coherent security strategy is very much evident in IGAD’s biggest and longest running 
intervention in Somalia.   
In seriously attempting to address this shortfall, the authority sought to develop a well-thought-
out regional peace and security strategy in the 2011-2015 strategic plan. This strategic plan 
appropriated peace and security as one of its pillars and considered in detail how the challenges 
and proposed specific actions were to be dealt with. IGAD’s regional strategy with its 
implementation plan of 2016-2020 strengthens this proposal and plan of action. While the 
2011-2015 regional strategic plan considers merely peace and security whereas the 2016-2020 
document adds humanitarian affairs as part of this pillar. Both documents feature peace and 
security as well as the promotion of good governance as essential elements of the regional 
strategic plan as outlined under the rubric of Pillar 3 (IGAD 2016c; IGAD 2011).  
In its 2016-2020 strategic plan, the authority proposed that it would need US$108,800,000 to 
put  the programmes and projects set under this pillar into place with thirty-seven percent (37%) 
of the money having already been raised (IGAD 2016c:103). The expected outcomes of this 
strategic objective are the following: one, “increased utilization of IGAD regional policies and 
mechanisms for peace and security issues” and, two, “effective cooperation among member 
states on addressing humanitarian issues” (IGAD 2016c:9). As noted in the chapter three, this 
pillar has three programme area: Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR); 
Trans-national Security Threats (TST); Governance, Democracy, Rule of Law and Human 
Rights (GDRL) (IGAD 2016c). Each of these programme areas have multiple programmes and 
projects.  
Under the programme area of CPMR, IGAD has set out three important sub-programmes: 
Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN); enhancing IGAD’s capacity for preventive 
diplomacy and mediation; and post-conflict reconstruction and development. A large portion 
of the estimated budget for Pillar 3 goes into these sub-programmes - around US$73 million 
out of US108 million. The overall intent of these programmes is to design and develop 
mechanisms for appropriate interventions and build capacity of the member states and the 
organisation in their efforts to prevent conflict and pursue management and resolution of the 
challenges. What is gleaned from the explication above is that the authority is keen to work 
towards setting up mechanisms for member states to develop own capacity to engage in 
peaceful resolution of conflicts/disputes and peace-building. Resolving their own differences 
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locally and on their own is what IGAD proposes through this programme area and this serves 
as a measure of success of the organisation in addressing the challenges it faces.   
Judging by the number of tensions and conflicts still burning in the region, IGAD is nowhere 
near to achieving its objective. It is thus arguable that aside from some peace-building, conflict 
resolution and management and other security related workshops, nothing substantive and 
noteworthy has been achieved.24 This is not, however, to dismiss the importance of the 
initiatives, but rather to measure their success and contribution. For example, the authority 
established a Mediation Support Unit (MSU) in December 2012 in line with the Resolution of 
the Committee of Ambassadors (COA). The rationale behind MSU is to enhance the mediation 
capacity of IGAD and thus develop, promote and capacitate local institutions of member states 
on conflict prevention and management as well as peace-making and peace-building. 
Figure 4. IGAD’s Peace building approaches  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from (IGAD 2016) 
Under CEWARN, IGAD has multiple projects whose main tasks involve gathering, processing, 
analysing and disseminating data and thus enhance capabilities of regional states on how to 
respond to and manage conflicts. Here, operational capabilities of the units in these projects, 
their response systems and structures as well as their join coordination at the regional level are 
given particular attention. There are what the organisation has called Conflict Early Warning 
                                                 
24 See the last five years media briefings and online inserts of the organisation in the section of Peace and 
Security Division. Indeed, the organization has held multiple issues based and, at times country specific, 
conferences and workshops with the support of Western donors.  
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and Response Units (CEWERU) in six regional members states: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda. Each CEWERU. These units are tasked with working with 
government and civil society in the respective states to facilitate conflict management 
initiatives. Despite being underfunded and working under difficult conditions, in many 
instances the CEWERU are well organised with their own situation room staff that regularly 
monitor situations in the regional states with the support of members states. They are equipped 
with GIS products and supporting its activities and monitoring local as well as regional issues 
of concern with GIS located in each of the Member States where the units are located.  
The second programme has to do with TST which is much more focused on the inter-
dependence of security challenges in the IGAD region. Based on such assessment, the 
organisation proposed what it called regional “comprehensive approach to security” 
challenges. Under this umbrella, IGAD has outlined three sub-programmes: 
(a) Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Coordination against existing, evolving 
and emerging Transnational Security Threats (EEE-TSTs) 
(b) Enhancing Member States’ and IGAD’s Institutional and Human Capacities to 
Address EEE-TSTs 
(c) Promoting and supporting regional and international normative, institutional/policy 
and programmatic frameworks to address EEE-TSTs 
 
The main concerns of this aspect of the Peace and Security strategic plan is to counter cross-
border security threats such as terrorist activities, violent extremism, illegal movements of 
arms, goods and people. Such initiatives broadly involve regional “cooperation and 
coordination against, Existing, Evolving and Emerging Transnational Security Threats (EEE-
TSTs) (IGAD 2016c:9) and the mechanism established and effectively contributed to the 
prevention and countering of cross-border security threats in the IGAD region. These also 
include land and maritime border controls which include engaging with piracy as one aspect 
of the peace and security concern in the region. The above programmes are meant to strengthen 
cross border control as preventive measures and law enforcement in such areas of concern. 
There is also recognition that this would have to be accompanied by the necessary judicial 
reform on criminal justice along with coordination and cooperation on these at the regional 
level.  In line with this, IGAD has established a mechanism of strengthening cross border law 
enforcement by preventing conflict and employing management strategies among member 
states (IGAD 2016b; IGAD 2016a). 
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The third programme area of the organisation under Pillar 3 is GDRL focusing on democracy, 
good governance, human rights and the rule of law. What is apparent in these is that the member 
states have come to recognise that these are fundamental to the sustainability of peace and 
security. This thinking features mainly in the organisation’s assessment of the state of the 
region and is attested to in the assertion that: 
The internal and external political, economic and social determinants of Peace and Security (PS) 
in the IGAD region will focus on: extreme poverty, income inequality, lack of governance, 
mismatches between performance legitimacy and popular legitimacy, corruption, election-related 
disputes and violence, radicalization and violent extremism, transnational threats and organized 
criminal activities, as well as migration, smuggling and human trafficking. The nature of state, 
social and political forces at national and sub-national level, and the nature of international and 
regional interventions may significantly affect the peace and security of the IGAD region (IGAD 
2016a:44). 
 
Thus, governance, democratisation and the rule of law, along with other issues, are deemed 
important factors causing instability within the region.  In pursuit of addressing this, IGAD 
proposed to engage with and assist member states in their efforts to succeed in good governance 
towards improving the human rights of their citizens. Along with these, the organisation 
proposed to ensure active and constructive participation of the civil societies in the member 
states. The authority also insists upon maintaining permanent peace and security in the region 
which requires the active and constructive involvement of local institutions and authorities.  
The broader objective of these programmes and projects it to transform the political affairs of 
the regional states in the areas of democratisation, rule of law and good governance. This can 
be gleaned from the two specific programmes proposed in this segment. The first programme 
focuses on strengthening the role and capacities of NGOs/CSOs and other stakeholders in their 
participation in promoting peace and security in the region. The second one focuses on assisting 
the regional states and promoting rule of law, democracy, good governance, and human rights. 
Gender is also another important dimension added under this programme. Here, IGAD has set 
up a project under this sub-programme with a title of Gender and Equality of Women’s 
Empowerment for Peace. This project is essentially focused on advocacy to influence member 
states’ policies and practices on gender and empowerment of women.  
Any assessment of this GDRL aspect of IGAD’s peace and security strategy would certainly 
tilt towards the negative, if not downright condemnation of the reality. The region fares badly 
in these measures. Much more troubling is that very little substantive work has been done by 
the organisation in this regard aside from acting as election observer in the shoddy elections 
the regional states have conducted. Aside from the infrequent workshops organised under this 
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rubric, substantive initiatives are hardly noticed by way of engaging, supporting and promoting 
the civil society organisations in the region.  
Considered more broadly, the peace and security strategy of the region works with conflict 
prevention, control and management. Its effectiveness hedges on how cooperative and involved 
the member states are. Effectiveness of the proposals in the PS strategy of the authority are 
rendered weak by the fact that the member states of IGAD are in conflict with each other with 
apparent rivalry and shifting alliances within the members states. Healy (2011:13) cites  
another dimension characterising the region and  notes that the “phenomenon of militarized 
peace and security processes are part of the regional culture in which states regularly project 
military power beyond their own borders. This creates a particularly difficult environment in 
which to build regional structures for peace and security”. As a result, IGAD’s institutional 
security constraints remain a serious challenge.  
Although IGAD appeared to have prioritised peace and security for well over a decade, there 
has been very little significant decreases in the level of conflict in the IGAD’s region or any 
signs of activities towards communal peace and security process (Healy 2011). A decade later 
after implementing the regional PS strategy, the member states in the IGAD region still face 
prolonged conflicts, security challenges and political instability. The region has, however, 
made some promising progress in other sectors like cooperation in TST and information 
sharing. Recognizing the “critical role that science, technology and innovation (STI)” play, the 
organisation has sought to appropriate them to effect regional members’ role in peace and 
security (ECA 2016a). These have already started to serve for M&E and information sharing 
within the IGAD region and institutions to address the peace and security problems of the 
region.  
The regional PS strategy of the region would have to be framed within and integrated into other 
continental PS strategies. What is to be considered here is the region’s PS strategy’s relation 
with AU’s peace and security architecture. The UN and AU committed all member states to 
abide by a constitutive Act to participate in promoting regional security collectively (IGAD 
2016a). IGAD’s regional PS strategy is formulated within these continental and global 
multilateral frameworks. For example, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is 
formed to connect and link the formation of the five African regions as ‘building blocks’ of the 
continent’s APSA policy. These are North Africa, Central Africa, West Africa, South Africa 
and East Africa. It is important to note that these are different from the RECs. Thus, IGAD’s 
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peace and security strategy is a different mechanism albeit drawing substantially from the 
APSA.  
Much of this featured after the historical post-election violence events in Kenya (2007/08) 
which significantly impacted the whole region. This shook the EAC and forced it to decide to 
initiate a peace and security programme by largely copying the institutions under the African 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (Thonke and Spliid 2012). However, as the 2010 
APSA guidelines noted, IGAD did not have the same Peace and Security Council (PSC).  
Notably then, IGAD initiated its peace and security strategy in 2011 and still does not have a 
PSC as a distinct organ and neither has it intended to establish one any time soon. Byiers 
(2016:32) argues that “IGAD’s peace and security architecture indeed looks considerably 
different from the AU” and the organisation questions whether such institutions building on its 
own address the regions pervasive and complex security challenges. Thus, as argued by Byiers 
(2016), a disaggregated evaluation was expected to survey advancement of peace and to 
improve continuous commitment of the IGAD states to the operationalization of the APSA as 
supported by the 2013 Assessment of the African Standby Forces. However, IGAD has 
endeavoured to build up comparable structures among a Council of Elders as an ‘East African 
Panel of the Wise’ (Byiers 2016). 
5.4 Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) 
As noted in the previous section, the core aim of the CEWARN is to work closely with all 
member states to attain sustainable regionally coordinated conflict prevention and management 
initiatives to build and ensure peace and security in the region. The milestones are achieved 
through the regional strategic framework. CEWARN was first formed in 2002 and then 
developed to be reformulated as part of the pillars of regional strategic plan. CEWARN was 
established to coordinate and ensure regional cooperation for conflict prevention and mitigation 
through collective information collection, analysis and sharing. As the name entails, it was 
designed to be an early warning and response. The idea was very much similar to IGAD’s 
predecessor IGADD (that had early warning system for drought and environmental changes) 
but now with a focus on peace and security.  
Thus, in 2002, IGAD launched what it called Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units 
(CEWERU’s) with a base in each of the regional member states at the time. The main structures 
of cooperation in CEWARN are highlighted in its Protocol for the member states including its 
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duties and functions that are established through the creation of “integration, contact and 
harmonization between CEWARN and the nationally established Conflict Early Warning and 
Early Response Units (CEWERUs)” (Weldesellassie 2011:27). According to IGAD (2016), 
some of the functions of CEWARN include the following: 
(a)  Promoting the exchange of information and collaboration among member states 
on early warning and response on the basis of timeliness, transparency, cooperation 
and free flow of information 
(b)  Gathering, verifying, processing and analysing information about conflicts 
(c)  Communicating all such information and analysis to the decision makers of IGAD 
policy organs and the national governments of member states 
Arguably, since the region faces multiple threats, conflicts and wars that have transnational 
characters, such kind of early collection, analysis and swift sharing of data on security related 
development is critical. The importance of coordinating this at the regional level cannot be 
taken lightly. Having such mechanism at the regional level has the potential of developing 
timely responses to regional security threats.  CEWARN as one of IGAD’s peace and security 
initiatives is constituted as an effort “to establish effective collective measures to eliminate 
threats to sub-regional cooperation, peace and stability” (Mulugeta 2009:23). CEWARN is, in 
many respects a flagship of the IGAD mandate and its geographic jurisdiction to identify and 
report on potential conflicts and threats (including security, environmental, social, economic 
and governance) (IGAD 2016b).  
In its pilot phase, between 2002 and 2006, CEWARN’s focus has been on the potential 
pervasive conflicts among the pastoralists in the region. Such initiative is an important step, 
especially considering the trans-boundary movements of pastoralists and the recurring conflicts 
among them over claims for grazing land and water for pasture. Here, the most notable cases 
were monitoring and gathering information on pastoralist clusters: the Karamoja cluster 
(Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan border) and the Somali cluster (Somalia, Ethiopia and 
Kenya) (IGAD 2016b). Since 2006-2011, CEWAR as a regional mechanism expanded to 
include other security issues (such as terrorism and extremism, piracy, trafficking etcetera) in 
all the regional member states. IGAD’s early initiative on CEWARN focused, as Abraha 
(2013:41) puts in relation to “livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, 
nomadic movements, smuggling and illegal trade, refugees, land mines and banditry”. 
93 
 
In 2011-2016 regional strategic plan (and again in 2016-2020 RS plan), CEWARN was 
reconstituted as one element within the broader Peace and Security Pillar. This was 
accompanied with serious strategic shift in the conceptualisation and reconstitution of 
CEWARN. These strategic shifts are reflected in the number of national, regional and global 
issues the organisation sought to pay attention to. It should be noted that there is a fundamental 
thinking to CEWARN which has been consistent throughout. The fundamental mission of 
CEWARN is to assess and report on situations that can potentially lead to tensions or conflicts 
and monitoring prevention mechanisms (IGAD 2016a). One of the key responsibilities of 
CEWARN is to collect appropriate information regarding the possibility of violence and 
conflicts before the outbreak and its spreading in the region and thus share this with the regional 
member states.  
To maintain regional peace and security, IGAD developed interventions targeting the power 
and rights of all the member states as well as the region as a whole for successful conflict 
prevention, management and resolution. Through CEWARN, IGAD strives to create and 
implement processes and mechanisms to promote peaceful means to resolve disputes by 
empowering countries of the IGAD region to resolve their differences locally and on their own 
by collaborating with other regional and global players (IGAD 2016b). IGAD has taken steps 
to accelerate the vision of CEWARN to strengthen partnerships as an effective and efficient 
early conflict warning system. Additionally, it aims to establish a conducive environment for 
peace and stability to ensure that disputes in the region are resolved and are of collective and 
mutual benefit. 
Civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-government organisations (NGOs) also play a 
major role in determining CEWARN’s duties and functions. The finding of this study reveals 
that for CEWARN to achieve its expanding geographic and thematic scope in the region, it 
must first resolve its political and institutional obstacles. Although there is some progress in 
certain smaller groups conflicts, CEWARN has been ‘found wanting’ in deadly prolonged 
conflicts including the most recent conflict in South Sudan (Byiers 2016). 
Arguably, Indeed, CEWARN constitute an important part of the PS strategy of the authority. 
Beside its importance, it is an integrative thrust that draws the member states to work closely 
on security matters, share information and actively respond to these. It is also notable that the 
authority has expanded what it considered to be security threat to include other areas that were 
not considered to as such (environmental, governance, social and others). Despite such 
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expansion, it is doubtful whether the organisation or CEWARN has acted in any meaningful 
way on these or not. An inference is drawn on these based on the persistent issue of non-
interference as a general principle which member states harbour as compounded by the rivalry, 
suspicion and mistrust that characterised their relations over the last two decades. In the 
following sections, the chapter explores IGAD’s two foremost and important interventions in 
the Somalia and South Sudan conflicts.  
5.5 The Somalia Conflict, Regional Actors and IGAD’s Intervention  
In many respects, the roots of Somalia’s conflict can be traced back to its colonial formation in 
1897 and later in 1948 when Somalia was divided by three colonial powers namely Britain, 
Italy and France. The Republic of Somalia became independent in 1960 from Italy and Britain 
(Abdi 2012). Somalia has withstood the worst post-independence civil strife because of 
competing global, regional and local interests that have made Somalia’s conflict intractable 
and resulted in continuous conflicts. For the last three decades, Somalia has been “suffering 
from lawlessness due to the non-existence of state institutions, highly factionalized political 
groups, terrorist attack and repeated external intervention” (Mulugeta 2009:11). Between1991 
and 1997, 13 attempts and during the 1980s and the 1990s several more attempts were made to 
establish a functioning government for Somalia and to re-establish the state (Gebregeorgis 
2013; Kodhek 2015). However, the history of Somalia’s conflicts show the world a non-ending 
and complicated war in the Horn of Africa region.  
Thus, IGAD, the AU and the international community have been challenged on how to address 
peace, security and stability in Somalia. Clan based conflicts, entrenched tribalism and 
interminable civil war have led to state and economic collapse which in turn destroyed many 
Somali lives and led to displacement of many (Wafula 2015). Many point to the “colonial 
legacy, clan system, and economic factors” as the root causes of the Somali conflict and the 
subsequent state collapse (Mulugeta 2009:9). Such assessments are still one-sided views 
(heavily focuses on the local dynamics) that ignore all the other players that have fuelled and 
perpetually enflamed Somalia’s conflict (contemporary external factors and interferences). 
Following is a brief exploration of these multiple and seemingly intractable conflicts in Somalia 
and the challenges and complexities of intervening in the labyrinth of these conflicts. This 
paves the way, then for the framing of IGAD’s intervention in the Somalia’s case and the role 
the member states in the region played.   
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In 1960 Somalia gained independence under the leadership of president Aden Abdullah Osamn 
and thus joining the then British and Italian controlled Somalia. Arguably, this independence 
was granted to a very fragile country whose grasp of economic and political structure was 
lacking. Since then, the inabilities can be traced back to the fact that there were huge differences 
between how Italy and Britain administered their respective colonies. Britain was largely 
accused of neglecting its territory whereas Italy had developed an economic and political plan 
(Kodhek 2015). Somalia was divided into five parts as colonies of the European colonial 
powers (Italy, Britain and France) and Ethiopia. British Somaliland and the northern territory 
of Kenya were ruled by the British and Italy controlled what was called the Italian Somaliland 
and France seized Djibouti at the northern coast and the Ogaden region was annexed by 
Ethiopia. These historical events shaped and continue to shape all attempts to restore Somalia’s 
territorial integrity (Mulugeta 2009). The last three decades of Somalia’s political reality was 
thus framed by these contexts as some of the different Somali-occupied parts came to be 
controlled by a single state in the 1960s (with the exception of Djibouti and Ogaden).  
Subsequent to this, much of Somalia’s history has been marred by internal strives and 
competing claims. Somalia’s conflicts and tensions are characterised by shifting alliances and 
competing and conflicting interests of the various players in Somalia. Today, Somalia is one 
of the few territories in the world without a fully functioning government structure in place. 
After gaining its independence from colonial Italy in 1960 under the leadership of a civilian 
administration, the stability of the Somalia states has remained fragile. Under the leadership of 
Adan Abdulle Osman and Abdilrashid Ali Shama’arke the first and the second presidents 
respectively, who were not without shortcomings, it was the reign of Mohammed Siad Barre 
(Gen.) which planted the seeds for the current unending conflict and instability. 
Barre’s administration was characterised by inequality, violence and a full-blown dictatorship. 
Hence, the emergence of rebel-armed groups which have since the 1980s challenged his rule 
inside and outside of Somalia. When Barre was ousted in 1991, there was a high degree of 
fragmentation among the armed forces of Somalia with no dominant group emerging to claim 
leadership and exercise power over the whole of Somalia. However, in the last three decades, 
chaos, instability, famine and different types of humanitarian crises have reigned in Somalia 
without a central authority to tackle these issues (Ashenafi 2017). 
Though some critics still argue that colonialism should be considered as the most critical factor 
to the Somalia crisis, others point to the clan system with all its tension and rivalry as the most 
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fundamental reason for Somalia’s ongoing crisis (see review of this by Besteman 1996). All 
Somalis speak one language, have the same religion, and are from the same ethnic group, which 
is uncommon in Africa. Such homogeneity should have been a significant contributory factor 
in creating a nation-state. Under any conditions, indeed, such ethnic homogeneity would have 
been considered essential in conjuring up a solid nation-state.25 However, a deep clan system 
and division have long disrupted internal cohesion.  
There are five major clans in Somalia: Darood, Hawiye, Rahanwyeen, Isaaq, and Dir, and each 
clan has its sub-clans. Clans and sub-clans play a very important role in defining the political, 
economic and social landscape (Gundel 2006:5-6). Over 80 percent of the Somali people are 
pastoralists without a political culture of dominance and/or control by a centralised 
organisational structure as much of the organisation is around kinship which promotes loyalty 
to their kin and clans (Gundel 2006; Lewis 1961/1999). In fact, in his seminal work, I.M. Lewis 
(1961/1999) shows us how the clan and its segmented formation constitute a decentralised 
political structure. These segmented political formations have certainly featured as the source 
of fragmentation of Somalia’s polity and perennial civil war.  
Multiple factors are often attributed for the rise of the clan and traditional authority and ensuing 
entrenched divisions. From the traditional clan rivalry and conflict, the very nature of the clan 
structure in Somalia to Siad Barre’s misrule are identified as contributory factors to this 
protracted problem in Somalia. During his two decades of rule (1969–1991), Barre is blamed 
for exploiting existing clan based divisions as a tactic of divide and rule policy and the 
patrimonial relations he established with his own clan group to ensure loyal political groups 
(Mulugeta 2009; Besteman 1996). This has another repercussion: the struggle against Barre’s 
rule emerged as clan based (Besteman 1996). By 1991, Siad Barre’s regime had collapsed as a 
result of a coup forcing him into exile and the result was that the Somali political and economic 
forces became extreme clan-based forces. The 1991 coup was different from the 1969 one 
because not a single person or party was agreed upon to take leadership. This led to the 
fragmentation of the state and clan-based grouping in the country (Kodhek 2015). 
Gundel (2006) points out that the fall of Barre’s rule and the resultant collapse of the state 
collapse had pushed Somalis to depend increasingly on traditional structures/authority to 
substitute for the vacuum and thus maintain some level of order. For Gundel (2006), this 
                                                 
25 Following the European experiment on nation-state, many consider homogeneity are crucial conditions for its 
rise and development (see Kramer (2011) and Smith (1986)) 
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unquestionably became the source of Somalis’ paradox: traditional authority/structure based 
on the clan that emerged as the foundation for relative peace and stability in Somalia has also 
pushed it towards fragmentation of the country. Gundel (2006) also suggests that endless 
stitching and unstitching of clans, sub-clans and sub-sub-clans as a basis for shifting loyalties, 
factions and political allegiances has often featured as the source of fragility of Somalia. 
According to Mulugeta (2009:10), these divisions and shifting allegiances have deepened and 
widened as consequence of “competition over resources”.   
Others have pointed out that the competition and fighting for economic resources are some of 
the main causes of Somalia’s conflict (see review of these works in Besteman 1996). Fighting 
over the natural resources including land, water and livestock has continuously been a source 
of dispute in Somalia. At the very least, this might have been compounded and complicated by 
Somalia’s longest warlords run civil wars and instability.  
In a nutshell, much of the analysis on this perplexing and complex chaos in Somalia focused 
on the broad structural factors within the country that are driving the crisis in the country. These 
include factors such as traditional authority, postcolonial conditions, environmental 
degradation, the clan political structure and emergence of warlords. Others have paid attention 
to the undue external interventions and interferences which to impose / promote their own 
external agendas (Besteman 1996). Additional explanation to these refers to the crisis as related 
to “the missed opportunities and miscalculations of leaders” and under such consideration the 
crisis is taken “not as a fate, but as a tragedy” (Menkhaus 2007:358-9).   
As Menkhaus (2007:359) argues, although each of these explain Somalia’s long standing 
troubles, they are, arguably, a confluence of factors and “of internal and external interests and 
pressures working against the revival of a central government”. As a result of the absence of a 
central government and the vacuum created by this, “Somalia has been the epicentre of 
terrorism and source of international terrorism in the IGAD region” (Demeke and Gebru 
2014:10). This is a direct function of state collapse in Somalia which has weakened and 
rendered the local actors powerless to control local security and Somalia’s territories. This 
instability is long known for having implications not only on economic, social and political 
certainty in the country but also the entire Horn of Africa region. This instability has undeniably 
affected not only the region but also the continent and the international peace and security at 
large (for example, piracy in the coast of Somalia, transnational terrorism and migration 
etcetera).  It is thus understandable that there has been a sustained desire and initiatives over 
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the last three decades to stabilise Somalia. Many of the interventions, regional as well as global, 
have to be partially framed within such considerations.   
 
5.5.1 Intervention of IGAD and Regional Actors in Somalia Conflict  
Many of the regional interventions in Somalia begin with the recognition of the prolonged 
conflict that has had serious implications for the IGAD region and that these were manifested 
in the economic, social and political landscape (Mulugeta 2009). Notably, multiple collective 
efforts to restore peace, build alliances and broker peace and stability in Somalia, by regional 
member states and others from further afield have been made (Healy 2011). In the last thirty 
(30) years, over twenty failed reconciliation conferences and initiatives to restore the Somalia 
state and bring together the various factions and actors in this conflict have been held. The 
involvement of external actors both from the region and elsewhere have also contributed to 
exacerbating the multiple Somalia conflicts.  Following is an explication of the interventions 
of regional actors (particularly Ethiopia and Kenya), the regional multilateral initiatives (as the 
ones mediated by IGAD) and the dynamics caused by both.   
In the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has pushed itself as a significant external role 
player in the Somali conflict. Notably, Ethiopia’s obstinate desire to dominate and control 
IGAD as a regional mechanism and be the driver of, particularly, matters related to Somalia’s 
case is related to this aspiration.26 For the large part, Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia’s 
conflicts is driven by its desire to drive and control the course of political change in Somalia. 
Few factors, arguably, frame and inform Ethiopia’s desire. Firstly, Ethiopia has a long border 
not demarcated with Somalia in the eastern part of the region. This is also compounded by the 
Greater Somalia aspiration of some Somali elites which is a claim directed at Ogaden.  
Secondly, there is, the historical hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia over contestation of 
the Ogaden region inhabited by the Somalis which is a “region of eastern Ethiopia which has 
resulted in interstate wars between the two countries” (Wafula 2015:47). Thirdly, Ethiopia has 
also often cited a security threat coming from AL-Itihad which is a popular terrorist group that 
declared war against Ethiopia (Mulugeta 2009; Wafula 2015). To add to these, the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) and the Oganden National Liberation Movement (ONLM), Ethiopia’s 
two secessionist movements, used Somalia as their base and for decades these organisations 
                                                 
26 As noted in the previous chapter, Ethiopia has not relinquished its chairmanship of the organization for years, 
and selectively calls for meeting on issues that it prioritized. 
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had been supported by Somalia. Ethiopia has also exhibited fear that Eritrea might want to use 
Somalia to open another front to weaken and thin down by dividing Ethiopia’s defence 
capability. This fear of Ethiopia gained particular credence with Eritrea’s support of UIC in the 
early 2000s.  
Notably, civil war broke out in Somalia followed by a complete state collapse before past 
enmities and aggression between the two countries could be settled legitimately and 
appropriately (Wafula 2015). Thus, to prevent state failure, civil war and uncertainty, Ethiopia 
has been involved, on the one hand, with peace negotiation and mediation efforts and, on the 
other hand, promoting and propping up selected factions in the Somali elites and clans.  
Kenya too has followed similar interventions in Somalia’s protracted conflict as it has a long 
border with Somalia and has a significant number of Somalis as its citizens. It also hosts the 
largest Somali refugees. On the surface, these are crucial factors informing Kenya’s desire to 
actively engage in Somalia’s political crisis. It is worth noting that it has hosted multiple 
conferences in its capital and for a long time, it hosted the Somalia government and parliament 
established in exile. Djibouti and Eritrea have also sought to play a role at some level.  
The early interventions were in the first half of the 1990s focusing on getting the various 
political players and actors in the conflict in Somalia to come to a round table discussion. These 
were the preludes to IGAD acting as a regional mechanism to deal with such problems. Since 
the formal establishment of IGAD, the organisation has been working on conflict prevention 
and negotiation working on establishing peace and security in Somalia using its formal 
structures. With the inception of IGAD, it has been (as it currently is) actively playing a role in 
mediation and peace processes in Somalia’s intractable conflicts as well as in peacekeeping 
operations (IGAD 2016b).  
IGAD’s almost two decades old expensive and extensive intervention in Somalia’s conflicts 
have often been claimed as regional initiatives in promoting peace and security. The 
organisation as well as observers points to the relative changes in security in Somalia to such 
regional mechanism. Demeke and Gebru (2014) argue that IGAD has played a comprehensive 
and continuing role in the reestablishment of an independent and legitimate state in Somalia. 
As the following section demonstrates, this is far from the truth. In fact, the fact that self-
interest guides many of the external actors’ involvement in Somalia is an attestation of the fact 
that these actors have contributed to the pain of Somalia and Somalis. Arguably, IGAD member 
100 
 
states’ conflicting desires to exploit IGAD for this purpose and impose their will on the Somalia 
conflict have also led to the protracted nature of this problem.   
The very first regional initiative to mediate and bring together the then warring parties was 
taken by Djibouti in June 1991 with the funding from Saudi Arabia. This was soon after Siad 
Barre was toppled down and Hassan Gulaid Abtidon, the then President of Djibouti, brought 
together leaders of six armed factions to a round table. In this Djibouti conference, Somalia’s 
prominent political leaders were present and coordinating the meeting. The conference was, 
for example, chaired by Aden Abdulle Osman (first President of Somali Republic), with two 
former civilian prime ministers Abdirizak Haji Hussein and Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal 
assisting. Djibouti hosted another conference as a continuation of this in July 1991. These 
became known as ‘Djibouti I’ and ‘Djibouti II’ conferences. What this conference achieved 
was merely to appoint Ali Mahdi Mohamed as the interim president of the Republic of Somalia 
for two years.  This was then challenged by General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Somali 
National Alliance (SNA) (the group he was running), completely rejecting the Djibouti 
conference and its outcome (Menkhaus 2010).    
The violence in the country continued unabated. This occurred despite multiple local (Somalis 
run peace efforts)27, regional and international initiatives to address the Somalia crisis. In 1994, 
Kenya hosted another initiative under the auspices of the UN to establish a new power-sharing 
agreement. This conference was attended by16 factions and militia leaders (including General 
Aideed, who was seen as spoiler), and it sought to establish an agreement on a coalition 
government. This initiative too did not materialise into anything. On the contrary, the violence 
in Somalia persisted and the country was deeply entrenched into fragmented areas controlled 
by warlords and factions. This is with the exception of Somali-Land that self-declared a 
republic despite lack of recognition from the international community. Notably, except Somali-
Land that was led by Mohammud Ibrahim Egal, there was hardly any properly functioning 
region of Somalia.  
In the rest of the country, multiple warring and faction groups were running the different 
regions of Somalia with varying degrees of success. Various regions were run by the formation 
of alliances such as the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), headed by Ali Mahdi Muhammud; 
                                                 
27 This is a reference to the various inter-group and inter-faction accords and meetings to address the prevailing 
crisis in their respective regions and between/among factions. These took place with varying degree of success 
and failure.  
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the Somali National Alliance (SNA), first formed by General Mohammud Aideed who died in 
1996 and then in 1997 led by his son Hussein Aideed; and a third alliance led by the Aideed’s 
former financier, Osman Hassan Ali. Both SSA and SNA alliances claimed to head 
governments and their leaders used the title of ‘president’ (Kodhek 2015).  
In October 1996, 26 Somali leaders affiliated with SSA factions met in Nairobi, Kenya, with 
the aim of establishing a government to rule over the entire state of Somalia and a commitment 
to continue dialogue towards lasting peace. This initiative was for the large part steered by 
Kenya and Western countries (particularly the USA and the EU). The Kenya’s stint was 
overshadowed by Ethiopian’s initiative at Sodere which took place from November 1996 to 
January 1997. Reflective of the competing regional interests in Somalia, the conference 
organised by Ethiopia was rivalling the Kenyan and Egyptian organised talks. These were 
actually taking place separately but concurrently (at least in the Sodere and Cairo processes), 
and these featured rather as separate rival efforts between the mid-1996 and early 1997. 
The Ethiopian organised conference in Sodere was attended by the leaders affiliated with SSA 
with those affiliated with SNA and the Republic of Somaliland having boycotted the meeting. 
Predictably, this meeting was in many respects dominated by Ethiopia and for large part it was 
an Ethiopian initiative even though Ethiopia was given a mandate from both the OAU and the 
newly established Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This conference 
organised by Ethiopia under the auspices of IGAD brought together 27 leaders representing 26 
political factions. The October 1996 meeting ended with the parties signing a declaration of 
national pledges and commitments to engage in peace. However, the major political actors of 
that time such as Mr. Hussein Aideed and Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal did not participate in 
the meeting. Following this conference in 1997, the National Salvation Council (NSC) was 
established thus buttressing the commitments set out in the meeting held in October 1996. The 
broader objective of this was to establish a single functional government for the Somalia state.  
Even though it was not accepted by some political actors in the Somalia conflict, and despite 
its failures, the establishment of NSC certainly paved the way for renewed hope for Somalia. 
The outcome of the Sodere conference was thus rather symbolic. In line with the Sodere 
conference, all efforts were channelled towards the establishment of a Transitional Central 
Authority (TCA) or Provisional Central Government (PCG) of Somalia. The declaration 
provided that an NSC total of 41 members were selected from 26 political movements with an 
eleven-member national executive committee led by five co-chairmen. The declaration called 
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for the pursuit of the following five points: “work towards the restoration of peace, stability, 
law and order; help reconcile the difference among the clan in conflict areas; Draft a 
Transitional National Charter (TNC) for the TCA; cooperate and facilitate the provision of 
emergency relief and rehabilitation programmes and other social services; and act as the 
counterpart to the international community in efforts to assist the reconciliation and 
rehabilitation process for the peace and stability in the region.” (Kodhek 2015:44)  
Despite the pledges and commitments made, the above five points were not implemented as 
expected. The main reason was the non-inclusion of the factions allied to SNA and the Republic 
of Somaliland. According to observers and mediators, both Hussein Aideed (from SNA) and 
Mohammud Egal (from the Republic of Somaliland) claimed to have been elected by their 
respective people and both rejected the formation of NSC laying claim to the leadership of the 
entire state of Somalia (Kodhek 2015). It should also be noted that Aideed had a troubled 
relation with Ethiopia which would make it hard for his faction to take part in an Ethiopian 
organised conference. As Menkhaus (2010) puts it, Ethiopia and Aideed’s SNA had become 
adversaries with Ethiopia accusing these factions for collaborating with Islamic groups that 
Ethiopia considered a threat to its security. It was also clear, and for all to see, that any peace 
initiative that would not include SNA and Hussein Aideed would be troubled, if not a complete 
failure.  
Arab states were also trying to mediate the various factions in the Somalia conflict, notably, 
the most prominent ones. In November 1997, Egypt organised a peace conference in Cairo to 
mediate Hussein Aideed’s SNA and the NSC that emerged from Sodere to form a national 
government. This was dashed as few faction leaders that were in NSC pulled out of these talks.  
Yemen too had similar efforts in May of 1997 along the same line. These competing and 
rivalling peace talks featured as a proxy war between Arab states and Ethiopia thus derailing 
any possibility for a peaceful solution to the Somalia crisis. Out of fear for its own security, 
Ethiopia was seen as developing alliances with selected Somalia factions in order to influence 
the political process in Somalia and at times playing them against each other (Menkhaus 2010).  
Despite a call from the United Nation Security Council (UNSC), none of the faction leaders 
agreed to disarmament and so fighting in several areas continued. Another factor that led to the 
stagnation of the peace efforts was the rise of the Islamist militia groups such as the Sudan- 
backed Al Ittihad. The groups carried out several attacks in Ethiopia leading to repeated cross-
border attacks by Ethiopian troops where the militias were cleared from their bases. These 
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developments were very much indicative of the fact that Ethiopia had long been party to the 
conflict which conflicted with its role as host and organiser of peace conferences.  
Over the years, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya and Egypt hosted several meetings 
to mediate between the various Somalia factions. Each of these mediation efforts took place 
sadly by limiting the participation of important Somalia actors and factions. The tension and 
mistrust among these hosting states and the conflicting interest they had in the Somalia political 
process, certainly hampered any progress. In the end, all the outcomes of these efforts turned 
out to be short lived and conspicuously failed to achieve peaceful resolutions to the Somalia 
crisis and bringing the groups together to rebuild the war-torn country. In what appeared to be 
a major breakthrough, the Djibouti government hosted Somalia National Peace Conference in 
the small town of Arta in August 2000 led to the establishment of the Transitional National 
Government (TNG). The Transitional National Government (TNG) was the 14th attempt to 
build a cohesive and stable government in Somalia. What is important about this peace 
conference was that it gained for the first time the endorsement of many regional and 
international actors (including the UN and Egypt).  
Nonetheless, TNG too “failed to win the backing of all the neighbouring states and the 
confidence of donor governments” and certain factions showed hostility towards it mainly “the 
‘blocks’ which were all aligned with Ethiopia” (Menkhaus 2010). This was predictable 
considering the fact that Ethiopia was suspicious of the TNG rule and its relation to Hassan 
Dahir Aweys (formerly head of Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya) and personalities linked to Al-Itihad. 
Out of these concern and calculation, Ethiopia “actively supported the establishment of an 
opposing alliance of military factions called the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council 
(SRRC)” (Menkhaus 2010:16). This is clear indication that regional states rivalry and undue 
intrusion in the Somalia crisis has led to difficult alleyway.   
Known as an outcome of the ‘Arta process’, the establishment of TNG with its own 
Transitional Charter for government was important. Despite its legitimacy and wide 
acceptance, due to poor infrastructures, lack of strong territorial control, inability to collect 
taxes and an inability to provide proper social services, the TNG government was unable to 
function in Somalia (Kodhek 2015). Ethiopia’s established SRRC that openly opposed TNG 
also seriously challenged the legitimacy of TNG. TNG’s acceptance slowly waned locally, 
internationally and regionally. Two years after its establishment, by 2002, TNG was already 
deemed irrelevant.  
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This opened up for renewed diplomatic efforts through IGAD to bring together TNG and SRRC 
for a national reconciliation conference. This IGAD-led Somalia National Reconciliation 
Conference (SNRC), hosted by Kenya and supported by the UN and Western donors, was the 
longest peace conference that lasted two years (Blok and Tijmen 2010). After two years of 
back and forth, the Transitional Federal Charter was developed thus paving the way for the 
establishment of the Transitional Federal Parliament (Kodhek 2015). In line with these, the 
newly established parliament elected its first president Abdullahi Yusuf in October 2004, for a 
five-year transitional period to establish the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). TFG 
started work in 2004 under  president Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, making it the first 
internationally and regionally recognized government and leader in Somalia since 1991 
(Kodhek 2015).  
More effective than its precursor, the TFG tried to restore legitimate government and judicial 
institutions and, while doing this, it gained popular support from the population. Its tasks of 
restoring order and bringing about lasting peace and security to this war-torn country is yet to 
be realised.  The establishment of TFG is not without its own controversy. The entire process 
was marred by corruption to influence votes and allegiances, and Ethiopia’s undue influence 
of the process and clans aligned to it. As result, despite its international recognition, various 
Somalia factions view TFG as an institution controlled and steered by Ethiopia. Through time, 
“TFG proved to be a very fragile alliance as it was prone to internal strife and clan interests. 
Arguably, TFG enjoys international support from the United Nations, the African Union (AU), 
IGAD and many Western nations politically” (Blok and Tijmen 2010:3). It is thus notable that 
TFG also struggled to gain national acceptance and ensure physical control over Somali 
territories. 
Consequently, alliances inside Somalia, particularly those in Mogadishu (including Islamists, 
leaders of the previous TNG, and warlords), became a block rivalling TFG and refused to 
recognise it and much less host it in Mogadishu. It was out of this that the Islamic Court Unions 
(ICU) which brought a wide range of figures and factions into its fold, including Islamist forces 
ensued. In March 2005, the parliament of the TFG split and the militia group ‘Alliance for the 
Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism’ (ARPCT) seeing weakness in the government, 
decided to confront the Islamic Court Unions (ICU) in an attempt to control Mogadishu but 
were defeated.  
Following this, Ethiopia hankering to support TFG (which was already dubbed as its client), 
had its troops going into Mogadishu to depose the ICU in 2006 and recapture the city (Kodhek 
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2015). This was an open Ethiopian invasion of Somalia with all its tanks and troops under the 
auspices of the US and to a lesser extent the EU. Later, though, Ethiopia managed to install 
TFG and found itself stuck in the Somalia’s intractable conflict unable to find any way out of 
it. This turned out to work contrary to the interest of TFG and in the process lost any semblance 
of legitimacy for it was seen as a stooge for Ethiopia as it became effectively weak and unable 
to impose its authority over the significant portion of the country.  
Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia also divided IGAD. Eritrea wanted IGAD to chastise Ethiopia 
for invading Somalia and Uganda was not happy about it either. However, all the efforts failed 
to resolve the differences between Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as Uganda and Ethiopia (Abdi 
2012). In the end, Ethiopia managed to isolate Eritrea with the help of the regional states and 
western powers involved in the Somalia crisis (notably the USA), and kept a moderate deal 
with Uganda to get out of this.  
Ethiopian’s salvation for being stuck in Somalia came from international actors, the USA and 
the UN which helped negotiate an exit strategy for Ethiopia and brought in a peacekeeping 
force which was a component of them from IGAD. These facts are crucial in better 
understanding what IGAD and the regional actors did and did not do, should and should not 
have done. Following the spectacular failure of TFG and Ethiopia’s intervention to create new 
stable conditions in Somalia, new initiatives in 2008 were seen. This was a mediation effort 
initiated by the UN to bring an end to the fighting between TFG and the various armed groups 
fighting TFG and Ethiopian forces.  
The efforts of the international community seem to have delivered some tangible results in 
Somalia in recent years as evidenced in the formation of the Federal Government of Somalia 
(FGS) in 2012. The FGS was mandated to take office and replace the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) established in 2004 in exile, in Kenya. Notably, in August 2012 Somalia 
elected its first formal parliament that elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in September 2012 
(Kodhek 2015). After the transition from the TFG to FGS took place, many considered this 
transition as a pivotal shift towards bringing peace and stability to the war-torn country. 
However, the FGS is still a weak structure confronted by many challenges such as the Al-
Qaeda affiliated to Al-Shabaab, clan leaders and the differences between the national and 
regional governments.  
Like Ethiopia, Kenya too got involved in the Somalia conflict rather directly. Since 2009, 
Somalia’s main adversaries have been the Al-Shabaab militia prolonging the fighting and 
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plaguing the same region with terrorist attacks across the border. This became an intervention 
known as Operation ‘Linda Inchi’ launched in October 2011 with the Kenyan government 
having entered Somalia to secure its border. After intervening, Kenya pushed diplomatically 
to get its troops rebranded as peacekeeping forces a similar to the process which had been 
followed by Ethiopia.28 
After October 2008, IGAD was established as an implementer and cooperation office in Addis 
Ababa. The office was mandated to do the following: “facilitate reconciliation, assist 
institutional and capacity building efforts, assist the mobilization of financial and technical 
resources for the TFG II and assist the TFG II to fulfil its mandate as per the TFG and the 
Djibouti agreement” (Mulugeta 2009:34). The office also works with the African Union and 
the United Nations. To bring peace and to exercise its mandates to address the problems in 
Somalia, the office formed a strategic plan named “Re-establishing Effective Institutions in 
Somalia.” The two-year strategy plan (2009–2011) was designed to re-establish institutions 
that can create a system of basic administration and thus provide security. IGAD also 
established a liaison office in Mogadishu to follow-up and provide information on a daily basis 
to the facilitator’s office. Furthermore, the office has been supported financially by the IGAD 
Partners Forum (IPF), especially Denmark and Finland. According to Mulugeta (2009), “the 
Facilitator’s Office has been gathering information and updating the member states on 
developments in Somalia and  its activities have also been coordinated with the UN and AU” 
(Mulugeta 2009:35).  
IGAD has thus far been active in the security matters of Somalia. According to the IGAD’s 
Security Sector Program (SSP), “Al-Shabaab has become a regional security threat in the East 
Africa region” (Nagish 2016). In a new report titled “Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security 
Treat”, IGAD labelled Al-Shabaab as a threat to the wider Horn and East African region. Al-
Shabaab, the Islamic militant group, has long been perceived as merely a Somali-organisation. 
According to the report, “Al-Shabaab is clearly no longer an exclusively Somali problem, and 
requires a concerted international response”. In the opening remark, Commander Abebe, 
Muluneh, director of IGAD Security Sector Program (SSP), urged the IGAD member States to 
establish a transnational security initiative to promote cooperation and coordination within the 
sub-region. The report claims that Al-Shabaab aspires to become a truly regional organisation 
with membership and horizons that transcend national borders. Accordingly, Al-Shabaab as an 
                                                 
28 This is explored in some detail in the upcoming section. 
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Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in the Horn of Africa has a presence in five countries: Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Djibouti, Tanzania and Uganda. It also stated that the group is working hard to extend its 
tentacles across the region. This is the first time that IGAD has officially placed Tanzania 
together with other countries of the region that are facing a serious threat from Al-Shabaab. It 
expressed its concern that the group is already recruiting young people in the member states 
(Nagish 2016).29 The report further specifies that progressive expansion is mainly the result of 
the strategic direction adopted by its former leader and Ahmed Abdi Godane and his successor, 
Ahmed Diiriye who presently heads the movement. As Nagish puts it: “In late 2013, Godane 
re-organized Al-Shabaab’s military wing to include two transnational units: one, the Jaysh 
Ayman, directed against Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and another dedicated to operations 
against Ethiopia” (Nagish 2016). IGAD stated that while the group has failed in effective 
operation in Ethiopia, the report accused the Jaysh Ayman for launching continuous cross-
border attacks to Kenya in 2014. Notably, “an attack in Kenya’s Garissa University College 
occurred a little over a year ago and resulted in the loss of 148 lives including 142 students. 
The attack was the second bloodiest in Kenya since Al-Qaeda bombed the US embassy in 
Nairobi in 1998, killing 213 people” (Nagish 2016). Just after a year, there was another attempt 
in the same city. The initial target was at a busy shopping mall but the plot was identified and 
lives were saved.  
IGAD’s Security Sector Program (SSP) in collaboration with the Sahan Foundation officially 
launched and released the study and report on Al-Shabaab. The report provides a series of 
recommendations to be taken by IGAD member states and other stakeholders in order to 
mitigate the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. Subsequent to the submission of the report, on May 
2016, IGAD commissioned a study on ‘Mapping Jihadist Organizations and Influences in the 
IGAD Region’ which is still to be reported to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
and the Committee on Eritrea and Somalia (Nagish 2016). The Islamic militant group has 
continued to fight with Somali security forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM). 
AMISOM is facing different resistance from Al Shabaab who continues to operate mostly in 
rural areas. Wafula (2015) argues that “continued collaboration between AMISOM and the 
United Nations is critical in turning Somalia around. AMISOM must also understand the 
                                                 
29 https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/content/al-shabaab-no-longer-exclusively-somali-problem, Al- Shabaab 
no longer an exclusively Somalia problem: The Reporter, 20 August 2016, By Yemane Nagish (accessed June 2 
2018). 
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perceptions of the Somali people towards their presence in Somalia so that they can respond 
appropriately” (Wafula 2015:54). The UN Security Council Resolution 2093 aims to 
increasingly put the United Nations in charge of peace and security in Somalia by specifically 
building capacity in the security sector and thus establish the rule of law institutions (Wafula 
2015). The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) began work in 2013 to 
identify the process to achieve the goals of the organisation but these strategies respond to 
technical rather than political problems.  
The US government established a military officially with a small contingent cell in Mogadishu 
ostensibly at the request of AMISOM and the Somali government (Martinez 2014). This unit 
includes advisers, planners and communicators assisting the AMISOM and the Somalia 
government forces. Until 2001, the US also funded the Somalia peace process but its 
involvement, along with Western powers, was minimal. This was the case until September 
2001, which dramatically changed the US’s and Western powers interest in Somalia. It was 
during this period that the funding from the US and other Western powers came in force; and 
this development managed to ensure that IGAD was able to function without the involvement 
of Egypt, Libya and Yemen who had direct interests in Somalia and the Horn of Africa at large 
(Abdi 2012).  
All the external actors in the Somali case must tread carefully because of the complexity and 
nature of the conflicts. As argued by Sharamo and Mesfin (2011), there are many other national, 
regional and international actors that play a significant part in promoting peace and security in 
Somalia. These actors include regional states (Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Djibouti, and 
Eritrea) and states from further afield (the EU, Egypt, Turkey, Libya, Qatar, Syria, UAE and 
Iran). Other internal actors include the warlords, AhluSunnaWal-Jama and the business 
community. It is very important that the UN, the AU and IGAD, among others, strategize 
effectively and make diplomatic efforts to eradicate the support received from those actors that 
play a negative role. To this end, Sabala (2011:115) suggests, “they should rethink the basis of 
their cooperation with the other actors especially those seen as strategic partners. Somalia’s 
priorities and interests should be placed ahead of these actors ‘roles in Somalia irrespective of 
their impact.”   
Due to the regional security dilemma, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, have had a 
historical security presence in Somalia’s conflict. All four countries have supported or fought 
with armed groups inside Somalia. Neighbouring countries also have small groups that have 
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fought against various rulers in Mogadishu. At times, external interventions in Somalia have 
been carried out due to the need to fight domestic groups. At other times, external interventions 
have been used to steer dynamics inside Somalia in a neighbour-friendly direction. Thus, 
Somalia has been used as a proxy theatre (Wafula 2015). There have been persistent internal 
peace spoilers.  Typical examples in this instance are the Al Shabaab and other militia groups 
who are against the government. This did not rule out the effort being made by all the internal 
and external actors to help Somalia achieve its vision of having a federal government by 2016 
(Abdi 2012).  
Even though there are differential efforts and commitments of all the IGAD member states and 
that there are at times conflicting and competing interests in their engagement, IGAD sought 
to play an important task in strengthening the TFG II. Djibouti too played a pivotal role while 
Kenya and Ethiopia systematically pursued interventionist policies with the tangential ‘wait 
and see’ approaches (Mulugeta 2009). Thus, the most arguable and debatable question is: Why 
is Ethiopia viewed as a significant external actor in the Somali conflict? As noted above, 
geographically, Ethiopia has a long border that is not demarcated with Somalia in the Eastern 
part and Ethiopia considers its security vulnerability coming from Somalia.  For this reason, 
since the start of the decade-long Somali conflict, Ethiopia intervened in various ways by 
assisting in significant interim peace negotiations and mediations to outright military 
intervention with the claim of stabilising the country. Ethiopia was already embroiled in the 
Somalia conflict before it even formally invaded Somalia. Therefore, it was selectively training 
and arming the factions in the Somalia clan based war theatre thus creating resentment and 
anger among those who were not receiving such support.  
America and Kenya have been doing the same. It is notable though that with Ethiopia, 
considering the historical animosity, it was a bit more pronounced.  Somali’s Islamic militant 
factions had a military base in the Gedo region of South Somali (Wafula 2015). It is often 
claimed that subsequent to the failure of the central government, the country became a hotbed 
for different extremist groups. Thus far, the international community has exerted efforts to 
bring sustainable peace and security to the country but has not managed to bring any long 
lasting peace and stability to Somalia. The group also has strong support throughout the country 
and aims to establish an Islamic state in Somalia with the view of extending Islamic radicalism 
in the Horn of Africa. Al- Shabaab (meaning ‘the youth’ in Arabic) are the other main actors 
in the Somali conflicts. After the Ethiopian intervention, this group increased in size and 
strength especially in southern Somalia (Wafula 2015).  
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5.5.2 The AU, AMISOM and United Nations Mediation Process in Somalia  
During the entire period of conflicts, many interventions were made through the African Union 
(AU), the United Nations (UN), and the Arab League and IGAD (Roba Sharamo 2011). The 
main mediation processes implemented by external actors were: the 1997 Cairo peace 
conference; the 2000 Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) in Arta Djibouti; the 2002 
Somali Reconciliation Conference (SRC) in Eldoret, Kenya; the 2003 National Reconciliation 
Conference (NRC) in Nairobi, Kenya; and the 2007 National Reconciliation Conference in 
Magadishu (Kodhek 2015).  
According to Wakengela (2011:384), “the presence of the AU in Somalia occurs through the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is a peacekeeping mission operated by the 
AU with the approval of the United Nations under Resolution 1744. In September 2006, the 
AU decided to send a peacekeeping mission to Somalia”. AMISOM was officially deployed in 
Somalia in 2007 for six months only to provide peace and security support to the TFIs 
(Transitional Federal Institutions). Their efforts were geared towards not only the stabilisation 
of Somalia to ensure safety and security and the “furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation 
but also to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and [to] create conducive 
conditions for long term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia” (Wafula 
2015:53).   
When AMISOM entered Somalia in 2007, it initially deployed troops from Uganda and 
Burundi, with Uganda being the only IGAD member state. At the time, there was a great 
amount of suspicious over neighbouring states’ conflicting interest and stake and a broad 
consensus on not seeking troops from them for this mission. Thus, the AU was looking for 
troops to be contributed from countries elsewhere. By 2010 there was a combined force of 5 
250 in Mogadishu (2 700 from Uganda and 2 550 Burundians), which is 3 000 fewer troops 
than the minimum required number stated at the time. Even this number reached where it was 
in 2010 after a slow increment on the troop numbers. Other countries that offered troops were 
Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi, Djibouti and Guinea (Wakengela 2011). However, lack of resources, 
the need for equipment, uncertainty facing troops in Somalia and internal politics in these 
countries, led these states to withdraw their offer. This had certainly hindered the AU’s plans. 
This is not surprising considering the Somalia crisis and the multiple war fronts the country 
was (still is) hosting. In fact, the question many were asking was: How was this going to be a 
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peacekeeping mission in the absence of peace to keep? This has pushed many to consider and 
debate on possibilities of peace-enforcing mission instead of peacekeeping one.  
In any case, at the time, countries such Sudan, France, Kenya, Djibouti, Brazil, Uganda and 
Turkey were not willing to train troops (Wafula 2015; Ashenafi 2017), but were willing to end 
own troops for the mission. Notably, Kenya and Djibouti later sent its troop as part of 
AMISOM. Kenyan troops first moved into Somalia as an invading force but through diplomatic 
efforts, it was rebranded as part of AMISOM. Ethiopia too followed the same root. However, 
Ethiopia has since been in Somalia both as peacekeeping force and invading force. Besides 
getting a segment of its troop wear blue, Ethiopia maintains an unknown number of its invading 
force as a contingent in the name of fighting terrorism. As a result, Ethiopia has continued to 
be labelled among Somalis as invading force (even with the blue beret) which is an image the 
country battled to shirk off among Somalis. Kenya too got its invading force rebranded as 
peacekeeping force by wearing completely blue. However, its image as an invading force 
persisted. This is despite the fact that Kenya and Somalia did not have any historical enmity 
while Ethiopia had. The only obvious conclusion for this is that its first entry has not helped it. 
Notably, there have been multiple al Shabaab terror attacks in the Kenyan heartland as backlash 
of this intervention.    
By 2015, more than half of the IGAD member states were embroiled in the Somalia conflict. 
Except Burundi, all the troop-contributing countries to the AMISOM mission are from IGAD: 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda with a total of 22,000 troops. Eritrea and Sudan were 
also seen as supporting one or the other faction in Somalia. Eritrea was often in cross-hair with 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti for supporting factions which the others did not like or approve 
(considering them to be spoilers). These countries dubbed Eritrea as a spoiler and in the end 
ganged up against it to be sanctioned by the UNSC. It should also be noted that external powers 
such the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, USA and EU, etcetera have in one way or another 
sought to influence the political process in Somalia using their local and regional alliances. 
Typical examples in this regard are the US and Turkey which have boots in the ground. While 
the division among regional states was clear right from the beginning the African Union has in 
many respects shown interest and determination in peacekeeping and peace-building in 
Somalia. While the USA is eager for the large part to quell Islamic terrorism, the Arab League 
states (particularly Turkey and the Gulf states) may have their own Islamic agenda. 
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These multiple conflicting involvements and interests that Somalia was expected to 
accommodate have not helped the AMISOM mission in any way.  What was even troubling is 
that the troop-contributing countries were not in agreement with each other (Barnett 2016) as 
they often engaged in activities that were contradictory to the states’ mission. It was already 
known that, despite the UNSC sanctions, much of the arms circulating in Somalia were coming 
from the neighbouring states that had contributed troops to the mission (see Wezeman 2010; 
Allison 2015; Koigi 2018). There are also reports blaming countries involved in the AMISOM 
mission for being there for financial reasons rather than genuine concern for peace and the 
reconstruction of Somalia (TRT 2019; Williams 2019). In fact, with 10 years of the AMISOM 
mission, there is very little to show for it (Maruf 2017).  
In spite of the stated failures / shortcomings, considering the complexity of the Somalia crisis 
and the mission itself, AMISOM has at least achieved few objectives. In the early years, the 
mission had been successful in offering protection to the Abdullahi Yusuf administration and 
that of Sheikh Sharif. The subsequent security of Somalia and Mogadishu was made possible 
through this effort. However, these accomplishments have not been without massive human 
and financial losses. All peacekeeping forces continue to be threatened by the opposition armed 
groups and these huge logistical and financial challenges make the mission more complicated. 
As noted earlier, the AMISOM task is certainly more on the lines of peace-enforcing than 
peacekeeping which entail engaging in combat with armed forced seeking to destabilise the 
country.  
Besides these challenges, there is sustained consensus that Somalia would descend into anarchy 
if it were not for the efforts of AMISOM. Thus, the presence of the AMISOM troops, despite 
the heavy cost (particularly human, financial and political), has continued to be indispensable 
for the relative security and stability of Somalia. Pointing to this reality, Sabala (2011:100) 
states: 
In terms of sustaining a peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the hope lies in the request to the 
UN Secretary General to explore the option of replacing AMISOM with a UN peacekeeping 
operation in Somalia. Until AMISOM is replaced by an UN-operated peace mission it seems 
the mandate of AMISOM will continue to be a subject of renewal for some time. The 
likelihood of other African countries contributing troops to join AMISOM continues to 
diminish, as the AU has not been able to marshal sufficient resources and equipment to support 
them.  
 
It is thus arguable that against all odds, AMISOM has done incredible work to maintain peace 
in Somalia since its entry in 2007. For the first time, Somalia has an internationally recognised 
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legitimate government which was formed inside the country. AMISOM has been supportive of 
reopening embassies to support the new government. AMISOM is also reputed for fighting al 
Shabaab effectively and slashing the power and grip of this organisation in much of Somalia.   
5.6 IGAD and the Peace Process in South Sudan 
The current South Sudan and Sudan were under colonial Egyptian rule until they gained 
independence in 1956 and inherited its boundaries from Anglo–Egyptian Sudan (Kodhek 
2015). Geopolitics and history show that Sudan is located in one of the most conflict-torn 
regions of the world.  Its neighbouring countries are Chad and the Central African Republic in 
the west, Egypt and Libya in the north, Ethiopia and Eritrea in the east and Kenya, Uganda and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo in the south. Sudan is very much diverse in terms of 
ethnicity, language and religion. As Mugo (2016:2) contends, this diversity is not reflected in 
the leadership of the country as Sudan is characterized by a continuous domination of the centre 
over the marginalized peripheries”.  
This drove Sudan down through the long running civil war and down in the middle creating a 
slip of South Sudan. As a consequence of this political failure, Sudan hosted the longest running 
civil war that lasted from 1962-2004. For the first time, Kenya-led mediation efforts in 2002 
made a breakthrough in ending the civil war and getting South Sudanese rebels and Sudanese 
governments. This is what then became known as the Machakos Protocol which enabled the 
south to conduct a referendum for self-determination after six years. With the help of the AU-
led mediation in January 2005, North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was 
signed as an accord thus effectively ending the longest running civil war in the continent. This 
includes details of ceasefire, autonomy for the south, a power-sharing arrangement between 
government and rebels and a condition for the proposed south Sudanese referendum. 
The AU, IGAD and the regional states were instrumental in ending the Sudanese conflict and 
midwifing the birth of South Sudan. Following the 2011 referendum, South Sudan became an 
independent state. In 2003, barely two years after its declaration of independence, this newly 
established state of South Sudan descended into another round of civil war and conflict thus 
dashing all hopes of the newly born state. In responding to the South Sudanese crisis, the IGAD 
regional states took the frontline. So, in trying to resolve the South Sudan conflict, Ethiopia, 
Uganda and Kenya have sought to play their parts both as individual states and as members of 
IGAD. Early at the onset of the South Sudanese crisis, “the regional leaders particularly that of 
Kenya, Sudan and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, immediately sent their foreign 
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ministers to Juba on 19 December 2013 for consultation with the political leadership after the 
unfolding of deadly violence” (Mugo 2016:32).  
A full-blown civil war broke out in South Sudan in December 2013 following President Salva 
Kiir accusation of his former vice-president, Riek Machar for plotting to overthrow him. It 
devolved to this because President Kiir fired the entire cabinet including Vice-President Riek 
Machar in July 2013 thus sparking off a civil war. The infighting within SPLM turned into an 
armed confrontation between the South Sudan government (Kiir’s forces) and the opposition 
forces (Mchar’s forces) (Kodhek 2015). It is reported that the conflict erupted in 2013 when 
the personal guards of president Kiir and Machar entered into armed confrontation.  
Besides this, what appeared to be a dispute over power sharing soon devolved into civil conflict 
along ethnic lines largely between the Dinka and the Nuer communities. As the war raged the 
country, Machar formed a rebel force out of the South Sudanese army loyal to him and waged 
armed insurgency in many parts of the country. Thus, what started as a power struggle within 
the governing Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) turned into a devastating war – 
edging the state towards collapse. Since the war began it has so far claimed more than 300,000 
lives and more than three million people have been displaced in a country of 13 million with 
millions internally displaced and one million left to neighbouring countries namely, Sudan, 
Kenya and Uganda (Fikade 2017).  
On 27 December of 2013, IGAD’s Heads of States and governments met in Nairobi, as part of 
IGAD’s 23rd extraordinary session of Assembly of Heads of States. The South Sudan crisis 
was the major agenda and the Assembly thus elected the Ethiopian leader as the chair of IGAD 
to mediate between the conflicting parties in South Sudan. It also elected the one-time 
Ethiopian foreign minister, Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin, as head of IGAD’s Special Envoy 
for South Sudan, whose team consisted of General Lazarus Sumbeyo of Kenya and General 
Mohamed Ahmed El Dabi of Sudan (Abiye 2017). Notably, no person from Uganda is chosen 
here, despite the fact that Uganda is already embroiled in this conflict – with the intent of 
protecting Salva Kiir’s government. The Ugandan army was crucial to shoring up the advance 
of opposition forces and their attack on the capital in January 2014. Indeed, from the beginning, 
the engagement of IGAD’s frontline states (namely, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Sudan) were 
significant and these countries too assumed a major role in the negotiations. IGAD’s role as 
lead mediator in the South Sudan conflict was supported by the African Union and the 
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international partners (notably the US and EU) because of IGAD’s significant investment and 
its involvement in peace-making in Sudan-South Sudan. 
A protracted peace talks under the auspices of IGAD occurred in Addis Ababa. These peace 
talks took place while the fighting continued in multiple parts of the country. As a culmination 
of IGAD’s two (2) years efforts, Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic 
of South Sudan (ARCSS) was finally signed in 17 August 2015. ARCSS was seen as a major 
breakthrough which led to the end of the civil war in South Sudan that had broken out in 
December 2013. It was on the bases of this accord that the National Unity Government of South 
Sudan (NUGSS) was established thus enabling the power sharing arrangement. As part of this 
deal, in April 2016, Machar returned to Juba and was re-instituted into his former position and 
in 2016 April - Riek Machar finally returned to Juba and was sworn in as first vice-president 
in a new unity government but was sacked in July after further conflict and went back into 
exile. 
This calm made possible through ARCSS turned out to be a short-lived one. Unstable as it was, 
the deal collapsed in July 2016 after new fighting in the capital Juba broke out which forced 
the first vice president Machar into exile. This clash between the two rival parties left more 
than 300 civilians dead and over 150,000 displaced. The situation was unpredictable and forced 
the citizens to live in fear while causing foreign governments to evacuate their nationals from 
Juba. Among these, Italy and Germany managed to airlift European citizens out of Juba, and 
Japan, India and Uganda also evacuated their nationals (Anberbir 2016). 
Subsequently, the country noticed a split of the opposition with Taban Deng taking over as first 
vice-president and Machar’s faction took up arms against the government (Abiye 2017). 
Machar left Juba when the conflict started and having failed to return on the deadline set by 
Salva Kiir,30 Kiir replaced Machar with Taban Deng Gai (Gen.) (Nagish 2016). Subsequently, 
Machar’s faction took up arms against the government and brought more complexities to the 
South Sudan problem. Besides Kiir's government army and Machar's SPLM/A-IO, half a dozen 
armed opposition groups have sprung up since July 2016 (Nagish 2017). 
                                                 
30 Riek Machar left Juba with deteriorating security in the capital and siting personal threat he claimed to face. 
There were reports at the time that his residence was attacked by government forces (purportedly loyal to Salva 
Kiir); Machar left Juba after have been on the run and hiding for a couple of weeks in Juba (Fortin and Kron 
2016; BBC news, 9 July 2016 ). 
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Following this outbreak, in August 2016, IGAD held a closed session meeting in Addis Ababa 
in Ethiopia with the warring parties with the intention of getting Reik Machar back to the unity 
government. The discussion of this meeting sought to get Salva Kiir’s camp agree that Riek 
Machar reassumes his previous position of First Vice President of the NUGSS. In the first 
place, IGAD did not approve Taban’s appointment and it did not see this as a prudent choice 
on the part of president Kiir. In particular, Ethiopia was not happy with this decision and it was 
already hosting Machar at its capital at the time. This in turn became a sore point between Juba 
and Addis Ababa and thus dragged Uganda into the fray. Nagish (2016) points out that “amid 
the closed meeting of IGAD, the representatives, who were not part to the negotiation, called 
upon the regional block members to decide for the deployment of intervention forces 
immediately to protect civilians and halt the collapse of the South Sudanese state”.  
Arguably, this was an Ethiopian position which did not go down well with Juba and Kampala. 
When this statement was released by SPLM-IO officials, the government refused to accept the 
appointment of the new Vice President claiming that it completely violates the agreement 
signed between the two contending parties. It is notable that the divergent interests of and 
division between the Ethiopians and the Ugandans hurt the South Sudanese peace process. 
Ethiopia has not liked the Ugandan continued military presence in Juba to support Kiir’s 
government while informal officials from Kiir government have been accusing Ethiopia of 
taking sides with Machar’s group. In multiple occasions in the course of the mediation process, 
Uganda has overtly shown strong determination to retain Kiir in his position. Evidently, the 
rivalry and competing interests among all the regional states involved in mediating this crisis 
are expressed in multiple instances and in various forms. These reflect the fact that they have 
divergent economic and security investments in controlling and managing the South Sudanese 
crisis which has serious ramifications for the mediation process.  
The assembly of heads of state and government and the African Union specially appointed a 
committee to discuss the political developments and peace negotiations in South Sudan. This 
summit held in Addis Abeba was a consensus building meeting organised and directed by 
IGAD. The gathering was led by the Ethiopian PM of Hailemariam Dessalegn (at the time) 
then Chairperson of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government with the 
participation of Heads of State from the district and agents from the UN and the African Union 
(Nagish 2016). 
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On July 11, 2016, Ethiopia revealed its readiness for a hard-hitting measure to enforce peace 
in South Sudan days after an IGAD’s communiqué demanded revisions on the United Nations 
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to establish an intervention and mediation process. Former 
Ethiopian Communication Affairs Minister, Getachew Reda remarked in a press conference 
that troops from contributing countries should take strong actions to ensure peace in South 
Sudan and to realise the peace agreement. Thus, it was asserted to this effect that “Ethiopia 
believes that peace could not be sustainable the way it has been handled in Juba unless a 
forceful measure is taken by the peacekeeping mission there” (Anberbir 2016).   
This latest position came days after a communiqué was issued by IGAD demanding an urgent 
revision of the UNMISS. IGAD’s council of ministers met on July 11 2016 in the capital of 
Kenya where they discussed the recent situation in South Sudan. The meeting, which was 
presided by Ethiopian Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom and attended by the members of 
council as well as representatives from the Troika (United States, United Kingdom, and 
Norway), condemned the latest fighting between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 
and the SPLA in Opposition (SPLA-IO) in Juba. They also condemned the fact that many 
people lost their lives and suffered casualties and the destruction of properties that continued 
unabated. IGAD demanded an immediate ceasefire and a revision of the UNMISS mandate to 
initiate an intervention process and to increase the number of troops from different regions to 
secure Juba. 
According to Minister Getachew Reda, IGAD and the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) 
have selected Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda to be prepared for an extra contribution of troops. 
According to Getachew, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn had met officials of both the 
rival factions and urged for a ceasefire. However, the situation escalated even to the extent of 
launching a military attack on the UN compound which is clearly a war crime. An Ethiopian 
solider was among the wounded while a Chinese peacekeeper was declared dead. Political 
analysts and observers criticised the peacekeeping mission in Juba for failing to protect the 
civilians (Anberbir 2016). The Christian Science Monitor reported on Reda’s suggestion to put 
in place an international intervention team willing to be more hostile to re-establish peace in 
the country. According to him, the brigade could be placed in the wider UN mission and would 
need to be constituted of African Union troops.  
IGAD has returned the warring parties once again into the negotiating table and prioritised 
cease-fire. These renewed efforts, following the July 2016 fallout, were peace initiatives both 
at the national and regional levels. IGAD came up with what it called High Level Revitalization 
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Forum (HLRF) which was  a decision taken at its Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State 
and Government on South Sudan on 12 June 2017. This was a decision to bring parties in South 
Sudan conflict to the negotiating table and thus revive ARCSS. In these talks, IGAD sought to 
bring back the Chairman of the Sudan People Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) 
to his previous post in the government so that the ARCSS could be fully respected (IGAD 
2015). 
The HLRF was officially launched in December 2017 and since then it facilitated numerous 
negotiations between the South Sudanese warring parties (SPLM/A-IG and SPLM/A-IO), 
including other oppositions groups over a period of a year and a half. These IGAD-led 
negotiations came to be known as Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in 
the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) which is to be construed as a culmination of this 
South Sudanese warring factions and the government signed at least six important peace 
agreement.  
The first agreement was the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians 
and Humanitarian Access signed on 21 December 2017 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This deal to 
cease all hostilities followed the high-level meeting at the African Union headquarters in Addis 
Ababa. The Ethiopian minister of Foreign Affairs Workneh Gebeyehu noted that this peace 
deal had to be regarded only as the first step towards further negotiations towards finding a 
better way to secure humanitarian aid in the country (Nagish 2017). This was certainly 
indicative of the direction IGAD and its mediating team wanted to take in the negotiation. True 
to this direction, the HLRF initiative managed to get the parties in South Sudanese conflict to 
sign on the Addendum to the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians 
and Humanitarian Access, signed on 22 May 2018 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This particular 
agreement focused on elaborating details to ensure permanent ceasefire and access and 
corridors for humanitarian aid/activities. However, the parties rejected power sharing, 
transitional period, governance system and broader security arrangements proposed by IGAD 
and left the meetings without any formal agreements on these issues.  
Following intense pressure from IGAD and the international community, President Salva Kiir 
and Riek Machar met in Khartoum for the first time in two years (The Star 2018). At this 
meeting, the parties inked the Khartoum Declaration of Agreement between the Parties to the 
Conflict in South Sudan on 27 June 2018. This agreement includes a cease-fire and power 
sharing arrangements. Once the signing ceremony ended with much fanfare, the cease-fire only 
lasted just few hours, with skirmish in the Northern part of the country and both parties blaming 
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each other for this violation. Subsequent to these, a week later, in a meeting held to discuss the 
violation of the previous agreement and way forward, on 6 July 2018, the Agreement on 
Outstanding Issues of Security Agreements was signed in Khartoum, Sudan. The Agreement 
on Outstanding Issues on Governance was signed on 5 August 2018 in Khartoum, Sudan. The 
latest peace-making efforts also saw the signing of a peace agreement on 12 September 2018 
in Addis Ababa. Despite President Kiir and Riek Machar signing peace agreements 12 times, 
the South Sudan conflict has continued unabated with varying levels of intensity. 
Arguably, regional states and IGAD have played a leading role in these conflicts. Ethiopia 
particularly dominated this process and in the last few years Uganda and Sudan have taken the 
lead. Early at the start of this conflict, Ethiopia and Uganda were pushing difficult terms and 
disagreeing on how to handle the negotiation and peaceful settlement of South Sudan’s crisis. 
Lack of consensus (and the apparent rivalry) between Addis Ababa and Kampala as mediators 
on the South Sudan crisis has hampered the peace process. As Vertin (2018:1) puts it, “the 
potential value brought to the South Sudanese mediation effort by IGAD’s frontline states—
Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda—was ultimately outweighed by their competing national 
interests and stakes in the outcome.” In the end, IGAD-led mediation process was tainted by 
unsubtle imposition of interests of the member states in the process and apparent bias of 
mediators. The opposing interests and involvement of global powers (particularly, the USA 
and China) have also complicated this crisis. As discussed in the next section, these global 
powers often sought to influence the political and security process through the regional states 
and organisation as well as the AU/UN.  
5.6.1 The Role of Global Actors in South Sudan’s Conflict  
On the surface, there appears to be broader consensus in the urgent need to stabilise South 
Sudan. Notably, IGAD has been mandated by the international community (AU and UN) and 
Ethiopia is leading the mediation process. However, there are apparent divisions on how to 
take this forward and the end outcome external actors expect out of this process. Like all 
diplomatic manoeuvres, the peace mediation processes were framed and guided by geopolitical 
interests of each state. In many respects, this is what has caused the wider division between 
Ethiopia and Uganda in the South Sudan crisis and between China and USA.  For example, the 
USA proposed UNSC sanctions on South Sudan were consistently blocked by China and 
Russia.  
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Evidently, local actors are aligned to regional actors and global actors. Despite having been the 
mediator, Addis Abeba has apparently been aligned with Machar, while Kampala has sided 
with Kiir. Since the start of the conflict, the US has sided with Kiir’s camp. The Obama 
administration indeed supported Salva Kiir by enabling him access to arms through Uganda at 
the behest of the US. It is notable that the US has winked on Ugandan People’s Defence Force’s 
(UPDF) intervention and move to Juba following the escalation of the crisis in South Sudan in 
2013-2014. The US has also been blocking the arms embargo and this was meant to enable 
weapons flow to president Kiir controlled government (Temin 2018). In many occasions, US 
officials formally and informally acknowledged their desire to retain Kiir as president and thus 
discouraged Machar from joining the unity government. For example, Special Envoy Donald 
Booth told the US Congress, “We do not believe it would be wise for Machar to return to his 
previous position” (Hunt 2018). This is despite the fact that US has shifted its position, partly 
due to frustration on the lack of progress. Early in 2018, the US sought to sanction 6 South 
Sudanese officials, accusing them for obstructing the peace process to which President Kiir 
vehemently objected. 
When Machar fled from Juba, it was Ethiopia that hosted him and there are also reports that he 
trains an army which launches his attacks from Ethiopia. This is arguably related to the fact 
that Ethiopia is in a difficult position as a home for ethnic Nuer, and Ethiopian’s Nuer are seen 
to be supporting Machar and his group inside Ethiopia. What makes matters worse is that at 
the start of the conflict in 2014, Kiir government has been accusing the UN strong 8,500 
peacekeeping forces in the country for siding with Machar’s rebels. The Ethiopian army is the 
largest contingent of this peacekeeping force deployed in South Sudan. Besides this, Ethiopia 
has an economic interest in South Sudan. This is not unique to Ethiopia, for it is known that 
Uganda and Kenya have similar ambitions in South Sudan.  
China is a major country with interests in both South Sudan and the Sudan with actual 
investments in multiple sectors. It is well known that China is the closest ally to the Sudanese 
government and its major exporter of weapons and ammunition albeit maintaining good 
relations with major businesses in South Sudan including the imports of about 6% of its needs 
of oil from South Sudan. China’s foreign policy is built upon the principle of ‘non-interference 
in the internal affairs’ of its allies, friendly countries or business partners. So, it was certainly 
disturbed by the development in post secession relations between South Sudan and its 
neighbour Sudan (Mugo 2016). 
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China has been investing heavily in infrastructure, the petroleum sector and telecommunication 
in South Sudan which constitutes a real presence on the ground and support through various 
sectors in the country. South Sudan inherited China’s oil companies working with other south 
Asians as de facto investors upon its concession. Energy-hungry China advances its presence 
in South Sudan through supporting the developmental activities of the government by 
providing loans and being a major market for its defence needs. China’s role in the 
advancement of peaceful resolution of conflict commenced with IGAD’s early mediation 
processes where it contributed financial support urging the parties to reach a quick solution. Its 
interests in South Sudan coupled with its strategic relations and influence in the region 
(Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and South Sudan) encouraged China to play a vital role in engaging 
the parties bilaterally or collectively towards a nationally owned agreement (Mugo 2016). 
China views the conflict in South Sudan as something that goes beyond the local politics of 
power struggle within the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM), to an international 
conflict over resources where its rival the US tries to unseat it through proxy and support to 
favourable individuals in power. In light of this, China consequently took a robust stance by 
supporting the mediation process and thus engaged the parties while deploying its first combat 
force in South Sudan as part of the United Nation’s peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan 
(UNMISS) in a clear mark of Chinese vested interest.  
IGAD received one million dollars support for the mediation process from China at the 
beginning of 2014 (Mugo 2016) and it (China) continues to engage high-level representation 
of its Special Envoy to South Sudan (SESS) and Sudan. Both parties to the conflict view 
China’s role as important and they were vocal in rejecting the United Nation Security Council’s 
(UNSC) proposed sanction’s threats. Both parties appeared to view China as the more credible 
party. China focuses on encouraging the parties to expedite the process and it viewed the 
proposed sanctions as less productive and constructive. China's UN ambassador Liu Jieyi 
dismissed the proposed sanctions and their modalities as illogical (Mugo 2016). In fact, none 
of the IGAD member states thought sanctions would be constructive. Instead, IGAD proposed 
the deployment of armed forces under blue which the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) 
upheld (Nagish 2016).  
Arguably, the regional block has to manage some balance in the military presence in Juba. 
More precisely, with Kirr sitting at the helm of the government, how many of his forces Machar 
could bring to Juba was an issue that needed consensus. Additionally, Kiir has to order some 
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of its troops out of Juba. The whole ordeal took weeks of back and forth with Machar arriving 
at the Gambella Airport ready to leave and cancelling a couple of times. According to 
observers, when the deadline for the August agreement was put in place by IGAD Plus, one of 
the conditions was for IGAD to fully refer the South Sudan issue to the AU or the UN, should 
the recent round of negotiations not get implemented. Needless to say, the process was stalled. 
With the recent arms’ sanctions failing to pass the floor at the UNSC due to the opposition of 
a handful of countries like Japan, Russia and the like ( to serve their own political interests), 
the role of the UN seems  to be undermined in the South Sudanese conflict as well. 
In December 2016, Ambassador Okamura Yoshifumi, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 
special envoy to South Sudan denounced atrocities and human rights violations committed by 
the warring factions in South Sudan but remarked that his country would, however, reject the 
United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) peaceful draft resolution to enforce an arms 
embargo on South Sudan. This was confirmed by Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn, 
(Former Ethiopian prime minister) who was at the time chairman of IGAD. Ambassador 
Yoshifumi stated that Japan did not support the move the UNSC was considering to take with 
regards to South Sudan which was a reference to the proposed sanctions. Refuting these 
measures which the UNSC was about to vote on Japan supported regional peace initiatives and 
proposed the deployment of Regional Peace Forces (RPFs) to stop atrocities, killings and the 
violation of human rights in that country. The Japan Ambassador also noted that the protection 
of aid workers would have to be part of the mission of this peacekeeping force which Japan 
supported wholeheartedly (Fikade 2017).  
In addition to urging for inclusive peaceful dialogues, the ambassador conveyed Prime Minister 
Abe’s request that those involved in the killings of civilians be held accountable. According to 
the ambassador, Abe’s administration has approved and deployed 350 contingency military 
personnel to South Sudan. Nevertheless, the ambassador denied involvement of the troops in 
any combat missions so far and vouched that they are not mandated to do so. Rather, the 
Japanese contingent is involved in the rebuilding of South Sudan’s war-torn infrastructure. 
Spending three days in Juba, ambassador Yoshifumi met President Salva Kiir and his ministers 
before he left for Addis Ababa.  The former vice president-turned-rebel chief of South Sudan, 
ambassador Yoshufimi stated that the ousted leader should be part of the newly-launched 
national dialogue which President Kiir announced. According to media reports, Machar is 
believed to be under house arrest in South Africa (Fikade 2017; Abiye 2017; Nagish 2017). 
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So far, a peace accord, negotiation or mediation attempts by IGAD member states have not 
been achieved. Back in 2015, IGAD came up with a roadmap suggesting a power sharing 
arrangement in an inclusive transitional government. The proposal of the regional block was 
swiftly scuppered by both Kiir and Machar. However, ambassador Yoshifumi argues that it is 
a hasty generalisation to claim that the peace processes are failures altogether. He also 
denounced the UNSC remarks that “it’s too early to impose sanctions”. According to the 
ambassador, the effectiveness of the arms embargo is dubious and might further escalate the 
already worsened crisis in South Sudan. In contrast to the Japanese, the government of the 
United States through its ambassador to the UN, Samantha Powers, urged the international 
community to impose sanctions on South Sudan as the situation is getting dire. Despite 
international pressures, however, the plight of civilians in South Sudan is still dire. Currently, 
reports are suggesting that South Sudan is on the brink of genocide. 
As established earlier on in the discussion, competing interests, mistrust and enmities within 
IGAD members have contributed to much of the failures and protracted nature of the South 
Sudan crisis. Global powers’ differences on how to deal with this and their desire to dictate the 
outcome have compounded this problem. In the final analysis, these developments and 
experiments in mediation and intervention raise questions on whether IGAD is up to the 
challenges the region is facing or not. The main argument advanced in these is that power 
dynamics and material interests of the regional and global actors involved in the peace process 
have serious ramifications in dealing with and handling the South Sudan and Somalia crises. 
5.7 Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the various policies and programmes that IGAD outlined for itself 
focusing on the two consecutive periods of five (5) years regional strategic plans. It has also 
been seen how the authority categorised its strategies into specific pillars with each outlining 
its own multiple programmes, sub-programmes and projects and budgetary requirements. This 
chapter also explored briefly the progammes and projects by probing in their application and 
implementation. The main argument is that IGAD has a long way to go in terms of its capacity 
and resource to implement its strategic objectives and plans. When considering that the various 
projects already implemented and are to be implemented, the available budget and what is still 
required, IGAD is still dependent on the good will of external funders. This makes it pliable 
towards the donor’s interest rather that its own priorities.  
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This chapter also explored IGAD’s peace and security strategy by focusing on its intervention 
in two most devastating regional crises. Here, IGAD’s role in mediating and intervening on 
Somalia and South Sudan was explored including how the military, economic and political 
diplomacy of all the actors are deployed to handle the crisis of the two countries. Notably, their 
efforts are shaped and influenced by political and economic interests of the regional and global 
actors which are reflected in the process and initiatives. The political economy of IGAD 
member states and global power interest interactively form and frame regional initiatives. The 
necessity and desire to intervene in the protracted conflicts are, thus, guided by the self-interests 
of the states involved.  
It can thus be assumed that the political economy of inter-governmentality guides IGAD’s 
regional integration and the regional strategic plan.  South Sudan and Somalia have borne the 
strain of post-independence civil wars and destructive conflicts because of failure in leadership 
which led to continuous conflict. To this day, the power vacuum has been exploited by the rise 
of military groups such as Al-shabaab in Somalia and the escalation of ethnic leaders in the 
case of South Sudan which once again leads to stagnation of the country (Kodhek 2015; 
Demeke and Gebru 2014). IGAD’s interventions in these two cases are, in some respects, 
meant to deal with these vacuums as an initiative of transnational governance.  
IGAD has been subjected to hard power and external support in its fight against terrorism and 
must direct resources to fight terrorist groups in its member states. In part, in both Somalia and 
South Sudan cases, the ‘dependency syndrome’ has implicated and complicated the situations 
of these states and opened them up for manipulation and the imposition of external agendas. 
Though a central role player, IGAD too has suffered from the above problem thus leaving it 
exposed to external influence and pressures as is the case in the Somali’s states, stakeholders 
and institutions.  IGAD should focus on the burning issues of political settlements, social and 
economic inequality, extreme poverty, corruption, bad governance, lack of tolerance and 
extremist ideologies towards progressive peace and sustainable economic development in 
Somalia (Demeke and Gebru 2014). In the case of South Sudan, challenges range from inter-
clan conflicts over natural resources to highly politically driven power struggles among the 
military and political ruling class (Kodhek 2015). 
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Chapter Six 
Considering Challenges and Opportunities of IGAD’s Regional Integration Project 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter deals mainly with the challenges that IGAD faces which include political, security, 
economic, social and structural challenges. Notably, regional integration is a multidimensional 
process since besides economic considerations, it involves cultural, social and political aspects. 
Similarly, the success of regional integration depends on a combination of social, cultural, 
economic and political factors. This chapter, therefore, outlines how the conflict in the region 
implicated IGAD’s peace and security agenda to improve the socio-economic lives of citizens 
in the region.  
The first section explores and assesses the challenges facing IGAD by way of considering both 
intra and inter-state conflicts which have become pervasive in the region. The second section 
examines the challenges emerging from multiple membership and the nature of the state in the 
region. Notably, states in this region are weak when considering the criteria for determining 
the weakness-strength of a state. Hence, this section addresses the challenges of regional 
integration of weak states and their implications. Section three engages with IGAD’s multiple 
challenges which combine conflicts, terrorism and piracy associated with increasingly 
troubling developments in the refugee crisis. Following this, this chapter explores the 
challenges posed to regional integration by the lack of sufficient and well-developed 
infrastructures in member states. Finally, the chapter pays attention to the lack of good 
governance which is a neglected dimension in regionalism.  
6.2 Assessment of Challenges facing IGAD: Intra and Inter-state conflicts 
Thonke and Spliid (2012:15) argue, “it is evident that there is a quite large gap between 
ambitions and reality in regional integration in Africa”. The ideology of countries differs from 
one another which might be a colonial legacy as argued by same writers. IGAD has been trying 
to bring about peace and security, on the one hand, and socio-economic collaboration, on the 
other hand. When it comes to peace and security, the importance of state building and capacity 
have not been viewed as imperative to the above major concerns of the region.  The assumption 
has been that once peace and security are brought the other prerogatives will follow. However, 
collaboration in this area is a question of state interest and strong political will. Even though 
126 
 
IGAD adopted many protocols and declarations regarding peace and security, their 
implementation has not been effective  (Gebregeorgis 2013). 
The IGAD region experiences many  challenges  as a result of man-made and  natural disasters 
and has had more than its share of intra and inter-state conflicts some of which have lasted for 
more than four decades (IGAD 2016b). Almost all the IGAD member states have experienced 
civil/conflicts with neighbouring states. The thirty years of long civil war in Northern Ethiopia 
ended in 1991 but the region has barely recovered from this war. For example, the government 
is fighting against the OLF, ONLF and other opposition groups and the state  must deal with 
over nine broad conflicts (Molla 2002). In Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the 
West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) have been engaged in armed opposition to the regime in power. 
The Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and other opposition forces have been operating against the 
Eritrean government. Somalia is still a conflict zone divided by different clans and warlords 
tearing it apart. In Djibouti, the Afar-based Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy 
(FRUD) battles against the government. The Islamic party of Kenya has been engaged in 
subversive activities against the Kenyan government. The situations in Sudan and South Sudan 
are even more troubling with multiple instances of civil strives and wars. It is arguable, 
therefore, that these domestic conflicts negatively impact on the inter-state relations in the 
IGAD sub-region (Molla 2002).  
Mulugeta (2009:37) notes that “the religious culture is under pressure from the tiny to highly 
violent Islamist extremists who aim to establish a Taliban-like regime in the Horn of Africa by 
uniting all Somalis living in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti”. The extreme Islamist 
groups who always  declare allegiance to the global jihad movement are becoming a clear threat 
to peace in Somalia even further complicating regional peace and security strategies (Mulugeta 
2009). The IGAD regional states have a long history of engaging in each other’s internal 
conflicts by supporting oppositional groups. However, it is hardly possible to think of a genuine 
security policy and organised mutual benefit peace strategy. There is an air of uncertainty and 
non-cooperation rather than of peaceful and strengthening partnerships among the states. IGAD 
is, therefore, powerless to develop a common position to effectively deal with the Somali peace 
and security process.  
Intra- and interstate conflicts have also made it very difficult for IGAD to focus on addressing 
the issue of radical Islamism in the region. For example, IGAD has devoted considerable 
energy, time and money dealing with the crisis in Sudan from 1994 to 2005 and from 2011 
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until now (Mulugeta 2009). The direct and indirect involvement of some Arab states also 
undermines IGAD’s ability to deal with ongoing intra- interstate conflicts in the region. 
According to Mulugeta (2009:39), “Al-Shabaab is said to  be receiving financial support and 
weapons from supporters from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Egypt and Libya also face similar 
accusations. Egypt has been repeatedly accused of spoiling the peace initiatives taken or 
endorsed by IGAD”. These states are   well-known for providing financial support to radical 
Muslim groups in the name of voluntary ‘non-profit organizations’ which remains problematic 
for the establishment of peace and security in the IGAD region (Mulugeta 2009). 
Relations between Sudan and Uganda remain fragile largely because of Uganda's support of 
the SPLA and Sudan's links to Ugandan rebel groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF). Sudan’s relations with Eritrea have also been 
marred by repeated border incidents since 1993. The Sudan government has supported Eritrea’s 
opposition groups like the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ). In turn, Eritrea has provided assistance 
to SPLA groups. Sudan has been in conflict with Kenya particularly over the sovereignty of 
territory on the Kenyan side of the Kenyan-Sudan border known as the 'Elemi-triangle' which 
is believed to contain substantial deposits of petroleum. Sudan's relations with its neighbour 
Ethiopia is also characterised by conflict. Ethiopia accuses Sudan for exporting Islamic 
ideology to the region and Sudan's suspicion of Ethiopia’s support to SPLA can be cited as 
examples of conflicts between the two IGAD member countries (Molla, 2002).  
Ethio - Eritrea relations have been marred by conflict and tension, and both states support each 
other’s oppositions, which may exacerbate the already tense security situation in the Horn of 
Africa.31 Despite this, the African Union has “always proved eager to play a profound role  in 
resolving inter-state disputes and has been unwilling to involve itself in civil conflicts within 
states even on occasions when it is within the purview of the African Union policy of conflict 
prevention, management and resolution strategy” (Tekle 1996:11). Most of the conflicts in the 
region end either after a loss of thousands of lives a result peace and security among the 
member states remain fragile. 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 There appears to be a shift over the last few months in the region in this regard, with thawing relations 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. They have also come to an agreement on security, economic and regional 
cooperation.  
128 
 
6.3 Weak States, Multiple Membership and Lack of Super National Authority 
 
The implementation of preferential trade between member states requires advanced and fair 
practices such as the harmonisation of production, marketing and import-export needs to be free 
of bureaucratic procedures plus fair practice of rules and regulations. According to Healy (2011), 
capacity is unevenly distributed in the IGAD region and  is almost non-existent in the most fragile 
countries like Somalia and South Sudan (Healy 2011). Arguably, without a strong sense of 
collective integration, a single state or the involvement of only two states cannot bring IGAD’s 
nations together. Overlapping memberships also become another serious challenges in the 
different regional trade blocks and regional organisations in Africa one way or the other. 
Overlapping membership is a problem for two reasons: firstly, when it becomes a serious 
challenge and constraint in economic and political resources and, secondly, when it leads to 
unnecessary conflicting commitments of member countries. All the IGAD member states 
excluding Somalia are members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African states 
(COMESA). Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan are members of the Arab League, and also, five IGAD 
members Eritrea, Somalia Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti, are additionally members of the 
Community of Sahl-Sahelian states (CEN-SAD) (Gebreglorgis 2013; Healy 2011).The 
implications and consequences of the involvement of IGAD member states into multiple regional 
groupings ranges from low level participation in the meeting to challenges in making  payments 
on budgetary contributions (Molla 2002). It also creates heavy constraints on the integration 
process, which leads to conflicts over mandates and divided loyalty between member states. Such 
challenges cause financial and administrative burdens for the states.   
Moreover, the core reasons for the weak institutionalisation and the weak progress of IGAD are 
poor interstate relations, violent intrastate conflicts, major military conflicts and recurring massive 
humanitarian crises. Additionally, the policy approach for cooperation is very poor and the 
financial and regulatory policy framework for the comprehensive economic integration in the 
IGAD region is weak. It also causes conflicting political commitments and courses of action as 
well as pressurizing states to oppose the objectives of various sub-regional organisations on the 
continent at large.  
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Figure 5.Summary of multiple memberships  
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Source: Adapted from (Union, 2009)  
Global international activity has increased significantly. The regional institutional actors have 
become more interactive and cooperative on the continent. Although regional institutions might 
have similar objectives, regional integration groups choose contradictory routes to achieve 
them. COMESA, for example, has a schedule for tax and tariff reductions, which may not be 
similar to that which the East African Community (EAC) member states will have to fix. 
Deciding on the rules of origin and the list of exceptions has  also  raised difficulties in 
COMESA and different criteria may be arrived at in the EAC region (Goldstein and Ndung’u 
2001). 
Like other economic integration arrangements in Africa, IGAD is an intergovernmental 
organisation devoid of power to enforce decisions over its constituencies. IGAD has a high 
organ that comprises Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministries, a Committee of 
Ambassadors and a Secretariat and the Secretariat that are appointed by the Heads of State and 
Government. This structure could lead to (or create the appearance of) domination of the 
organisation by single heads of states which may result in increased levels of politicisation of 
its programmes and, even worse, create a pattern of a single state-led organisation (Mwendwa, 
2014). In this regard, the follow-up of decisions taken at sub-regional meetings is left to the 
Heads of States or a few ministers and to civil servants in the ministries dealing with 
cooperation matters without the involvement of the rest of the population.  
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In other words, IGAD’s integration in the sub region lacks a strong supranational authority. 
The supreme policy and important decision maker of IGAD is the Assembly which consists of 
Heads of States and Government and decisions are reached by consensus. This allows 
governments to avoid loss of sovereignty through unilateral decisions in the application of 
regional agreements. Most of the IGAD officials are more loyal to their governments than to 
the institution. This has become one of the challenges to effective integration in the sub-region. 
As Mwendwa (2014:95) puts it, “[t]he lack of political will on the parts of the participating 
governments is also reflected on their reluctance to give executive independence to the 
Secretariat in the running and management of the institution”. 
6.4 IGAD’s Multiple Challenges: Conflicts, Refugee Crisis, Terrorism and Piracy 
IGAD’s goal is to “achieve regional cooperation and economic integration through promotion 
of food security, sustainable environmental management, peace and security, intraregional 
trade and development of improved communications infrastructure in the Horn of Africa” 
(IGAD 2016b:3). Almost all the IGAD members are engaged in inter-state conflicts. Above 
all, without peace and security the success of IGAD ultimately relies on peaceful and smooth 
relations among member states. Continuous conflict and tension among the states instead of 
full engagement in the economic development sector, means that the region has been struggling 
to maintain peace and stability.  
Implementing democratic government and state building from the national to the regional level 
becomes a growing concern for the region. There are many small groupings and clans, which 
are not yet accepted and are referred to as tribes and ethnic groups in South Sudan and Somalia 
associated with land are common. In this regards, conflicts occur where communities claim 
ancestral land from the persons displaced because of civil wars (Kodhek 2015). According to 
UNHCR, the “South Sudan situation is the third largest refugee emergency in the world after 
the Syrian crisis and Afghanistan situation and the largest and most complex emergency in 
Africa” (UNHCR 2017:27). Peace and security remains unstable in Somalia as well. Armed 
conflict continues the killing of the civilians, abductions, rape and a general state of 
lawlessness. 
Many of the problems in the IGAD region are caused by the nature of the states and external 
interferences. Currently, all long-lasting and complicated problems in the IGAD region relate 
to an absence of legitimacy either due to dictator governance and intolerance to diversity, or 
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lack of capacity and political will to  govern peacefully (IGAD 2016). Ketema (2013) argues 
that state policies regarding regional institutions are very poor: 
[D]espite the obvious need for a better regional security framework in the Horn of Africa, the 
scope and the effort of the IGAD secretariat to develop an autonomous conflict resolution 
capability will remain limited, and member states will try to use IGAD’s authority to legitimize 
their own regional policies. (Ketema 2013:99)  
 
Somalia and Sudan remain a security challenge for cooperation and integration in the region. 
Notably, domestic conflicts have negative impacts on inter-state relations. We have seen 
countless conflicts and wars between the states. Such conflicts challenge IGAD member 
countries to work together in pursuance of common development goals. Evidently, IGAD 
region, refugees, terrorism and piracy create a large gap between ambitions and realities. The 
region has been the centre of continental instability and humanitarian disaster for more than 
three decades. According to Demeke and Gebru (2014) “states of the region experienced 
authoritarian regimes, which massacred thousands of people. They have also undergone 
through conflicts over ethnic identity, resources and boundary questions in the region” 
(Demeke and Gebru 2014:5). The region has seen much known poor governance and weak 
economic development. Furthermore, the IGAD region is also besieged by drought, massive 
famine and influx of refugees. Among other things, terrorism and extremist groups have posed 
some of the greatest security challenges in the region. 
Particularly, the dominant form of trans-national terrorism in the IGAD region has been 
committed by organisations operating within the region. Al Shabaab has been the major 
terrorist organisation operating and organised within the region. It declared itself as an al-
Qaeda affiliated organisation with the primary objective of establishing an Islamic republic 
state in Somalia (Demeke and Gebru 2014). IGAD acknowledged that land access and peaceful 
economic development have become a serious and continuous concern causing ethnic and 
religious tension. Terrorism is also a major obstacle to establishing peace and enabling 
development. Since the mid-1990s Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Somalia have faced terrorist 
attacks emanating from radical organisations based in Somalia (IGAD 2016a).  
As primary targets of terrorist attacks by Al Shabaab, IGAD member States are at the forefront 
of fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Al Shabaab based in Somalia and its operatives in Kenya, 
Djibouti and Ethiopia, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda and South Sudan have 
victimised nationals of IGAD member states and other countries (IGAD 2016b). It is also 
unfortunate that almost all the IGAD region’s election results have been disputed and have 
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often led to violence and civil unrest.  Political force has become a way of obtaining power and 
has deteriorated the legitimacy of elections and the outcome of results in the region, for 
example, Ethiopia (2005), Kenya (2007), Uganda (2010), and Djibouti (2013) (IGAD, 2016). 
Migration has emerged in the last few years as a critical political and policy challenge for many 
African states as it includes dimensions such as integration, social cohesion, the attraction and 
retention of skills and labour as well as border management. The IGAD region has suffered 
much as a result of border disputes that escalated into wars between countries. Migration is 
thus a cause or consequence of conflicts. Due to the impacts of localised conflicts, there are 
and will continue to be more internally displaced people and refugees in the IGAD region 
(IGAD 2016b). This requires a shift of focus to internal displacement and the influx of refugees 
from the IGAD region to the Middle Eastern countries is expected to drastically increase with 
the increasing demand for low and highly skilled migrants which leads to ‘brain drain’ which 
burdens  the region. Migration challenges IGAD’s sustainable socio-economic development 
objectives. According to IGAD’s assessment of civil conflicts and cross-border wars, the 
region currently hosts 4.6 million internationally displaced persons (IDPs) and 1.8 million 
refugees while also producing 1.9 million refugees. In July 2012, IGAD ministers adopted a 
regional migration policy framework focusing on labour migrants, refugees, IDPs and 
returnees. IGAD (2016a) has established a ‘Regional Migration Coordination Committees’ 
(RMCC) where Directors of Immigration from the IGAD member states hold regular meetings 
to address migration issues among member states.    
South Sudan and Somalia repeatedly feature as a major concern with widespread violations of 
international humanitarian law and a massive humanitarian crisis that civilians face in the Horn 
of Africa. Civilians are at high risk of being killed and injured in indiscriminate attacks by all 
parties to internal armed conflicts and because of generalised violence and collapse of the rule 
of law. For example, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) report (2010), over 200,000 civilians were estimated to have fled their homes in 
Somalia between January and early September 2010, some 1.4 million are currently displaced 
within the country and 68,000 have been registered as newly arrived refugees in neighbouring 
countries in 2010 (UNHCR 2017)32.  
                                                 
32 10 November 2010, Index Number: AFR 01/007/2010 
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According to this UNHCR report, in South Sudan, one in four people are forced to leave and 
the outflows of refugees have become a concern for all international institutions. Notably, “the 
South Sudan situation is the third largest refugee emergency in the world after the Syrian crisis 
and Afghanistan situation and the largest and most complex emergency in Africa” (UNHCR 
2017:34). The institution further outlined that there are more than two million refugees in the 
sub-region in addition to two million South Sudanese who are displaced. Out of the 12 million 
South Sudanese population, a third  has been displaced and more than half of the entire 
population has been affected by the conflict (UNHCR 2017).  
Hosting refugees always has security, political, economic and social implications in the IGAD 
region. Refugees can cause direct or indirect security challenges to the host country. For 
example, Somali refugees who moved in their thousands into Ethiopia and Kenya Al-Itihad 
undertook a series of terrorist attacks in the mid-1990s. According to Mulugeta (2009), 
“currently, the Al-Shabaab is said to be recruiting troops from refugee camps in Kenya and 
there is a growing fear in Nairobi that it could launch terrorist attacks. The threat is also eminent 
in other states, since Al-Shabaab established networks within the Somali Diaspora” (Mulugeta 
2009:13). The presence of Somali refugees in the front-line states – Kenya, Ethiopia and 
Djibouti—is said to have created ethnic militants in the Somali inhabited areas of these states. 
The economic implication of hosting refugees is also high and creates a massive security 
burden in these states (Mulugeta 2009).  
IGAD and the international community are highly concerned about the occurrences of piracy 
off the coast of Somalia. In 2009, 217 ships were attacked by Somali pirates of which forty-
seven were hijacked and 867 crew members were held hostage. This is a dramatic increase as 
compared with 2008, when over 134 incidences had been recorded (Mulugeta 2009:15). This 
shows that in 2009 Somalia was regarded as the country with the highest piracy incidents in 
world records. Somalia accounted for more than half of the 406 piracy incidents that happened 
in 2009 alone. It experienced a marked increase in the number of reported attacks along the 
Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden, which caused significant damage to regional and 
international trade. The piracy attacks in the region also had serious economic implications on 
shipping companies, insurance companies and the stakes were excessively high. However, 
when sailing through the Gulf of Aden, which the insurance companies consider to be a 
typically high-risk zone, the premiums on the ships increase and this has a ripple effect on 
import-export trade and the cost of goods transported through these waterways. A recent study 
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estimates an increase in insurance and transport costs from US$500 to US$20,000 for a voyage 
through the Gulf of Aden. Though the actual use of force by the Somali pirates is modest, the 
human cost of piracy incidents is still a concern for the international community. For example, 
out of the 889 crew members taken hostage in 2008, 815 were taken in Somalia (Mulugeta 
2009:16).  
Piracy can also increase the possibility of environmental degradation and has financial 
implications for the IGAD nations. Pirates indiscriminately fire rocket-propelled grenades to 
capture potential targets. Such violent acts against chemical and oil tankers can result in major 
oil spills and cause environmental damage in the region. The international community 
responded in collaboration with some IGAD member states to the rising threat by deploying 
naval forces along the lengthy coast of Somalia, which is a costly exercise. The presence of 
naval forces temporally subdued piracy activities. Nonetheless, effective maritime security has 
made it difficult to conduct normal operations due to continued instability in Somalia and 
elsewhere (Mulugeta 2009). 
6.5 Poor Communication Infrastructures within Member States  
Due to lack of proper and organised communication and infrastructures the region has been 
struggling with rapid growth and the expansion of market competitiveness among all the 
member states. Transport and communication are implicated because of poor infrastructure, 
roads, railways and airways, which make the effort of integration inefficient and difficult.  Like 
most of the developing countries, the IGAD region remains weak and small (Gebreglorgis, 
2013). Lack of technological advancement and poor infrastructures are the primary challenges 
in Africa especially in the Horn of Africa. Interconnectedness and economic interaction 
through modern technologies is vital for regional integration. Economic advancement in a 
single state thorough communication, railways, IT, roads, plus  advanced infrastructures will 
not bring sustainable and healthy economic integration for the rest of IGAD member states 
(Ketema 2013). However, the Horn of Africa was and still is a troubled region with weak states 
suffering from economic malaise and with environmental, social and political practices that are 
unsustainable. Under such conditions, economic relations and integrating them among all 
member states, have become a continuous challenge. The challenge to effective and 
progressive integration is also reflected in the poor records of intra-trade in the sub-region of 
IGAD. 
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6.6 The Neglected Dimension of Regionalism: Lack of Good Governance  
The region has been experiencing lack of good governance for more than four decades.  
Consolidating democracy and reinforcing good governance remains a challenge on the African 
continent. Political leaders manipulate power for their own interests rather than that of the states 
and this creates ongoing threats to  the future of African socio-political dynamics (Geda and 
Kebret 2008). Corruption, favouritism, nepotism, maladministration and incompetent 
governance are the main problems in the IGADs region. The following are continuous 
challenges:        
(a) Lack of infrastructure, financial and technical resources;  
(b) Poor economic and political governance;  
(c) Lack of institutional capacity to address problems at the grassroots levels;  
(d) High population growth and slow economic growth;  
(e) Poor record of basic human rights. 
   
Some member states have unclear projects when it comes to policy and institutional 
strengthening processes and regional institutions need to do much to accommodate all member 
states equally and fairly. Some member states have a very poor record of maintaining basic 
constitutional and democratic rights like the right to choose leaders freely and fairly. Rigged 
elections have become a norm and following that anger and civil unrest follow. The outcome 
of election results leads to massive clashes and this is also a potential threat to the states and 
the region at large.  
 
The implication of the lack of good governance in the region also results in massive migration 
and further security challenges. In order to work with member states, selective engagement to 
the exclusion of some cannot bring about a sustainable and progressive regional agenda in the 
region. We have seen that most of the IGAD’s member states suffer from rifts between them; 
efforts to act under the umbrella of IGAD are affected by this, as well as the organisation’s 
ability to deal with the wide range of socio-political challenges across member states. For 
instance, Sudan and Eritrea are widely considered to be authoritarian and repressive while 
Uganda is described as a semi-authoritarian regime (Byiers, 2016). Any country which has a 
record of human rights abuse and manipulating the rule of law will not have healthy relations 
with its neighbouring states.      
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6.7 Conclusion  
As discussed in this chapter, IGAD can play a significant role on the continent as well as in 
regional development, cooperation and integration. Its major responsibilities are enhancing 
economic cooperation, promoting environmental protection and food security, promoting 
regional capacity building, promoting infrastructure development and physical integration in 
the region, reducing global challenges and enhancing opportunities to partner with the AU and 
other continental and international institutions. In the past couple of decades, IGAD has made 
some progress in different fields such as infrastructure development, food security and poverty 
reduction, investment attraction, trade exchanges, natural resources management and disaster 
control, capacity building, social development and political stability.  
These practices can strengthen the assumption that RECs can bring about achievements in their 
regions or on the continent. The study identified that intra- and inter-state conflicts, weak states 
and multiple membership, conflicts, refugee crises, terrorism and piracy, low stakeholder 
participation, lack of good governance and poor communication among member states are 
major challenges. All member states must be part of the solution and show practical action for 
permanent change. Transparent and credible elections not only bring peace and progressive 
socio-economic advancement to one state but for the IGAD region at large. Millions of people 
are displaced across the region and beyond. It is argued that unrest and civil war between South 
Sudan and Sudan, the unstable Somalia, the boarder tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea and 
the Islamic radicalism in the Horn of Africa remain ongoing challenges to IGAD.      
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Chapter Seven 
 Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.1 Conclusion  
The study established that IGAD, as one of the RCs and regional integration initiative, crucial 
regional mechanism to ensure regional development, peace and stability. These aspirations are 
reflected in its strategic objectives and activities it has planned to undertake and already is 
undertaking in the region. Its fundamental objectives involve promotion of sustainable 
socioeconomic development, and peace and stability in the sub-region. The driving reason for 
the transformed itself from Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development 
(IGADD) into IGAD in 1996 was to establish a properly constituted RC in this sub-region. In 
its initial years, IGAD had continued to focus on drought and related natural and man-made 
challenges in the region. It started to move into areas that proper RCs are meant to engage in, 
with all the necessary institutional and organisational forms.   
This study has also explored IGAD’s strategic framework and its structure, how it operates, 
and its aims and objectives. IGAD’s four major pillars (namely, Agriculture, Natural Resource 
and Environment; Economic Cooperation, Peace, Security, and Humanitarian Affairs; and 
Integration and Social Development; and Corporate Development Service) outlined with 
indicators of success on the improvement of economic development and peace and security in 
the region.  
Despite the institutional arrangements/structures developed and resources mobilised to meet 
these objectives, IGAD as RC of this sub-region still lags behind its peers. As we have seen, 
complex regional dynamics, conflicts and tensions have dragged this organisation down. The 
inter-state and intra-state conflicts, competition for dominance and influence have often 
creeped into the organisation’s agendas and influencing its activities. This was very much 
apparent in the manner in which the authority sought to intervene in the political crisis of South 
Sudan and Somalia. 
This study also showed that IGAD lacks in its economic integration, which was considered 
very important stepping stone to scaled full integration of region. The political tension and 
competing material interests of states in the region have blinded them from seeing their 
complementarities. The current conditions in the IGAD region are also still framed within geo-
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political and social recognition of Africa, whose conditions are influenced by three factors. 
One, the region’s configurations (e.g. ethnic composition, state formation, border and 
economy) are primarily determined by the legacy and, continued influence, of European 
colonial powers. Two, the emerging powers desire to influence and enhance their footprint in 
the region’s political outcomes and economy is also palpable. Three, state forms in the sub-
region and, their contemporary interactions, are characterised by unrelenting competition and 
confrontation. Combined effects of these directly contributed to continued existence of 
fragmented, small and/or weak states (both politically and materially) in the sub-region. These 
have not much to do with the progressive emergence of nation states.  
Besides this, like the rest of Africa, the Horn of Africa region is constituted of states with weak 
and fragmented market, both locally and regionally. Altering us to the negative consequence 
of this, Hartzenberg (2011:5) points out that, “small domestic markets and continental 
fragmentation translates into lack of scale economies in the production and distribution of 
goods and services”. Despite some promising economic changes in the IGAD region, the 
integration of their economies are still lagging (of course, with some of the members states are 
doing a bit better than others).   
This study, therefore, has demonstrated that the effective regional integration attempt in the 
IGAD sub-region remains far from being successful. This, is manifested mostly by the fact that 
the  deep economic dependency of most of IGAD countries, intra- and -inter-state conflicts, 
poor performance of infrastructure and communications development, lack of political 
commitment on the part of participating good governments, the refugee crisis, terrorism, 
suspicion, and lack of confidence among the member states are still major challenges. 
Maruping (2005) argues that most of “African regional integration history shows that it initially 
starts from political rather than economic or developmental agendas, but has more recently,  
become strategically re-launched with an economic focus” (Maruping 2005:4).  
As the dissertation outlined, critical appraisal of IGAD’s success and failures, opportunities 
and challenges would have to be framed within the political economy of inter-
governmentalism. On one hand, we have looked at how IGAD regional states engagements 
with each other and at the regional level are reflective of the political economic dynamics and 
interests of their respective states. On the other, how these regional inter-governmentalism are 
influenced by global powers – through direct pressure, donation and agenda setting. Thus, 
outcomes of the regional integration initiatives are interconnecting the national, regional and 
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global power dynamics as well as political and economic interests.  We have also seen regional 
grouping at the structural levels reflects how states interact at the domestic levels and the 
international levels and thus becomes a site of struggle for the political and economic elites. In 
this sense, IGAD’s geopolitics is an expression of the behaviour of states in the international 
system.  
This dissertation has assessed not only the historical background of IGAD member states but 
also the overall structure and strategies. The strategic implementation plan of 2016 to 2020 is 
organised along with the four fundamental pillars of IGAD whose aim is to actively enhance 
socio-economic integration in the IGAD region. The various conflicts and security challenges 
in the region are explored by ways of assessing peace and security strategy of the authority. 
Here, in order to serve as a concrete example, this study focused on the IGAD’s, regional and 
global actors’ intervention in the South Sudan and Somalia conflicts. IGAD, the AU, the UN 
and the EU are among the regional, international and global players who have been trying hard 
to bring peace to the region. Thus, the role IGAD assumed in these crisis were coalesced with 
global powers and regional actor’s that sought to determine the outcomes of these process to 
serve their interests. Indeed, thus, IGAD’s main challenges and factors determining the success 
and failures of its initiatives are emanated from dynamism of overlapping the intra-and inter-
state conflicts, and competition and rivalry among states in the Horn of Africa.            
The study concludes that considering that states in the region are weak states with limited size 
of national economy and market, they have no alternative but to work towards pulling their 
resources to build these at a regional level and as sub-regional economy and market. Their low 
level of development are likely to negatively impact the much needed market expansion 
through regionalism. Thus, the potential dynamics of emerging from regional groupings in an 
enlarged market and economies of scale are unlikely to occur if the countries involved are very 
poor and unproductive.  Even though IGAD adopted many protocols and declarations regarding 
peace and security, these have not materialised.  
As we have seen, using the regional economic integration index, economic integration of the 
IGAD region still have a long way to go. Despite the weak overall performance in this, we also 
notice that some member states in IGAD have managed to achieve significant progress in 
coordinating their trade, investment and infrastructural development. However, since these are 
early stages and not fully developed, they are yet to translate into effective integration, which 
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manifests in the free movement of people, goods and capital, plus financial and macroeconomic 
integration in the region. 
This study has established that economic integration in the greater Horn of Africa needs to be 
approached from a variety of angles: cultural, social, economic and political. In this sense, to 
move forward, effective and hegemonic regionalisation is a necessary condition, not only a 
function of political will. Thus, it is not an exercise by political actors and their decisions, but 
rather a broad-based collective understanding and collaboration towards sustainability and 
eradicating socio-economic challenges. Thus, the success of economic integration requires a 
strong combination of cultural, social and political aspects to address a broad and committed 
policy. It is against this backdrop, therefore, that the economic objectives of the integration 
scheme must amicably target all member states in relation to their integrities and common 
interests. In other words, IGAD’s member states need to recognise their complementarities and 
collective strength, and buttress these for common vision of development and prosperity of the 
region.  
Another formidable regional challenge of IGAD has been peace and security. The most 
immediate challenges that may hinder the successful implementation of the IGAD Peace and 
Security Study (IPSS) are the politics of the region (Gebregeorgis 2013). The Horn of Africa, 
an area engulfed by struggles over economic and political power is also marked by ethnic 
conflict and unstable peace and security. Thus, armed conflicts, climate change and famines, 
among other things, have threatened the region in many ways, necessitating practical and 
actionable strategies. IGAD has been acknowledged as one of the most important mechanism 
to tackling such regional challenges. It is in line with these that IGAD developed its regional 
peace and security strategy, with its own policy and programmes of action. Having weighed on 
the various regional security challenges and threats, within this strategy, IGAD has introduced 
CEWARN, IGAD Climate Prediction & Application Centre (ICPAC), and IGAD Capacity 
Building Programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT).  This dissertation has explored and 
examined CEWARN more closely, for it sits at the heart of peace and security strategy of the 
authority. 
IGAD’s core peace and security strategy tools are the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) and the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN).  Both peace 
and security indicators assist regional cooperation and integration through conflict prevention 
and mitigation and early warning responses among member states. It is notable, though, that 
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all the efforts and plans towards achieving  peace and stability are hampered by conflicts in 
South Sudan and instability in Somalia, unresolved border conflict between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, to mention but a few challenges in the region. Thus, this study argued that the nature 
of international and regional interventions and the roles played by internal and external 
institutions may significantly affect the peace and security process. What is troubling in this 
region is the widespread practice of one member state supporting and hosting militant groups 
and opposition parties of another member state to use as leverage for their own agenda rather 
than for the stability of the region at large.   
This study strongly questions the realisation of the Implementation Plan 2016-2020 as expected 
given the fact that only two years are left before its final date. There are hardly signs of visible 
success in the regional cooperation benchmarks set for this plan of action in the areas of 
agriculture and livestock development and food security, regional economic cooperation and 
integration, social development; natural resources management and environment protection, 
maintaining peace and security and IGAD’s corporate development. More broadly, this study 
argues that the funding mechanisms currently operational, sources of funding and the funds 
allocated to IGAD’s programmes reflect the prerogative of funders. Notably, the bulk of 
IGAD’s funding comes from western powers that seek to promote their own interests in the 
region.  
South Sudan and Somali are major challenges to the region and IGAD’s continued efforts 
towards achieving mediation and peace have proved to be a protracted process, straining 
resources and commitments. This directly or indirectly impacts on the entire strategy of 
resolving unemployment, poor infrastructure and lack of transparency among member states, 
and improving the standard of living and sustainable economic growth. This study assessed the 
IGAD-led peace process in South Sudan and has found it unsuccessful so far. The political and 
social implications of the South Sudanese conflict are felt by ordinary South Sudanese through 
displacement, pervasive poverty and famine, and the impacts of war. These factors have to be 
influential and prominent drivers to search for a solution and to reach consensus and lasting 
peace in the country.  Despite the fact that the peace process is still ongoing, the region has 
shown that permanent peace and stability is a long process.                
The principal conclusion of this study is that the implementation of regional integration in the 
Horn of Africa has been mixed with internal politics in each state. However, strategic 
partnerships of African regional integration will strengthen African trade with the rest of the 
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world. Integration at the political level for the IGAD region, however, remains challenging. 
Regionalisation in Africa has become the will of political and economic elites rather than 
collective and grassroots understanding and collaboration towards addressing the complex 
socio-economic challenge of the African people. In the Horn of Africa, as in many other 
developing countries, regional integration is a politically charged subject. IGAD region has a 
dire need for cooperation among all the member states by shifting the focus towards economic 
fronts and matters of trade, investment, joint infrastructural development and tourism.  
The IGAD region often deemed to present excellent trade and investment opportunities for the 
Middle Eastern countries due to the size of its population and natural resources (Maru 2017). 
At the same time, the IGAD region can benefit immensely from development, investment 
partnership in Middle Eastern countries and eventually trade with them, particularly in 
agriculture, skilled labour mobility, livestock and related products, resources, as well as in the 
other areas of cooperation. Yet, regional integration in the greater Horn of Africa is often 
mocked by observers as ‘castles in the air’ that do not result in tangible and progressive results. 
This is especially the perception about economic integration in Africa where regional 
belligerence, civil war, extremism, terrorism, poverty, migration and corruption are  constantly 
observed  (Thonke and Spliid 2012; Girma 2016). Though, it is hard to dismiss these, the story 
from IGAD is not one of a complete despair, and indeed, the regional integration initiatives on 
themselves are a learning process.   
Another fact tainting the image of the region is that the current leaderships of Ethiopia, Uganda, 
Eritrea and Somalia came to power by winning civil wars respectively, and thus strongly 
believe in the importance of force and good strategies (Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2003). The stronger 
political leadership is realised through peaceful means and free and fair elections and when this 
materialises it makes possible the attaining of success of economic and political cooperation. 
Political will plays a pivotal role in the strong and devoted IGAD socio-economic strategies. 
The region spends time and money in search of sustainable peace and security and this may 
indeed eventually bring about peace and security. However, in the short and medium term 
national budgets and economic resources are exhausted without being focused on sustainable 
socio-economic commitments and the eradication of poverty. The study strongly argues that 
fighting unemployment, poverty and inequality remains a continuous challenge in the IGAD 
region. Moreover, establishing a globally competitive industrial sector to sustain the region’s 
economy and allowing a conducive environment for investors is another critical challenge.      
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7.2 Recommendations  
Regional integration has become increasingly interdisciplinary and multi-vocal. The lack of 
commitment around the world collectively or individually speak to burning issues like conflict, 
peace and inequality. While global challenges require unified partnerships, the intimidating 
task is to find ways of interacting and dialoguing effectively across theoretical and practical 
boundaries. Weldesellassie (2011:29) is of the view that IGAD tends “to extend itself as an 
instrument of super-power and donor countries: a risk that questions its true ownership”. 
Therefore, a collective political commitment is necessary to enhance IGAD’s institutional 
commitment. Lack of proper commitment of all the member states is a growing concern and 
presents challenges for the IGAD region. Political leaders in particular need a strong stand and 
strategy for the building up of Eastern Africa and the African continent at large. 
Africa needs strong macro-economic reforms and governance mechanisms, strong 
commitment to improve transport, telecommunications, infrastructure and domestic regulatory 
environments to create a more predictable investment climate (Qobo 2007).  Promoting capital 
inflow and higher investment, improved technology and expanding export markets are key 
ingredients for successful economic regional integration in the Horn of Africa. IGAD needs 
ardent leadership, accountable and responsive institutions to speed up regional integration, 
prosperity and peace in the Eastern Africa region. Political unity and driving the diversity of 
Africa will be the culmination of the integration process resulting not only in  the free 
movement of people and the establishment of strong continental institutions but also in full 
economic integration (ECA 2015). 
According to the African Union Agenda 2063, the role of regional economic communities as 
building blocks for continental integrity and accountable states at all levels and in all spheres, 
plus financing Africa’s  development is fundamental for sustainable growth and socio-
economic development in the Horn of Africa and in the continent at large. Arguably, the 
following areas in IGAD’s policy framework  still need to be addressed: policies and 
institutional capacities, financial resources and budgetary allocations, technical innovation 
capacity, climate change, low investment, information and reliable scientific data, education 
and training and marketing (IGAD 2016a). 
Poor internal political security is regarded as both a driving force and a threat for regional 
integration and cooperation in the Horn of Africa. On the regional level, the mandates of 
IGAD’s peace and security initiatives fall far behind the expected outcome. However, 
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Kritzinger-van Niekerk (2005) suggests that “it is over the past few years, that intra- 
interregional political security has been assuming increasing importance in the regional 
cooperation agendas of RIAs and they are actively institutionalizing their mandates in some 
form or another” (Kritzinger-van Niekerk 2005:10). It is notable that one of the greatest 
opportunities Africa has is its young and growing population which presents the continent with 
a fundamental development opportunity. According to the World Economic Forum on Africa 
Durban, 3-5 May 2017, successful implementation depends on Africa’s shared values and 
identities.  
Therefore, true regional integration is a bottom-up cultural process and not a top -down political 
or technical process (Kanza 2017). The study strongly argues and poses the following two 
questions: does a history of economically and socially deprived Africa has the potential bottom-
up culture of integration and progress? How can one bring about significant integration in 
Africa in the absence of political will and without integrational transitions strategies? Africa 
desperately needs to push forward structural reforms that boost productivity and thus create 
more opportunities. The African Union Commission ‘Agenda 2063’ asserts that an integrated 
continent with rule of law, democracy, human rights, good governance, and justice will further 
the dream of an Africa that is integrated, peaceful and prosperous.  
Here, IGAD needs to take seriously Maruping's (2005:150) suggestion “[r]egional integration 
treaties, protocols, leadership and priorities should be unambiguous in providing binding rules-
based frameworks and results-oriented milestones to guide national, sub-regional and regional 
actions required for envisaged eventual continental integration.” He also points out that these 
have to be accompanied with “[e]ffective monitoring, follow-up and corrective mechanisms 
[…] be put in place and enforced,” and to this end, the regional organisation “should be 
adequately staffed and resourced, with authority to act as necessary” (Maruping 2005:150). 
Recent studies suggest that foreign direct investment, economic integration can  support 
modern technological transfer, innovation and knowledge among African countries, supporting 
advances in productivity and enabling entrepreneurs to achieve sustainable economic 
development on the continent “Agenda 2063”. For instance, it is noted that all the African 
Union member states aim for an Africa in 2063 with “free movement of capital, significant 
increases in investments amongst African countries” (ECA 2016a). The integration process in 
IGAD’s region needs to go beyond ‘regional grouping’. Multi-lateral trade has to be 
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strengthened at continental levels while international trade and the investment sector must play 
a pivotal role for sustainable socio-economic growth in Africa.  
Therefore, meaningful legislative power in the organisation is important in driving integration 
and improved participation of the citizens in the regional integration process. Thus, the AU has 
to step in aggressively to bring about significant progress. IGAD must plan strategic 
implementation of the regional integration agenda in the country and at sectorial levels to roll 
out programmes and also monitor and evaluate the success of its economic integration on the 
continent.        
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